New Council on Foreign Relations paper on remodelling the US military

(And then there is that little matter of paying the mercenaries)

The U.S. Army, built around divisions of ten thousand to fifteen thousand soldiers since World War I, began a radical reform of its organizational structure in 2004 that designates the much smaller “brigade”—with three thousand to five thousand soldiers—as the linchpin of the army’s structure. The reforms, which took on new urgency as the strain of maintaining a large combat force in Iraq grew, reflect the fact that a unit of the size of today’s “Brigade Combat Teams” (BCTs) can bring to bear the destructive power equal to that of a much larger division of decades past. At the end of the reform process—by early 2008—the army will field forty-three BCTs, which operate independently, in comparison to the thirty-three brigades available in 2004, which under the old structure were designed to operate primarily as part of a division.

The new brigades are intended to be “modular,” meaning their smaller battalion- and company-level components can be mixed and matched by the brigade’s commander to suit the particular mission. (This Backgrounder provides a fuller examination of modern military unit structures.) In theory, the new brigades require fewer support troops, making them more self-sufficient and, theoretically, increasing the percentage of forces available to deploy in combat roles. In practice, some experts wonder whether the unforeseen length of the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will blunt the value of some of the reforms.

More Deployable Combat Power

*snip*

Last January, however, under congressional pressure, Gates announced a plan (AP) to increase the active-duty army and Marine Corps end strength from the current authorized level of 547,400 army soldiers and 202,000 marines. In total, the plan adds 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines over the next five years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of this expansion will amount to about $108 billion by 2013. Gordon Adams, former associate director of national security at the Office of Management and Budget, told CongressDaily that these burdens could turn into a budget buster for the Pentagon. “It will do nothing to alleviate force stress in Iraq, unless you assume we are there in large numbers for another three [to] five years,” he said. The army’s Fiscal Year 2008 budget projects major increases in personnel costs beginning in Fiscal Year 2009.

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