IN FULL: ICH article on leaked counterinsurgency manual

File

us-fm-31-20-3.pdf (click to view full file)
us-fm-31-20-3.pdf (alternative address)
Analysis
US Special Forces counterinsurgency manual leaked
Summary

US Army Field Manual FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces; 2004 edition. Made US Army doctrine (policy) on 20 September 1994; 219 printed pages. Written at the sensitive but unclassified level.

This sensitive US military counterinsurgency manual could be critically described as "What we learned about running death squads and propping up corrupt government in Latin America and how to apply it to other places". Its contents are both history defining for Latin America and, given the continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of insurgencies and guerilla movements world wide, history making.

The document, which is official US Special Forces policy, directly advocates training paramilitaries, pervasive surveillance, censorship, press control, restrictions on labor unions & political parties, suspending habeas corpus, warrantless searches, detainment without charge, bribery, employing terrorists, false flag operations, concealing human rights abuses from journalists, and extensive use of "psychological operations" (propaganda) to make these and other "population & resource control" measures palatable.

Verified by Wikileaks editorial board. Since the manual is US Army doctrine there are also public references to the title and tables of content elsewhere.

Selected extracts follow. Note that the manual is 219 pages and contains substantial material throughout. These extracts should merely be considered representative. Emphasis by Wikileaks.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

[...]

Insurgent Strategies.

There are three general strategies of insurgency: foco, mass-oriented, and traditional.

Foco Insurgency.

A foco (Spanish word meaning focus or focal point) is a single, armed cell that emerges from hidden strongholds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. The most famous foco insurgencies were those led by Castro and Che Guevara. The strategy was quite effective in Cuba because the Batista regime was corrupt and incompetent. The distinguishing characteristics of a foco insurgency are The deliberate avoidance of preparatory organizational work. The rationale is based on the premise that most peasants are intimidated by the authorities and will betray any group that cannot defend itself. The development of rural support as demonstrated by the ability of the foco insurgency to strike against the authorities and survive. The absence of any emphasis on the protracted nature of the conflict.

Fidel Castro/Cuba

In 1952, Fidel Castro began his revolutionary movement in Cuba. After an unsuccessful attack of Ft. Moncada, he was imprisoned. Upon release in 1955 he fled to Mexico to train a new group of guerrilla warriors. In 1956, Castro and 82 of his followers returned to Cuba on a yacht. Of this group, only 12 of Castro's followers made their way to the Sierra Maestra mountains. From his remote mountain base, he established a 100to 150-man nucleus. As Castro's organization grew, small unit patrols began hit-and-run type operations. While Castro continued to expand his area of influence, the popularity of the corrupt Batista government waned. In May of 1958, the government launched an attack on the Sierra Maestra stronghold. Castro withdrew deeper into the mountains, while spreading his message on national reform. Batista's continuing repression of the country led to general strikes and continuing growth in popular support for Castro's small cell of revolutionaries. Finally, Batista fled the country on 1 January 1959, and Castro established a junta and became the Prime Minister and President.

Mass-Oriented Insurgency

This insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Mass-oriented insurgencies emphasize creating apolitical and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside, Their political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a well-developed ideology and decide on their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. The distinguishing characteristics of a mass-oriented insurgency are:

Political control by the revolutionary organization, which assures priority of political considerations. Reliance on organized popular support to provide recruits, funds, supplies, and intelligence. Primary areas of activity, especially in early phases, in the remote countryside where the population can be organized and base areas established with little interference from the authorities. Reliance upon guerrilla tactics to carry on the military side of the strategy. These tactics focus on the avoidance of battle, except at times and places of the insurgents choosing, and the employment of stealth and secrecy, ambush, and surprise to overcome the initial imbalance of strength. A phased strategy consisting first of a primarily organizational phase in which the population is prepared for its vital role. In the second phase, armed struggle is launched and the guerrilla force gradually builds up in size and strength, The third phase consists of mobile, more conventional warfare. Conceptually, this third phase is accompanied by a popular uprising that helps overwhelm the regime. It is a concept of protracted war.

Vietnam Conflict.

The Vietnam conflict (1959-1975) is one example of a mass-oriented insurgency. In December 1960, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the National Liberation Front was formed in North Vietnam. Its main goal was to establish shadow governments at all levels in South Vietnam to take control of the population from the South Vietnamese. The National Liberation Front also used propaganda and guerrilla action, expecting the South Vietnamese population to rally to their side and overthrow the government. The insurgency was actually a failure because the mass uprising of the population, envisioned by the communist leaders, never occurred. Relentless guerrilla attacks did serve to weaken the government of South Vietnam, but they did not cause it to fall. In the spring of 1975, North Vietnam launched a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam using armored vehicles. Saigon, the capital city, fell on 30 April.

Traditional Insurgency.

This insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. The insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. They seldom specifically seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society. They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents demands. The concessions the insurgents demand, however, are so great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them.

Huk Rebellion.

The Huk rebellion in the Philippines can be considered a traditional insurgency despite its Communist origin. The Huks first surfaced as an armed force resisting the Japanese occupation of the Second World War. After the war, when other resistance bands disarmed, the Huks did not. After the American liberation, the Huks saw a chance to seize national power at a time when the newly proclaimed Philippine Republic was in obvious distress as a result of a monetary crisis, graft in high office, and mounting peasant unrest. By 1950, the Huks had built a force of 12,800 armed guerrillas with thousands of peasant supporters on central Luzon. They were defeated in a series of actions by the Armed Forces of the Philippines led by Ramon Magsaysa. By 1965, they were nearly extinct, down to 75 members. Largely agrarian, the Huks do not view the government as totally in need of replacement but believe that many of the people in it need to be replaced. Recently the Huk movement has been gaining popular support, once again on the island of Luzon.

[...]

Counterintelligence

[...]

Most of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures to use are
Background investigations and records checks of persons in sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be questionable.
Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and individuals of counterintelligence interest.
Internal security inspections of installations and units.
Control of civilian movement within government-controlled areas.
Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents gaining access to installations or moving freely.
Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
Censorship.

[...]

PSYOP [Psychological Operations] are essential to the success of PRC [Population & Resources Control]. For maximum effectiveness, a strong psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being. PSYOP efforts also try to create a favorable national or local government image and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort.

Control Measures

SF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation] forces in developing and implementing control measures. Among these measures are the following:
Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the insurgent of support and to identify and locate members of his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological Operations] help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their need. The government informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.
Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily suspended. This measure must be taken as a last resort, since it may provide the insurgents with an effective propaganda theme. PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as protected villages or resettlement areas. Registration and pass systems and control of sensitive items (resources control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity that applies to selected groups (labor unions, political groups and the like) are further PRC measures.

[...]

Legal Considerations. All restrictions, controls, and DA measures must be governed by the legality of these methods and their impact on the populace. In countries where government authorities do not have wide latitude in controlling the population, special or emergency legislation must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a form of martial law permitting government forces to search without warrant, to detain without bringing formal charges, and to execute other similar actions.

[...]

Psychological Operations

PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the government side with offers of amnesty and rewards. Motives for surrendering can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has persuasive power.

[...]

Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which a revolutionary movement operates. Frequently, they establish a centralized intelligence processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. Long-range intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an insurgency. For example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the underground movement takes places) are useful in identifying the members of the underground. Information about the underground organization at national, district, and local level is basic in FID [Foreign Internal Defense] and/or IDAD operations. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence personnel must gather information on members of the underground, their movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected underground members, detailed information on their homes, families, education, work history, and associates are important features of short-range intelligence.

Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the enemy. The insurgent's underground cells or infrastructure must be neutralized first because the infrastructure is his main source of tactical intelligence and political control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves two goals: it ensures the government's control of the area, and it cuts off the enemy's main source of intelligence. An intelligence and operations command center (IOCC) is needed at district or province level. This organization becomes the nerve center for operations against the insurgent infrastructure. Information on insurgent infrastructure targets should come from such sources as the national police and other established intelligence nets and agents and individuals (informants).

The highly specialized and sensitive nature of clandestine intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly trained agents. Information from clandestine sources is often highly sensitive and requires tight control to protect the source. However, tactical information upon which a combat response can be taken should be passed to the appropriate tactical level.

The spotting, assessment, and recruitment of an agent is not a haphazard process regardless of the type agent being sought. During the assessment phase, the case officer determines the individual's degree of intelligence, access to target, available or necessary cover, and motivation. He initiates the recruitment and coding action only after he determines the individual has the necessary attributes to fulfill the needs.

All agents are closely observed and those that are not reliable are relieved. A few well-targeted, reliable agents are better and more economical than a large number of poor ones.

A system is needed to evaluate the agents and the information they submit. The maintenance of an agent master dossier (possibly at the SFOD B level) can be useful in evaluating the agent on the value and quality of information he has submitted. The dossier must contain a copy of the agent's source data report and every intelligence report he submitted.

Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, financial rewards) as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must maintain the informant's anonymity and must conceal the transfer of information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.

Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different situations. The basic procedures include mechanical observation (wiretaps or concealed microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical surveillance of subjects.

Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a hasty interrogation takes place to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value. The most frequently used methods for gathering information (map studies and aerial observation), however, are normally unsuccessful. Most PWs cannot read a map. When they are taken on a visual reconnaissance flight, it is usually their first flight and they cannot associate an aerial view with what they saw on the ground.

The most successful interrogation method consists of a map study based on terrain information received from the detainee. The interrogator first asks the detainee what the sun's direction was when he left the base camp. From this information, he can determine a general direction. The interrogator then asks the detainee how long it took him to walk to the point where he was captured. Judging the terrain and the detainee's health, the interrogator can determine a general radius in which the base camp can be found (he can use an overlay for this purpose). He then asks the detainee to identify significant terrain features he saw on each day of his journey, (rivers, open areas, hills, rice paddies, swamps). As the detainee speaks and his memory is jogged, the interrogator finds these terrain features on a current map and gradually plots the detainee's route to finally locate the base camp.

If the interrogator is unable to speak the detainee's language, he interrogates through an interpreter who received a briefing beforehand. A recorder may also assist him. If the interrogator is not familiar with the area, personnel who are familiar with the area brief him before the interrogation and then join the interrogation team. The recorder allows the interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder also lets a knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned without the interrogator interrupting the continuity established during a given sequence. The interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies, keeping pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator have to be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar with the interrogation procedures. His preinterrogation briefings must include information on the detainee's health, the circumstances resulting in his detention, and the specific information required. A successful interrogation is contingent upon continuity and a welltrained interpreter. A tape recorder (or a recorder taking notes) enhances continuity by freeing the interrogator from time-consuming administrative tasks.

[...]

Political Structures. A tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, may be found at the center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the village, district province, and national levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but parallel command channels exist. There are military chains of command and political channels of control. The party ensures complete domination over the military structure using its own parallel organization. It dominates through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters, a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a political military officer.

[...]

Special Intelligence-Gathering Operations

Alternative intelligence-gathering techniques and sources, such as doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and, in some cases, infiltrate guerrilla units to gather information on guerrilla movements and its support infrastructure.

Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to switch allegiance and serve with the security forces. Prospective candidates must be properly screened and then given a choice of serving with the HN [Host Nation] security forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist crimes.

Government security force units and teams of varying size have been used in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces. They have been especially effective in getting information on underground security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team, the selected men should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like authentic underground or guerrilla units. In addition to acquiring valuable information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of their own units.

[...]

After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area, the screening point or center is established. All civilians in the cordoned area will then pass through the screening center to be classified.

National police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist in the police files, a basic registration card and photograph all personnel over the age of 15. They print two copies of each photo- one is pasted to the registration card and the other to the village book (for possible use in later operations and to identify ralliers and informants).

The screening element leader ensures the screeners question relatives, friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable individuals of guerrilla leaders or functionaries operating in the area on their whereabouts, activities, movements, and expected return.

The screening area must include areas where police and military intelligence personnel can privately interview selected individuals. The interrogators try to convince the interviewees that their cooperation will not be detected by the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain types of information and equipment.

[...]

Civilian Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death squads"]

When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages to accept the government's CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating.

To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions that inspire fight-to-the-death emotions in the peasant. The village or town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some faraway irrelevant government.

[...]

Members of the CSDF receive no pay for their civil duties. In most instances, however, they derive certain benefits from voluntary service. These benefits can range from priority of hire for CMO projects to a place at the head of ration lines. In El Salvador, CSDF personnel (they were called civil defense there) were given a U.S.-funded life insurance policy with the wife or next of kin as the beneficiary.If a CSDF member died in the line of duty, the widow or next of kin was ceremoniously paid by an HN official. The HN administered the program and a U.S. advisor who maintained accountability of the funds verified the payment. The HN [Host Nation] exercises administrative and visible control.

Responsiveness and speedy payment are essential in this process since the widow normally does not have a means of support and the psychological effect of the government assisting her in her time of grief impacts on the entire community. These and other benefits offered by or through the HN government are valuable incentives for recruiting and sustaining the CSDF.

[...]

The local CSDF members select their leaders and deputy leaders (CSDF groups and teams) in elections organized by the local authorities. In some cases, the HN [Host Nation] appoints a leader who is a specially selected member of the HN security forces trained to carry out this task. Such appointments occurred in El Salvador where the armed forces have established a formal school to train CSDF commanders. Extreme care and close supervision are required to avoid abuses by CSDF leaders.

[...]

The organization of a CSDF can be similar to that of a combat group. This organization is effective in both rural and urban settings. For example, a basic group, having a strength of 107 members, is broken down into three 35-man elements plus a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each 35-man element is further broken down into three 1 l-man teams and a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each team consists of a team leader, an assistant team leader, and three 3-man cells. This organization can be modified to accommodate the number of citizens available to serve.

[...]

Weapons training for the CSDF personnel is critical. Skill at arms decides the outcome of battle and must be stressed. Of equal importance is the maintenance and care of weapons. CSDF members are taught basic rifle marksmanship with special emphasis on firing from fixed positions and during conditions of limited visibility. Also included in the marksmanship training program are target detection and fire discipline.

Training ammunition is usually allocated to the CSDF on the basis of a specified number of rounds for each authorized weapon. A supporting HN government force or an established CSDF logistic source provides the ammunition to support refresher training.

[...]

Acts of misconduct by HN [Host Nation] personnel

All members of training assistance teams must understand their responsibilities concerning acts of misconduct by HN personnel. Team members receive briefings before deployment on what to do if they encounter or observe such acts. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions lists prohibited acts by parties to the convention. Such acts are-
Violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.
Taking of hostages.
Outrages against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
Passing out sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that affords all the official guarantees that are recog-nized as indispensable by civilized people.
The provisions in the above paragraph represent a level of conduct that the United States expects each foreign country to observe.

If team members encounter prohibited acts they can not stop, they will disengage from the activity, leave the area if possible, and report the incidents immediately to the proper in-country U.S. authorities. The country team will identify proper U.S. authorities during the team's initial briefing. Team members will not discuss such matters with non-U.S. Government authorities such as journalists and civilian contractors.

[...]

Most insurgents' doctrinal and training documents stress the use of pressure-type mines in the more isolated or less populated areas. They prefer using commandtype mines in densely populated areas. These documents stress that when using noncommand-detonated mines, the insurgents use every means to inform the local populace on their location, commensurate with security regulations. In reality, most insurgent groups suffer from various degrees of deficiency in their C2 [Command & Control] systems. Their C2 does not permit them to verify that those elements at the operational level strictly follow directives and orders. In the case of the Frente Farabundo Marti de la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, the individual that emplaces the mine is responsible for its recovery after the engagement. There are problems with this concept. The individual may be killed or the security forces may gain control of the area. Therefore, the recovery of the mine is next to impossible.

[...]

Homemade antipersonnel mines are used extensively in El Salvador, Guatemala and Malaysia. (Eighty percent of all El Salvadoran armed forces casualties in 1986 were due to mines; in 1987, soldiers wounded by mines and booby traps averaged 50 to 60 per month.) The important point to remember is that any homemade mine is the product of the resources available to the insurgent group. Therefore, no two antipersonnel mines may be the same in their configuration and materials. Insurgent groups depend to a great extent on materials discarded or lost by security forces personnel. The insurgents not only use weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades, and demolitions for their original purpose but also in preparing expedient mines and booby traps.

[...]

A series of successful minings carried out by the Viet Cong insurgents on the Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Province, demonstrated their resourcefulness in countering minesweeping tactics. Initially, chain-dragging sweeps took place morning and evening. After several successful mining attacks, it was apparent that they laid the mines after the minesweepers passed. Then, the boats using the river formed into convoys and transited the river with minesweepers 914 meters ahead oft he convoy. Nevertheless, boats of the convoy were successfully mined in mid-channel, indicating that the mines were again laid after the minesweeper had passed, possibly by using sampans. Several sampans were observed crossing or otherwise using the channel between the minesweepers and the convoy. The convoys were then organized so that the minesweepers worked immediately ahead of the convoy. One convoy successfully passed. The next convoy had its minesweepers mined and ambushed close to the river banks.

[...]

Military Advisors

[...]

Psychologically pressuring the HN [Host Nation] counterpart may sometimes be successful.Forms of psychological pressure may range from the obvious to the subtle. The advisor never applies direct threats, pressure, or intimidation on his counterpart Indirect psychological pressure may be applied by taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S. commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart to force the subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological pressure may obtain quick results but may have very negative side effects. The counterpart will feel alienated and possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. Offers of payment in the form of valuables may cause him to become resentful of the obvious control being exerted over him. In short, psychologically pressuring a counterpart is not recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last resort since it may irreparably damage the relationship between the advisor and his counterpart

PSYOP [Psychological Operations] Support for Military Advisors

The introduction of military advisors requires preparing the populace with which the advisors are going to work. Before advisors enter a country, the HN [Host Nation] government carefully explains their introduction and clearly emphasizes the benefits of their presence to the citizens. It must provide a credible justification to minimize the obvious propaganda benefits the insurgents could derive from this action. The country's dissenting elements label our actions, no matter how well-intended, an "imperialistic intervention."

Once advisors are committed, their activities should be exploited. Their successful integration into the HN [Host Nation] society and their respect for local customs and mores, as well as their involvement with CA [Civil Affairs] projects, are constantly brought to light. In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN and the United States.

[...]

PRC [Population & Resources Control] Operations.

Advisors assist their counterparts in developing proper control plans and training programs for PRC measures. They also help coordinate plans and requests for materiel and submit recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of operations. They can be helpful in preparing to initiate control.
Select, organize, and train paramilitary and irregular forces.
Develop PSYOP [Psychological Operations] activities to support PRC operations.
Coordinate activities through an area coordination center (if established).
Establish and refine PRC operations.
Intensify intelligence activities.
Establish and refine coordination and communications with other agencies.
Context
United States
Military or intelligence (ruling)
US Department of Defense
Wikileaks release date

Friday June 13, 2008
Primary language

English
File size in bytes

1259747
File type information

PDF document, version 1.3
Cryptographic identity

SHA256 a22d7058025c14d320f1b389b61185acc2fae7d07709917422346a293789b78e

- Just like in the good ole USA, eh -

INFRAGARD SUGGESTED LINKS

Related Searches

Airport Security Study Alcoholic Anti Anti Semite Anti Semitic Anti Viruses BOOZE BOX Bilge Water Brawny New Bunker Buster Briary Accommodate Bush Budget Would Bring CIA Circuit Court Classmate Couples Ahh Cultural Enclave Rises Cyber Storm DANGER DARPA Dalian China Dana Perino David Shuster Debbie Schlussel Desert Disabled Spy Satellite Threatens Doll Sized Drunk Driving East Germany Enhanced Interrogations Erika Jacobson Esser Ethics FBI FEMA FRINGES Federal Bureau Fox News Fox News Neil Cavuto From Richard Reid GOP GRADE Global Guerrillas Good Year Guantnamo Bay Half Dose Hayden Admits Hillary Rodham Clinton Homeland Security Homeland Security Campus Homemade Bombs Horsesass Org House Republicans Houston Chronicle Human Fear Imjingak Pavilion India Prepares Desert War InfraGard Jeff Topping Jeffrey Gardere Kabul Chronicles Ladies Only Largest Terrorism Loudoun County Luis Alberto Urrea Luke Esser Medea Benjamin Mel Gibson Mercenaries Terrorize Iraq Mexican Troops Mexico City Michael Mukasey Military Potential Missile Defense Radar More Cities More Impunity More Inflatable Military Stuff Much Summary NYC Neil Cavuto Next Stop North Korea PANDORA PERIPHERAL Pentagon Explores Pentagon Looks Toward Space Pentagon Plots Sim Iraq Pioneering Blackwater Protesters Given Police Tech Post Cold War Nuclear Press Secretary Dana Perino Private Stasi Privatized Prisons Propaganda Tests RAP ROOM Record Deficits Reilly Factor Representative Tom Lantos Republican Values Response Drill Riiight One Rouge Boutique SECOND SHEET STUDENT SURVEILLATOPIA Safety Zone Saint Petersburg San Francisco Satellite Spotters Glimpse Secrets Secret Trial Seven Steps South Korean Spy Gear Stephen Colbert Subterranean Earth Supreme Court Susan Falknor TRENCHANT Test Anti Tomato Factory Becomes Marines Tony Fratto Torture Yourself Transgender Issues Transit Top Security Spending Transportation Ahh Trevor Paglen VIEW Virginia Republicans Virtual Fence WAR WORTH War Game Washington GOP Where Soldiers Slept White House YOU YouTube

See also: http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf

InfraGard Backgrounder: on CIPAV

FBI's Sought Approval for Custom Spyware in FISA Court

By Kevin Poulsen February 06, 2008 | 3:27:14 PMCategories: Surveillance

The FBI sought approval to use its CIPAV spyware program from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in terrorism or foreign spying cases, THREAT LEVEL has learned.

Officials processing a Freedom of Information Act request from Wired.com have turned up some 3,000 pages of FBI documents about the CIPAV, according to an FBI FOIA official. They date back to at least 2005. Some 60 - 75 percent of them are internal e-mails. Others are technical documents and legal filings.

Among the legal filings are affidavits submitted by the FBI in other criminal cases, and affidavits submitted to the secretive FISC, a court based in the Justice Department's headquarters that approves surveillance orders and covert entries in cases involving national security, including terrorism probes. The court was created by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

FISC hearings are closed and the decisions secret.

As first reported by Wired.com, the software, called a "computer and internet protocol address verifier," is designed to infiltrate a suspect's computer and collect various information, including the IP address, Ethernet MAC addresses, a list of open TCP and UDP ports, running programs, operating system type and serial number, default browser, the registered user of the operating system and the last visited URL, among other things.

That information is sent covertly to an FBI computer in Quantico, Virginia. The CIPAV then monitors and reports on all the target's internet use, logging every IP address to which the machine connects.

The FBI's use of the technology surfaced in July when Wired discovered an affidavit in an investigation into a series of high school bomb hoaxes in which the bureau traced the culprit using the program.

An FBI spokeswoman then invited Wired to submit a list of questions about the technology, but hasn't gotten back to us.

While the FBI FOIA official did not remark on the quantity or details of the CIPAV affidavits, it's likely the surveillance requests were granted Through the end of 2004, the court approved 18,761 warrants, and rejected only five. It approved 2,072, in 2005, and 2,181 in 2006, rejecting none. Five were withdrawn before a ruling.

In a rare published opinion in 2002, the court accused the FBI and Justice Department of supplying "erroneous information" in more than 75 affidavits.

It's unclear when Wired.com will see the FOIAed documents, and the FISC affidavits will almost certainly be withheld in their entirety.

Click here for our a list of unanswered questions about the FBI's use of spyware.

See Also:

• Appeals Court Clarifies: Government Spyware Not Protected in Ruling
• FBI Spyware: How Does the CIPAV Work?;
• 'Thank You For Your Interest in the FBI'
• FBI's Magic Lantern Revealed
• FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats

Bugged and tracked via your cell phone

author: Henk Ruyssenaars - Ex Scandinavia correspondent e-mail: fpf@chello.nl

People at LM Ericsson in Sweden went on strike three decades ago because they refused to make telephones with build-in bugging software for the dictatorial Stroessner regime in Paraguay. Nowadays people - like in Greece - are killed or 'suicided' if they talk about what really can be done via a cell phone.

IF YOU THINK IT'S DIFFERENT IN YOUR COUNTRY, THINK AGAIN

FPF - Amsterdam/Stockholm - November 27th 2007 - The globally cooperating telephone companies Vodafone and Ericsson got hung up in Greece's phone-tap scandal, because they of course knew everything about the cell phones with build-in software they have been selling for ages. In Greece this was definitely not true: ''Ericsson says it has checked the networks of the three other Greek cellphone-service providers that use its equipment as well as a number of other customers world-wide and hasn't found traces of this type of illegal bugging software." This is crap of course: the bugging and tracking program is nowadays always build-in.

In a statement Vodafone spokesman Ben Padovan said: "As far as Ericsson knows, this is a unique incident. We have never discovered anything like this before or since." And he totally forgot about all the build-in tapping software. He also forgot to mention that he represents Vodafone which since its start cooperates with the Israeli secret service Mossad and affiliated CIA, BND in Germany, SÄPO in Sweden etc. Some experts and politicians say the operation appears to be the work of foreign intelligence agencies, given its sophistication.*

All telephone and other data traffic can be tapped by using the United States's secretive Bad Aibling base in the Bavarian Alps, which houses the American global eavesdropping program dubbed Echelon. [And the 'National Security Agency' successors.] And laws, conventions or normal human decency don't count anymore.*

Investigative journalist Christopher Bollyn wrote about it in the American Free Press:

"The most critical computer and communication networks used by the U.S. government and military are secured by encryption software written by an Israeli "code breaker" tied to an Israeli state-run scientific institution. The National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. intelligence agency with the mandate to protect government and military computer networks and provide secure communications for all branches of the U.S. government uses security software written by an Israeli code breaker whose home office is located at the Weizmann Institute in Israel.*

EVIDENCE OF US COERCION OF IAEA MEMBERS AGAINST IRAQ REVEALED

How it already worked years ago was shown on Sunday March 2, 2003, when The Observer in the UK had a very informative and strongly related article* about how the US junta threatens, twists arms, bullies and in all ways coerces votes using anything - including tapping and blackmailing: "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war". A story which was very well documented:

"Secret document details American plan to bug phones and emails of key Security Council members."

And the article included - and still includes - the secret memos.

''The United States is conducting a secret 'dirty tricks' campaign against UN Security Council delegations in New York as part of its battle to win votes in favour of war against Iraq. Details of the aggressive surveillance operation, which involves interception of the home and office telephones and the emails of UN delegates in New York, are revealed in a document leaked to The Observer. Talk about it: dirty tricks?" it was asked. And we all know this is the rotten way it's done by those who orchestrate the wars and profit from it.*

As more troubling revelations come out of Europe, it may become more difficult to ignore how easily spying programs can be hijacked for illegitimate purposes. The brave soul who pursues this line of inquiry, however, should fear for his or her life. And Vodafone? They declined to comment.

THROWING STONES WHEN LIVING IN A GLASS HOUSE?

The years of illegal spying have given the humanoids - which manage the Bush administration and the US/UK/NATO war machine in these financiers group's fight for might and money - power over the media and the opposition. And they all use cell phones. Quote:

''Journalists and politicians don't want to have their adulterous affairs broadcast over television, or to see their favorite online porn sites revealed in headlines in the local press with their names attached. Only people willing to risk such disclosures can stand up for the country.''

The above was stated by Paul Craig Roberts, whom's credentials include Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration, Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. It is an excerpt from ''My Epiphany'' which I encourage you to read in its entirety - Url. below.) In the Venezuelan news agency VHeadline.com, and written by Chris Herz, there's a good story concerning this:

RED ALERT: UNITED STATES' ESPIONAGE EFFORTS DIRECT SNOOPING ON VENEZUELA!

Washington D.C. based commentarist Chris Herz writes: The British Guardian newspaper reports on a story out of Greece, concerning the suspected wiretapping of government officials in that country by US intelligence interests. This sordid tale lead to the suicide (or murder) of a technician in the Vodafone company which runs the Greek cellular telephone after he discovered and reported illegal activity to his superiors, who apparently were complicitous in this surveillance.

The US press services are now reporting on how techniques of wire-tapping and of the use of cellular phones to track their owners, which were once strictly tools available to counter-espionage agencies, are now being used routinely by police and even private investigators in ordinary criminal or even civil cases. [end excerpt*]

So, wherever you go: as long as you got your cell phone you can be sure it is known where you are.

And 'they' can listen to your conversation and swan song concerning privacy too.

Whether you want it or not.

Don't you feel secure?


HENK RUYSSENAARS


FPF - RELATED:


* RED ALERT: UNITED STATES' ESPIONAGE EFFORTS DIRECT SNOOPING ON VENEZUELA! - You can read the rest here at Url.: http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=77085

*A RELIABLE NEWS AGENCY IN VENEZUELA: VHEADLINE - Url.: http://www.vheadline.com/

* ISRAELIS HOLD KEYS TO NSA AND U.S. GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS - Url.: http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?noframes;read=89717

* ILLEGAL WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING AND THE COWED MEDIA - CONNECTED? - Url.: http://tinyurl.com/pzdtu

* EVIDENCE OF US COERCION OF IAEA MEMBERS AGAINST IRAN REVEALED - Url.: http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?id=234999;article=1110;show_parent=1

* DUTCH TAPPING ROOMS ARE NOT KOSHER - The discussion focusses on the tapping installations for telephony and internet delivered to the government in the last few years by the Israeli company Verint. - Url.: http://archief.fnl.nl/ct-nl/archief2002/ct2002-12/aftappen.htm

* ''KILL SWITCH' OR BUGGING: HOW TO USE ELECTRONICS AGAINST PEOPLE - RATED DOWN BY INDYMEDIA IN ISRAEL - Url.: https://israel.indymedia.org/newswire/display/7685/index.php

* TWO STRANGE DEATHS IN EUROPEAN WIRETAPPING SCANDAL - by Paolo Pontoniere and Jeffrey Klein + FPF-link - Url.: http://www.cemab.be/news/2006/08/1809.php

* VODAFONE, ERICSSON GET HUNG UP IN GREECE'S PHONE-TAP SCANDAL - Url.: http://www.rinf.com/columnists/news/vodafone-ericsson-get-hung-up

* WIRETAPPING, EUROPEAN-STYLE - Think Bush's warrantless NSA surveillance is bad? Wait till you hear what the British government does.- Url.: http://www.slate.com/id/2136147/fr/rss/

* THE WEB: PENTAGON'S PRIVATE INTERNET - Url.: http://www.patrickcrusade.org/PENTAGON_PRIVATE_INTERNET.html

* PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL - THE UK WATCHDOG - Url.: http://www.privacyinternational.org/

* NEW EUROPE - THE EUROPEAN WEEKLY - Url.: http://www.neurope.eu/

* THE STATE OF OUR WORLD IN RELATED LINKS - Url.: http://tinyurl.com/2ncumy

* IT'S DANGEROUS TO BE RIGHT, WHEN YOUR GOVERNMENT IS WRONG. - VOLTAIRE

* MAMARAZZI WEB SITE: FOR ARTISTS - PHOTOGRAPHERS AND OTHER BEAUTY LOVERS - Url.: http://tinyurl.com/2k3ehh

* FPF-COPYRIGHT NOTICE - In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107 - any copyrighted work in this message is distributed by the Foreign Press Foundation under fair use, without profit or payment, to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the information. Url.: http://tinyurl.com/3z3r6

FOREIGN PRESS FOUNDATION
Editor: Henk Ruyssenaars
http://tinyurl.com/2wegpc

F.Y.I. Nothing is as simple as it seems.

If you use Facebook you need to check this out:

http://albumoftheday.com/facebook/

 

This is an excellent video clip of who owns
Facebook and the potential they have to use any
information about you including your credit
rating etc etc etc!!!!!!!

Check out the connections to CIA and information collection and storage. scary stuff
Also look at this from Common  Ground...

http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/lofiversion/index.php/

Common Ground Common Sense 

http://www.commongroundcommonsene.org/forums/lofiversion/index.php/f4.html

Issues that Affect Our Lives


http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/lofiversion/index.php/f7.html

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/lofiversion/index.php/f77.html

Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties Archive

http://www.thecolorofinfinity.com/blog/archives/2005/07/big_brothers_bi.html

http://www.thecolorofinfinity.com/blog/arc...rothers_bi.html


Big Brothers, Big Facebook: Your Orwellian Community

A few days ago I stumbled across a couple
articles mentioning TheFacebook, and a little
start-up capital they happened to get in the sum
of $13 million. The number intrigued me, so I did
a little more research, a little more stumbling,
and found something that even I still have a hard
time accepting. So, here's what I came up with:

(p.s. - I'm hoping that someone from EFF or 
people concerned with privacy rights will take 
notice. This really worries me and a lot of my friends.)

TheFacebook.com, created in February of 2004 by 
21 year old Harvard student Mark Zuckerberg, is a 
student social network now active at more than 
800 campuses, with more than 2.8 million 
registered users. [1]

Among its features, TheFacebook allows a user to upload a picture of 
themselves and can include information about favorite music, books, movies, their 
address, phone number, e-mail, clubs, jobs, educational history, and even political 
affiliations. Facebook is extremely popular, attracting on average 80 percent of a school's 
undergraduate population. However, there are some questions raised regarding privacy
concerns on the site, and when some digging is done to find out who is really
behind the site's management, there are more questions than answers.

The first venture capital money to come into 
TheFacebook, $500,000 worth, came from venture 
capitalist Peter Thiel, founder and former CEO of 
Paypal. [1]

A Stanford graduate and former columnist for the Wall Street Journal, Thiel is 
author of the book "The Diversity Myth," [2] 
which received praises from notable 
neo-conservatives such as William Kristol. [3]
In fact, Thiel is on the board of the radical conservative group
 VanguardPAC. [4]

Further funding came in the form of $12.7 million 
from venture capital firm Accel Partners. Accel's 
manager James Breyer was former chair of the 
National Venture Capital Association (NVAC). [1]

Breyer served on NVAC's board with Gilman Louie, 
CEO of In-Q-Tel, [5] a venture capital firm 
established by the Central Intelligence Agency in 
1999. [6] This firm works in various aspects of 
information technology and intelligence, 
including most notably "nurturing data mining technologies."

Breyer has also served on the board of BBN Technologies, a research and development firm 
known for spearheading the ARPANET, or what we know today as the Internet. [7]
In October of 2004, Dr. Anita Jones climbed on board, becoming a part of a firm packed
with leaders from other areas of Silicon Valley's venture capital community, including
none other than Gilman
Louie. But what is most interesting is Dr. Jones' experience prior to joining BBN.

Jones herself served on the Board of Directors for In-Q-Tel, and was previously the
Director of  Defense Research and Engineering for the U.S. Department of Defense.
Her responsibilities included serving as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense
and overseeing the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

While the nearly $13 million that came from Accel to fund The Facebook
certainly looks suspicious and unfortunately disturbing after reviewing all of this
information, the only problem on the 
surface seems to be the appearance of
some incestuous relationships between the Pentagon, 
the CIA, and these venture capital firms.
But this goes further than just the initial 
appearances. DARPA shot to national fame in 2002 
when John Markoff of the New York Times announced 
the existence of the "Information Awareness 
Office" (IAO). [8] According to Wikipedia, "the 
IAO has the stated mission to gather as much 
information as possible about everyone, in a 
centralized location, for easy perusal by the 
United States government, including (though not 
limited to) Internet activity, credit card 
purchase histories, airline ticket purchases, car 
rentals, medical records, educational 
transcripts, driver's licenses, utility bills, 
tax returns, and any other available data." [9] 
Protests came from civil libertarians on both the 
right and the left who saw the IAO as a new 
Orwellian arm of the United States government. 
After Congress investigated DARPA's project, 
funding was cut off and IAO was essentially dead in the water.

The Information Awareness Office seems to have 
survived some of its original purposes in a 
mutated form, found in today's Facebook. In fact, 
one of IAO's original example technologies 
included "human network analysis and behavior 
model building engines," [10] a surprising echo 
of the social networking mapping that Facebook 
does using SVG visualizations. [11] Add that to 
the information that Facebook collects and 
compare it to the startlingly similar goal of the 
IAO. It appears at first glance that DoD, along 
with the CIA, has managed to circumvent its 
previous Congressionally established limitations 
and find corporate sponsorship for its programs, 
under the thin veil of a useful social network for unwitting college
 students.

And those college students continue to log on to 
TheFacebook, completely unaware of the massive 
affronts to their privacy. The so-called "Privacy 
Policy" [12] of Facebook includes a statement 
saying that they "may share your information with 
third parties, including responsible companies 
with which we have a relationship." It goes on to 
say that, "We may be required to disclose 
customer information pursuant to lawful requests, 
such as subpoenas or court orders, or in 
compliance with applicable laws. Additionally, we 
may share account or other information when we 
believe it is necessary to comply with law or to 
protect our interests or property. This may 
include sharing information with other companies, 
lawyers, agents or government agencies."

Some of the aspects of the privacy policy are 
downright creepy and confusing. This particular 
gem is especially disturbing: "Thefacebook also 
collects information about you from other 
sources, such as newspapers and instant messaging 
services. This information is gathered regardless 
of your use of the Web Site." And there's no 
telling when the privacy policy may change. As of 
when this was written (July 1, 2005), the policy 
was effective as of June 28, 2005.

Who knows where the information they collect 
about these three million college students, 
alumni, and professors is going, or what they 
intend to do with it. The fact that these 
companies and agencies are all so closely 
related, and that The Facebook has almost no 
organizational transparency are all cause for 
concern. Hopefully we can soon uncover the truth.

[1] "Accel Partners Invests In Thefacebook.com"
[Accel.com]


[2] Peter Thiel's book, "The Diversity Myth" [Amazon.com]


[3] Kristol's commentary, as well as others, can be found here:


[4] VanguardPAC Board of Advisors [TheVanguard.org]


[5] In-Q-Tel - About Us [In-Q-Tel.org]


[6] "Jim Breyer of Accel Partners Elected 
Chairman of National Venture Capital Association" [NVCA.org]


[7] General Catalyst Partners :: News - "BBN 
Technologies Appoints Dr. Anita K. Jones to Board of Directors"
(This includes information about BBN's 
involvement in ARPANET, as well as Jones' past with DARPA and In-Q-Tel)
Link

[8] New York Times - "Many Tools Of Big Brother 
Are Now Up And Running" by John Markoff and John 
Schwartz, December 23, 2002, Late Edition - 
Final, Section C, Page 1, Column 2 [NYTimes.com]


[9] Information Awareness Office [Wikipedia.org]
Link

[10] The Internet Archive's archived page of 
DARPA's Information Awareness Office
Link

[11] Thefacebook.com FAQ - Visualizations 
Thefacebook.com]
Link

[12] Thefacebook.com Privacy Policy 
Thefacebook.com]

This is a "lo-fi" version of our main content. To 
view the full version with more information, 
formatting and images, please 
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=34949


Invision Power Board © 2001-2007 
<http://www.invisionpower.com/>Invision Power Services, Inc.

More on the dragonfly surveillance - this time from Australia
(not the US, of course)

http://www.theage.com.au/news/technology/i-spy-a-dragonfly/2007/10/12/1191696133271.html