Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts

November 13, 2010

The Prudent Investor posts brilliant video ..

A Brilliant Explanation of Quantitative Easing i.e. Money Printing



Prudent (Toni Straki) says: Under Bush, Bernanke only blew up the US economy. Under Obama he is on the way to ruin the whole world. And Goldman Sachs collects fees on all transactions.
Worth watching to the last second (h/t John Hempton.)

September 23, 2008

MUST READ !! Webster Tarpley on the Bailout (and the jackals bringing you The Plan hahahaha)

NO To The Paulson-Bernanke
Derivatives Scam Bailout
Bail Out the American People, Not Wall Street!
An Economic Recovery Strategy for Protectionists,
Dirigists, Mercantilists, and Populists

By Webster G. Tarpley
9-23-8

WASHINGTON DC -- The grand theft bailout now being rammed through Congress by Treasury Secretary Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, and other officials of the Bush regime with the help of accomplices Pelosi, Majority Leader Harry Reid, and other parliamentarians is a monstrosity for the ages, combining every hideous feature of monetarism, elitism, oligarchism, and sheer feckless incompetence. It is to all intents and purposes a national suicide note of the United States of America, a contract with the devil that absolutely guarantees irrevocable national decline. For any person of goodwill there can be only one impulse at the present moment, and that is to stop this bailout -- to block it, to sabotage it, to bottle it up, to load it with killer amendments, and to do everything legally possible to stop this insane design from going through.

IF MCCAIN VOTES AGAINST THE BAILOUT, HE WILL WIN THE PRESIDENCY

In political terms, McCain is now running well to the left of Obama on this issue, with a much stronger populist profile. McCain has attacked the outrageous greed and corruption of Wall Street. Obama does not dare attack Wall Street, since these are his masters. Obama, sounding like Milton Friedman, only attacks Washington. Obama has said that he will support whatever Paulson demands. That is not a surprise, since Paulson represents Goldman Sachs, and Obama is a wholly owned property of Goldman Sachs, which is his single biggest source of campaign contributions. Obama is a creature of Brzezinski, Soros, and Rockefeller, and without them he has no existence; Obama is an abject Wall Street puppet, an agent of finance capital. This week, both senators will have to decide how they vote on the odious derivatives bailout. Obama will surely vote in favor of it, since this is what Wall Street demands. If McCain votes against it, he will most probably propel himself into the White House on the model of Give 'Em Hell Harry in 1948. Filthy corrupt Democrats like Schumer are already attacking McCain as the new Huey Long. Huey Long, the Louisiana populist of the 1930s, had many positive features, and we could certainly use a good dose of Huey Long in this country to counteract the elitism, oligarchism, condescension, and arrogant snobbery of foundation operatives like Obama. The bailout is already very unpopular ­ 72% of all voters are opposed to it ­ and it will become more and more hated when it becomes clear that it is also a failure. McCain's course is clear. Will he have the brains and guts to cross Obama's T on this vital issue?

PAULSON OF GOLDMAN SACHS, WOULD-BE FINANCE DICTATOR

Paulson is a ruthless and brutal eco-freak usurer who learned his trade at the Goldman Sachs stock-jobbing operation. He is now the leading member of the committee of public safety which rules in Washington, and which includes Gates, Rice, and Mullen. He now demands the astronomical sum of 700 billion dollars for the bailout of mortgage-backed derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and other poisonous derivatives. Make no mistake -- this is not a bailout of homeowners who are threatened with foreclosure; it is a bailout of the lunatic house of cards which desperate bankers have built on these mortgages using derivatives. The entire crisis is not a crisis of subprime mortgages, it is a crisis of the derivatives bubble which was launched by Wendy Gramm of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and Greenspan of the Fed with the connivance of Robert Rubin of Goldman Sachs and Citibank, and others in the Clinton administration, some 15 years ago.

These derivatives now amount to a total worldwide notional value that can be estimated between 1 quadrillion and two quadrillion US dollars. [!!!!!!!!!!!] This sum is so large that it dwarfs the total value of the entire planet earth and all those who live here. Compared to the cancerous, bloated, and fictitious mass of derivatives which is at the root of this crisis, the $700 billion demanded by politicians, large as this may seem, is nothing but a drop in the bucket. And a drop in the bailout bucket is what it will be. The mass of world derivatives between $1 and $2 quadrillion represents an insatiable black hole which is capable of putting an end, not just to civilization, but the human life itself. The moral choice could not be clearer: humanity will either destroy the derivatives bubble in our time, or the derivatives bubble will surely destroy humanity. Those are the stakes in the current exercise.

Paulson and Bernanke, both lawyers for the Wall Street jackals, lampreys, vultures and hyenas, argue that the public interest demands a bailout of their cronies at Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America, Wachovia, and the other large money center institutions. Before the American public antes up $700 billion just for openers in the game of genocidal poker which run by the infernal croupiers Paulson and Bernanke, we would be very well advised to examine the veracity of this premise.

COMMERCIAL BANKS ARE INDISPENSABLE

It is of course true that the healthy functioning of the United States economy requires a viable and flexible system of commercial banks. No one should doubt the necessity of commercial banks.

Andrew Jackson was clinically insane on this point, and he still has not a few followers around today. But it ought to be clear that without the services of a well developed commercial banking system, it is impossible to organize business activities as essential as payments, deposits, checking, payrolls, and the discounting of short-term commercial paper, bills of exchange, bills of lading, and all the credit instruments that are intimately connected with real productive activity. Without a functioning commercial banking system, the economic heart of the United States would stop beating, as it briefly did at the end of the Hoover administration in March of 1933. Without commercial banks, no wheel of a factory or railroad can turn, and no commodities can move to show up in supermarkets.

JPM, CITI, BoA ARE DERIVATIVES MONSTERS, NOT COMMERCIAL BANKS

But when we look at institutions like J.P. Morgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of America, we become aware that these large money center institutions have become detached from any conceivable connection to the world of production, wages, transportation, and all other useful and productive activities. These institutions are not commercial banks any more in any meaningful sense of the term. Ten years ago, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis and the aftermath of the Russian GKO state bankruptcy collapse, the boss of JP Morgan Chase went on television to announce that his bank was specialized in the "risk business." The risk business meant that JP Morgan Chase, had simply given up on the traditional activity of commercial banks, which was primarily to provide loans to corporations for productive investment in plant and equipment that would also create well-paid industrial jobs. J.P. Morgan Chase decided long ago that that activity was nowhere near profitable enough to be continued.

Instead, J.P. Morgan Chase devoted itself more and more to the issuance, sale, and purchase of derivatives. As early as 1992, the best definition of J.P. Morgan Chase was that it was no longer a commercial bank but rather a derivatives monster. In 2002, the J.P. Morgan Chase derivatives monster came very close to imploding, collapsing in on itself like the hopeless black hole that it still remains to the present day. According to the most recent report of the Comptroller of the Curreny of the US Treasury dated September 30, 2007, JP Morgan Chase today has between $90 trillion and $100 trillion of derivatives. In reality this is a very low-ball estimate, and the real derivatives exposure is some multiple of this figure ­ perhaps $300 or $400 trillion, especially now that Bear Stearns, a smaller black hole of derivatives has been absorbed. But even a mere $90 trillion is already six times the US GDP (currently estimated between $14 and $15 trillion).

DERIVATIVES ARE FINANCIAL AIDS

The question of the derivatives is once again the central issue of the crisis. Most people may not even know what derivatives are, although by now many have some idea that they are dangerous and toxic. French President Jacques Chirac once defined derivatives as financial aids, and he was right. A share of stock supposedly represents part ownership in a corporation. A corporate bond is a debt instrument issued by a corporation, with some claim to a part of the assets in case of bankruptcy liquidation. That means that the stocks and bonds are paper, but paper that is at only one remove from the real world of production, consumption, employment, and wages. The derivative is something radically different.

A derivative represents paper based on paper, no longer a stock or bond, but a future, option, or index that is based on some stock, bond, or other form of paper. Derivatives are therefore at least one step further removed from the world of tangible physical commodity production of useful items which humanity requires in order to survive and to conduct civilization as we know it. In addition to the options, futures, and indices, we have all the possible permutations and combinations of the above, with new variations that are almost infinite. Even to catalogue these would take a book. In addition to these exchange traded derivatives, there is a much larger class of derivative which does not appear on the Chicago Board Options Exchange or analogous institutions in all the money centers of the world. The second and larger class represents the counterparty derivatives, including such things as collateralized debt obligations, mortgage backed securities, structured notes, credit default swaps, and the myriad of other derivative products.

These derivatives were originally supposed to be used as a hedge against risk, but before too long they began to represent the biggest single source of risk and the entire lunatic edifice would finance. By now, to repeat this point yet again, the total world derivatives of in excess of one quadrillion dollars -- that is to say, 1000 billion dollars, and may be already approaching the neighborhood of $1.5 quadrillion or even more. One of the inherent problems of derivatives is that nobody knows this exact figure, since derivatives are not reportable in many countries and tend to escape regulation by the proper financial authorities.

DERIVATIVES ARE USELESS AND A THREAT TO CIVILIZATION

You cannot eat derivatives. You cannot live in a derivative. You cannot wear derivatives as clothing, nor can you drive a derivative work. You cannot sail in them or fly in them. They cannot be used as tools of any useful trade. They are not computers, not machine tools, not pharmaceutical equipment, not agricultural implements.

Derivatives are therefore totally outside the realm of capital goods production needs, no matter how these may be defined.

FOR RECOVERY, WIPE OUT, SHRED, DELETE ALL DERIVATIVES

J.P. Morgan Chase, therefore, performs no useful or productive social function, and there is absolutely no reason in the world why the people of the United States should want to bail out this pernicious and socially destructive institution. It has probably been several decades since J.P. Morgan Chase created a single modern productive job. J.P. Morgan Chase's strategic commitment in favor of the derivatives bubble means essentially that we can easily dispense with most of the functions of this self-styled "bank," really a casino. Instead of being bailed out, J.P. Morgan Chase ought therefore to be seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and put through chapter 11 bankruptcy. In the course of that bankruptcy reorganization, the entire derivatives book of J.P. Morgan Chase must be deleted, shredded, used as a Yule log, or employed to stoke a festive bonfire of the derivatives. The world did much better when there were no derivatives, and will get along just fine without them.

Derivatives were of very dubious legality in general and were illegal in some of their specific forms until the mid-1990s.

INSTRUMENTS MEANS DERIVATIVES

According to Paulson's pact with the devil published in the New York Times on September 20, 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury is supposed to be empowered by Congress to spend $700 billion on mortgage related securities, obligations, and instruments. That last word instruments is the favorite euphemism of television commentators and journalists who want to propose a derivatives bailout without using this word, which has now become to some degree unmentionable and taboo, presumably because of its highly negative connotations left over from the crises of more than a decade ago. Accordingly, one very good killer amendment that ought to be added to this pact with the devil should state that not one penny of taxpayer money should ever be used to finance the purchase of derivatives, no matter how they may be euphemistically referred to.

WHY BUY MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES THAT HAVE NO PRICE BID?

Paulson wants to buy up derivatives. But at what price? Derivatives have no intrinsic value. Like the rasbucknik in the old L'il Abner comic strip, derivatives have negative value, since somebody has to be paid to cart them away. Counterparty derivatives currently have no price, since there is no market where they are trading, and nobody would want to buy them if there were such a market. Collateralized debt obligations were selling at 5 cents on the dollar a few weeks ago, but that was well before the current crisis broke in its full fury. So how will Paulson know how much to pay for the derivatives he wants to purchase? Will he use the discredited Black-Sholes model, which led to the bankruptcy of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund ten years ago? Given all this, the only price which can be assigned to the mass of derivatives is not their notional value, but rather a big fat ZERO. Anything else is stealing from the government.

"INVESTMENT BANKS" DRIVE UP THE PUMP PRICE OF GASOLINE

Let us now leave behind the category of the commercial banks and move on to institutions like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the stock jobbing operations or counting houses that like to call themselves investment banks these days, even though they do not have the status of a commercial bank and are not members of the Federal Reserve. Why should any public money at all be used to prolong the noxious lives of these sociopathic and pernicious institutions? A short examination of what these so-called investment banks do will reveal that there is no public interest in keeping these creatures alive, and that, once again, touch better off without them.

Investment banks used to assist corporations and floating issues of stocks or bonds on the financial markets. Investment banks were supposed to function as the advisers of industrial corporations and other corporations as they sought to raise capital needed for new plant, equipment, and jobs. But today, these functions have virtually disappeared. The investment banks do a certain amount of work in initial public offerings for IPOs of new securities, but these are almost always of a financially speculative nature. The main thing is that investment banks now place bets on certain classes of assets in the hope of turning a purely speculative profit for themselves. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley maintain trading desks and engage in purely speculative trading of assets which they themselves own, and most of the time these assets represent derivatives of one kind or another. In recent times, the most important asset class which Goldman Sachs and MorganStanley have been trading is probably future indices on commodities, especially oil. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley between them have in the past year by various estimates accounted for about half of the speculative activity in the commodities markets of London, New York, and other money centers which brought about the doubling of the per barrel price of oil between July 2007 and July 2008, increasing the cost of gasoline to almost five dollars per gallon.

GOLDMAN SACHS, MORGAN STANLEY CREATE I.C.E. TO FLAY AMERICANS

In a very real sense, American motorists filling their gas tanks at the pump at exorbitant prices have been involuntarily subsidizing the speculative derivatives activity of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. [absolutely true! This is a hidden tax that discriminates against the poor and working class!] How bitterly ironic that the same American motorists should now be taxed in order to permit their tormentors to live on and to continue to mercilessly loot them. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley found that even the very weak regulatory regime maintained here in the United States under the auspices of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission was too onerous for them because it slightly constrained their rapacious quest for speculative profits at the expense of the American people. These two investment banks therefore created a new speculative commodity exchange, the ICE or Intercontinental Exchange located in London, with a regulatory regime is virtually nonexistent. The ICE or Intercontinental Exchange in London is where about half of the world
futures contracts in oil have been trading in recent months.

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, like their now-defunct brethren Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, have also made many speculative investments in the area of mortgage backed securities based on predatory subprime mortgages. The adjustable rate mortgages that underlie these derivatives should have been declared illegal long ago. But now let us imagine what will happen if a hapless victim of these predatory lending practices is forced into foreclosure in the current world economic great depression.

Goldman Sachs will send the bailiff to your door to throw you, your family, and your belongings out on the street, even though you have been taxed to permit Goldman Sachs to continue its sociopathic existence. You will in effect be robbed out of one pocket even as you are being pushed out the door and made homeless by the same institution which has been the beneficiary of your forced charity.

Surely any politician daring to come forward to suggest the public bailout of Goldman Sachs so that it can continue to enforce foreclosures against the American citizens who are paying the bill for the financial excesses of this bandit institution ought to be tarred and feathered and run out of town on a rail. Yet this is exactly what Pelosi, Reid, Dodd, and Frank are proposing to force through the U.S. Congress in the coming week. This represents a new low in public morality.

With Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the situation is slightly different, but the same criteria ought to apply. Fanny and Freddie worked very well during the three decades after the formation of Fannie Mae in 1938 as an agency of the federal government -- a hillbilly cousin of the US treasury, as it used to be called.

Things began to go wrong in 1968 when Fannie Mae was privatized, under the pernicious influence of the doctrines of the monetarist Milton Friedman of the infamous Chicago school of pseudo-economics and obscurantism. Fanny and Freddie have now been placed under the control of conservators, but they ought to be nationalized as part of a permanent state sector of the US economy, and operated as the public utility that they were intended to be. The salaries of their officials ought to be determined by the government-wide GSA schedule. Fannie and Freddie have guaranteed mortgages, and ought to continue to do so. But they have no obligation to guarantee mortgage backed securities or any other form of newfangled derivatives which were never mentioned in their charter.

Accordingly, Fannie and Freddie thought to strip away the mortgage backed securities that have been used to package or bundle the mortgages that they now hold. The mortgages represent a valuable asset for the future, under conditions of economic recovery which we intend to organize. But that extra layer of derivatives paper represents a useless additional tax on the public treasury, which the US government has no obligation to maintain. In short, it is time to separate the socially useful core of actual mortgages representing residential and commercial properties from the harmful and speculative overlay of the mortgage-backed security. By this kind of financial engineering, speculators can receive condign punishment, even as the public treasury is believed of an extra layer useless payment which would only reward speculative crimes.

If anyone should inquire as to the ultimate philosophical causes of the current George Bush world economic depression, the answer is simple: this depression is a direct result of the influence of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school, who are themselves to kind of come down American version of the Viennese school of Friedrich von Hayek. Ludwig von Mises, and other charlatans masquerading as economists. The common denominator of the Chicago school is the Vienna school which is represented by the right-wing anarchist thesis that government is always bad and the private sector, especially speculators, are always good. This absurd thesis is now being consigned to the dustbin of history. Friedman and von Hayek, if they were alive today, would doubtless demand the full fury of the free market the unleashed against the American people. This would lead, not to a recovery, but merely to death on a large scale.

The implications of the Chicago school and the Vienna school under current circumstances are nothing short of genocidal, and even the financiers are hastily dumping the discredited doctrines of Friedman and from Hayek as they rush to get their hands into the public till through bigger and better bailouts in an endless series. There is nothing anywhere in the world left today that might resemble a free market, only an endless list of cartels, trusts, monopolies, oligopolies, duopolies, and other conspiracies in restraint of trade. In fact, there has been nothing even vaguely resembling a free market in most of the world in the past several centuries. What is collapsing today in September 2008 is the delusion that such a thing as a free market might exist in the modern world.

The same negative judgment applies to the lunatic doctrines of Joseph Schumpeter, who preached the madness of creative destruction as a way out of the world economic depression of the 1930s.

Schumpeter's doctrines today are nothing less than a public menace, and persons who demand a deflationary crash of the world economy by preaching the Andrew Mellon formula of liquidating labor, liquidating stocks, liquidating bonds, liquidating real estate, etc., are to be put in a padded cell. This is even worse than Herbert Hoover. It was tried in 1932-33, and it turned out to be a bottomless pit already then, so it does not need to be tried again.

BACK TO THE NEW DEAL: RESTORE THE GLASS-STEAGAL FIREWALL

Scribblers like Friedman and von Hayek were paid by finance oligarchs to wage a relentless war against that heritage of the Franklin D. Roosevelt New Deal, the set of policies which allowed humanity to survive the Great Depression of the 1930s. The current crisis would not have been possible in the present form if the institutional safeguards enacted during the New Deal had been left in place, as they should have been. These safeguards represent permanent features of civilization, and they need to be restored. The best example is the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act under the Clinton administration in 1999. The Glass-Steagall Act was a classic piece of New Deal legislation which established that being a commercial bank and being a stockbroker are mutually exclusive activities that could not be legally combined in the same company.

Commercial banking was one thing, and stock brokerage was something completely separate. Naturally, the greedy financiers and their spokesmen clamored for the repeal of Glass-Steagall, and they finally got their wish. Now less than 10 years later all of the Wall Street banks, seemingly without notable exceptions, are bankrupt and insolvent institutions that cannot not survive without a massive infusion of taxpayer money. We need to restore Glass- Steagal, which will mean among other things that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley will not be eligible to become bank holding companies after all. If you don't like your tax bill next year, you should thank Newt Gingrich and others who made it their business to destroy and roll back the achievements of the New Deal in the name of the despicable ideology of monetarism as preached by Friedman and von Hayek. Newt, by the way, is now calling for an immediate deflationary crash to find out what the real prices of housing might be. This is like doing experiments on your own flesh, and Newt should go to the funny farm.

BACK TO THE NEW DEAL: RESTORE THE UPTICK RULE

Another example is the uptick rule. This New Deal measure meant that it was illegal to sell a stock short if it were continuously in decline. The speculator had to wait until there was an uptick, meaning a trade in which the stock in question increased in price; only then could a short sale be carried out. Another piece of bitter irony inherent in the present crisis is that this uptick rule was abolished by the feckless and incompetent Chairman Cox of the Securities and Exchange Commission at the beginning of last summer, just in time for the explosion of the world credit crisis which has led to the current world economic depression. Incredibly enough, Chairman Cox of the SEC has been unable to pull himself together long enough to permanently re-impose the uptick rule.

Instead, he has drawn up a list of 799 financial institutions and banks whose stock will now be illegal to sell short for at least 10 days, although one suspects that this prohibition will be prolonged indefinitely. This crackpot expedient reveals the true nature of the current monetarist regime. Shorting and destroying General Motors, which actually produces something useful, is fine, but no shorting of JP Morgan Chase, which is a public menace that produces nothing but toxic paper. The long-term roots of the current crisis go back to August 15, 1971, when Nixon, Kissinger, Arthur Burns and George Shultz wantonly destroyed the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency parities, ushering in the new world of financial risk which is now collapsing around us.

NATIONALIZE THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS A BUREAU OF THE TREASURY

The present crisis ought to provide the death warrant for the failed Federal Reserve System. When the Fed was created back under Woodrow Wilson, its Rockefeller and Morgan sponsors promised that the Fed would protect us against all future financial panics. The Fed failed once in 1929-1933, and now it is failing again for a second time. The Fed is worthless as a firewall against depression. We must therefore seize the Fed, audit it, nationalize it, and operate it in the future as a bureau of the US Treasury. From now on, we must go back to the Constitution, meaning that the size of the money supply and short-term interest rates will have to be determined by public laws of the United States, passed by the House and the Senate and signed by the president. Using this method, we can mandate new initial credit issues of $1 to $2 trillion to be used exclusively as low interest (.5% to 1%) and long-term (30 to 40 year maturities) credit for productive purposes only ­ manufacturing, farming, mining, commerce, energy production, infrastructure, and the other things we need. We should stop having the Fed lend money to Citibank at 2% and then having the Treasury borrow that same money back for 4% to 5% in the form of Treasury paper. Nationalize the Fed, and let the Treasury finance itself, cutting out the parasitical middlemen like JP Morgan Chase, Goldman, Citibank, and the rest. The taxpayers will be the big winners.

HOOVER'S RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION WAS A FAILURE

The Paulson-Bernanke $700 billion is roughly comparable (factoring in about 2000% inflation from 1932 to 2008) to the Herbert Hoover Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which started with $2 billion real 1932 dollars, but failed because it tried to prop up insolvent banks and shore up collapsing financial values. Under FDR, the RFC was put under Jesse Jones, who used it to create real plant and equipment with great success. Under Jones, the RFC contributed decisively to US economic recovery by building up the Metals Reserve Company, the Rubber Reserve Company, the Defense Plant Corporation, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the War Damage Corporation, the U.S. Commercial Company, the Rubber Development Corporation, and the Petroleum Reserve Corporation. In other words, the RFC under Jones rebuilt the industrial infrastructure which we have been using down to the present day. Most of these investments represented added physical commodity production.

Today, this could be repeated to produce infrastructure and energy plants for civilian use.

CLEARING THE DECKS FOR WORLD ECONOMIC RECOVERY

It is time to forget about paper and the price of paper, and to concentrate on production ­ securing the tangible physical commodities and hard commodity production which are necessary for human life and civilization. It is impossible to prop up financial values in a panic, and it is foolish to try. To secure a decent future, we must now enact the following measures. Any of these points, all of which seek to defend the general welfare and the public interest, can and should be used as killer amendments to be attached to the current bailout monstrosity as a means of bringing it down.

Stop all foreclosures on homes, farms, businesses, factories, mines, transport systems, for a period of at least five years or for the duration of the present world economic depression, whichever takes longer. If you throw a family out of their home or shut down a family farm, taxicab company, trucking firm, ferry, airline, railroad, or factory of any kind because of debt, you will be on your way to Leavenworth. All politicians now say that we have to keep families in their homes. Excellent! A uniform federal law with real teeth is the way to do it.

Seize bankrupt banks and financial institutions. Put them through Chapter XI bankruptcy, and cancel the hopelessly unpayable parts of their debts, starting with their derivatives book.

Wipe out all derivatives, whether exchange traded or counterparty, without compensation. They have always been illegal. They are now a threat to all of our lives. Not one penny of public money must go to buy derivatives.

Securities transfer tax or Tobin tax on all financial transactions, including stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, etc. This is a sales tax on finance oligarchs who need to start paying their fair share. This will take the life out of the booze for many speculators.

Stop oil, food and commodity speculation with comprehensive re- regulation including position limits, 50 to 100% margin requirements depending on market conditions, and by distinguishing between legitimate hedgers and predatory speculators.

No tax increases on households. Surtax for foundations like the Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Annenberg, and Gates Foundations, who use their funds not for charity but for subversion and divide and conquer social engineering to divide and weaken the American people in defense of the financier interest.

Restore business confidence and credit with new credit issue through the nationalized Federal Reserve, operating under the legal auspices of the US Treasury. Use credit as a public utility. Provide cheap, long-term credit for productive purposes only, not parasitical speculation or financial services.

Institute an absolute guarantee for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, WIC, food stamps, unemployment insurance, and the other remaining elements of the social safety net. No "entitlement reform" under any circumstances. Austerity for bankers, not people. Use the proceeds from the Securities Transfer Tax to replenish the Social Security Trust Fund and preserve the other vital programs through the end of the twenty-first century.

Using New Deal methods, it is possible to stop a depression cold in a single day. We did it before, and we can do it again. Only 28% of the American people now support the monstrous derivatives bailout, with 37% opposed and 35% unsure, according to Rasmussen on Sept. 22. This is an issue powerful enough to crystallize the current party re-alignment in the same way that slavery in the territories did in 1860, or the last depression did in 1932. Within a month, the current empty husks of the gutted Democratic and Republican Parties could collapse, and be replaced by the pro-Wall Street Bailout Party led by Obama and his phalanx of rich elitists and Malthusian fanatics from both parties, and the pro-middle class and pro-worker Anti-Bailout Party with support from right-wing Republicans, libertarians, and working class Democrats. Who will have the brains and guts need to assert leadership over the Anti- Bailout Party? Will it be McCain? Or Hillary Clinton?

Or someone else? We will soon find out.

See also by Tarpley (he's real good on banking and the Federal Reserve):

http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2007/09/surviving_the_c.html

The Paulson-Bernanke Bank Bailout Plan

Will the Cure be Worse Than the Crisis?

by MICHAEL HUDSON

Saturday’s $700 billion junk mortgage bailout is the largest and worst giveaway since a corrupt Congress gave land grants to the railroad barons a century and a half ago. If it goes through, it will shape the coming century by giving finance unprecedented power over debtors – homebuyers, industry, state and local government, and the federal government as well.

But what threatens to be even worse is the government’s move to let the financial sector make even higher, unprecedented gains by working its way out of negative equity to “make taxpayers whole” by repaying the government’s bailout by bleeding the economy at large. anticipating congressional capitulation in this license to engage in predatory credit, the latest Sunday evening surprise is that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s own firm, Goldman Sachs, is to become bank holding company picking up the financial wreckage now that the government is covering the bad loans and investment gambles Wall Street has made.

What Mr. Paulson did not say in his weekend TV interviews, organized as what he hoped would be a series of victory laps. Neither he nor Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke nor any other Wall Street spokesman has acknowledged that the government has helped promote today’s $46 trillion debt bomb. This enormous overhead consists of the product that banks are selling – interest-bearing debt that is being added to real estate, corporate industry and personal income to price the U.S. economy out of world markets.

We have heard nothing about how Wall Street lobbyists have succeeded in killing the financial cops on Wall Street – and done the same with the consumer cops on Main Street. There is no public recognition of the fact that more money in tax cuts went to the top 1% than the bottom 80% combined.

So how much credence should we give the newest proposals for the United States to commit economic suicide by turning over the powers of government in effect to Wall Street? When they talk about “making taxpayers whole,” what really is their game?

At first glance it may sound appealing to taxpayers for banks to be told to use their future earnings to pay back the $700 billion dollars in junk mortgages, bad hedge-fund bets and other gambles that the Treasury promised on September 20 to pick up at face value, no loss incurred. To provide a sense of proportion, this money could have funded the next forty or fifty years of Social Security. It could have funded health care for all Americans. It could have made a big step toward rebuilding the nation’s crumbling infrastructure. But that is another story. For now the major question is just how the banks, insurance companies and financial conglomerates are to raise the money to pay off this bailout.

The last time the government let banks earn their way out of negative equity was in 1980. Interest rates to bank customers topped 20 percent, driving down prices for real estate, stocks and bonds so low that the leading U.S. banks saw their net worth wiped out. Their debts to depositors and bondholders exceeded the collateral they held in their reserves to back these deposit obligations. But as soon as Ronald Reagan led the Republicans back into office, the Federal Reserve began to flood the economy with free credit, driving down the interest rates that banks had to pay. They were allowed to act as a monopoly and keep credit-card interest rates high, at 20 percent, and above 30 percent with penalties, thanks to the fact that America’s high post-Vietnam interest rates led state after state to repeal anti-usury laws to keep credit flowing.

So the banks did “earn their way out of debt.” But if you were a taxpayer who needed to use a credit card, you paid through the nose. The banks earned their way out of debt at your expense. And by the way, if you really did pay an income tax, you probably did not own commercial real estate or significant financial assets. The Internal Revenue Service made commercial real estate and a large swath of finance (at least for the wealthiest investors) income-tax free by generating tax credits that could be applied against income across the board. The capital-gains tax was lowered to a fraction of the income tax, leading investors to pay out whatever income their investments generated as interest on loans to buy property they expected to sell at a markup. And with Alan Greenspan appointed the head the Federal Reserve Board in 1987, the age of asset-price inflation had arrived.

Cities and states vied with each other to slash property taxes, replacing them with income and sales taxes that fall mainly on labor and consumers. The upshot is that wealth has polarized to an unprecedented degree. According to statistics collected by the Congressional Budget Office, the wealthiest 1% now own 57% of the nation’s returns to wealth (interest, dividends and capital gains) and the richest 10% own no less than 77%.

With this background in mind, it looks like the Paulson-Bernanke plan for the Wall Street investment banks and other predatory lenders – and insurers such as A.I.G. – to “earn their way out of debt” will be at the economy’s expense. The bailout is to be achieved by letting Wall Street’s post-Glass-Steagall financial conglomerates charge their customers exorbitant financial charges. As Britain’s Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher put it in her favorite phrase, TINA: There is no alternative. And as Lady Macbeth said, if the deed is to be done, let it be done fast. After all, it is a once-in-a-lifetime chance for every financial institution in America to cash out with a fortune!

For Mr. Paulson this means not giving Congress a chance to represent the public interest in designing the terms of this giant bailout. Sec. 8 of the Treasury plan bans any Congressional review, giving him unprecedented power by: “Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.” Under cover of emergency force majeur conditions, the plan is to take the money and run, preferably without permitting any Congressional debate.

It is bad enough for the government to buy $700 billion of bad bank investments at prices that no private-sector investor has been willing to approach. This itself is an undeserved giveaway to the financial institutions that caused the problem by living recklessly in the short run. But making them – and indeed, helping them – pay back this gift with the aid of favorable tax and deregulatory policies will simply shift the cost off their shoulders onto those of bank depositors, credit-card users, mortgage borrowers and hapless pension-fund contributors to the money managers who have taken most of the current income in the form of commissions, salaries and bonuses to themselves. This will sharply add to the price of doing business in the United States, and specifically to the economy’s debt overhead by the banks making even more predatory loans.

It gets worse. In order for the existing junk mortgages to be “made good,” real estate prices must be raised further above the ability to pay for this year’s five million homeowners in arrears and facing default. Is this a good thing? Is it good to raise access prices for housing even more, forcing new homebuyers to go further into debt than ever before to gain access to housing? Mr. Paulson has directed the Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHA (Federal Housing Authority) to re-inflate the real estate market. They are to pump nearly a trillion dollars into the mortgage market.

Fiscal policy is also to be brought to bear to turn the real estate market around by pressuring cities and states to “help homeowners pay their mortgage debts” by cutting property taxes. The idea is to leave more revenue available for property owners to pay mortgage bankers. Unfortunately, this will oblige cities to make up these cuts by taxing labor and sales, running deeper into debt than they already are, or cutting back their spending on basic infrastructure, education and public services and continue shortchanging their pension funds. This is the price to be exacted to “protect the taxpayer’s interest” by bailing out irresponsible banks. The solution is to let them make even more money by acting in a yet more predatory way.

This is not industrial capitalism; it is asset stripping. The closest analogy I can think of would be to give the Mafia free reign to start a new crime wave “in the taxpayers’ interest” so as to raise enough money to pay its fines to the Justice Department. Imagine how our world would look like if the economy had been turned over to Al Capone as head political capo and to Mafia financial manager Meyer Lansky as Treasury Secretary in the 1930s, with the pyramid schemer Carlo Ponzi heading the Federal Reserve and bank robber Willie Sutton as Attorney General.

The last thing the economy needs is a new real estate bubble. To prevent it, local property taxes need to be raised, not lowered. But this is not the Treasury’s plan. Instead of representing the national interest, it is representing the banking sector whose profits come from making more and bigger loans. This is just the opposite from what a well-run economy needs to recover its growth and competitive power. It needs debt write-downs to what homeowners can pay.

But Mr. Paulson has made it clear that aid for homeowners is not part of the Treasury’s plan. On Sunday, September 21, he resisted suggestions that his program be amended to include further relief for homeowners facing mortgage foreclosures. Because financial markets remain under severe stress, he claimed, there is an urgent need for Congress to act quickly without adding other measures that could slow down passage. “We need this to be clean and to be quick,” he said in an interview on ABC’s “This Week.” He expressed concern that debate over adding all of those proposals would slow the economy down, delaying the rescue effort that is so urgently needed to get financial markets moving again. "The biggest help we can give the American people right now is to stabilize the financial system," Mr. Paulson said.

If you doubt that this is the government’s ideal plan, just look at what it is rejecting. You hear no talk from Mr. Paulson or Mr. Bernanke about bailing out homeowners by writing down their debts to match their ability to pay. This is what economies have done from time immemorial. Instead, the Republicans – along with their allied Wall Street Democrats – have chosen to bail out investors in junk mortgages presently far exceeding the debtor’s ability to pay, and far in excess of the current (or reasonable) market price. The Treasury and Fed have opted to keep fictitious capital claims alive, forgetting the living debtors saddled with exploding adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and toxic “negative amortization” mortgages that keep adding on the interest (and penalties) to the existing above-market balance.

The question to be asked is just how much will the economy’s debt overhead grow, and what will it cost debtors (a.k.a. “taxpayers”)? And how will the economy look when the dust settles?

Economically the act gives a new meaning to the classical concept of circular flow. The traditional textbook meaning has referred to the circulation between producers and consumers, from wage payments by industrial companies to their employees, who use their wages to buy what they produce. This is why Henry Ford famously paid his workers the then-towering $5 a day. This was Say’s law: Income paid for production is finds its counterpart in consumption to maintain equilibrium in a way that enables the economy to keep on growing. The new circular flow runs from the Fed and Treasury to Wall Street in the form of bailouts, and then back to Republicans in Washington in the form of campaign contributions. The money circulates without having to go through the “real” economy of production and consumption at all.

The Treasury Department issued a fact sheet on the proposal on Saturday evening: “Removing troubled assets will begin to restore the strength of our financial system so it can again finance economic growth.” In everyday language the euphemism “removing troubled assets” means buying junk mortgages at way above current market price, as if the banks didn’t know all along that they were junk but hoped to pawn them off on their clients. The problem is that the banks have not been financing growth in the form of tangible capital investment, but have found their quickest profits to lie in a combination of asset stripping and asset-price inflation.

On Sunday a BBC World Service reporter asked me to list three things that the financial sector would like to see. Taking the open-ended question on the highest philosophical plane, I said, first of all, the banks would love to free themselves of all deposit liabilities – simply to keep the money for themselves. That is their objective when they see a client, after all: How much of the client’s earnings and money can they shift into their own pockets. Second, they would like to see politicians elected directly by the amount of money they could raise, thereby doing away with the actual problem of elections. If politics is going to be privatized, this is the way to do it. Rome’s voting system was organized along these lines. Third, the financial sector prefers not to have to report any data at all or pay any taxes. It has lobbied Congress to block collection of statistics, on the premise that what is not seen will not be taxed. And at present, banks and brokerage houses are still screaming to repeal Sarbanes-Oxley bill calling for full and honest accounting. For financial ideologues this is an equivalent watershed dragon to Rowe vs. Wade, now that they have repealed the Glass-Steagall Act that had separated banks from casinos.

Somewhat taken aback by the rawness of these principles, the reporter asked what outcome was most likely. If Congress does what it is supposed to do, there should be quite a showdown. But how unlikely to be achieved is the above scenario? A few hours earlier on Sunday my friend Eric Janszen of itulip.com sent me a note he had received from a fund manager attesting to the lack of care for clients of financial institutions, giving a flavor of the predatory spirit guiding the bailout’s planners and its beneficiaries:

RAIDS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS

This is so important a topic, that it deserves top billing!!! Hidden inside the AIG bailout funding package, surely hastily cobbled together, but carefully enough to include a totally corrupt clause, was a handy dandy clause that permits raids. The conglomerate financial firms are permitted at this point to use private individual brokerage account funds to relieve their own liquidity pressures. This represents unauthorized loans of your stock account assets. So next, if the conglomerate fails, your stock account is part of the bankruptcy process. ...

The actual evidence for legalized stock account raids by the financial firms can be found in recent articles in Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. So this is not a wild claim. The September 14th article on the Wall Street Journal entitled "Wall Street Crisis Hits Stocks" was the first exposure.

The runs on US banks are in progress. See Washington Mutual, where private email messages have been shared by WaMu bank officers. WaMu alone could deplete the entire Federal Deposit Insurance Corp fund for bank deposit coverage. Eventually the FDIC will compete for USGovt federal money for bailouts and nationalizations, which would be funded by the US Govt because they will not let FDIC run dry.

My Kucinich-campaign colleague David Kelley and I agree on how Wall Street’s action plan ideally would work. The Republicans will take the $800 billion of U.S. Treasury securities presently earmarked for the Social Security Administration accounts, and achieve the privatization that Pres. Bush and his backers have been pressing for so hard for the past eight years. Under emergency conditions – today’s 9/21 as the modern analogue to 9/11 just seven years ago (the well-known natural lifespan of locusts) – will swap these Treasury bonds for junk mortgages, at face value of course. Then, a few months from now (after the new president takes office in February, or perhaps a few days before to achieve the usual political clean slate) the government will tell prospective retirees and workers who have been suffering FICA withholding all these years,

“Oops, the government has just lost all your money. Well, that just shows how government planning is the road to serfdom. Next time save yourself by handling your own accounts – or at least choosing whether to consign your forced retirement savings to Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns or kindred predatory money managers. If only we could have done this a few months ago, there would have been no meltdown and Wall Street would have been doing just fine.”

If you are going to take such a step, you of course say you are doing it to “save” the economy. You even proclaim yourself to be a hero. This is how the nation’s newspaper and TV media responded after news of the bailout of AIG and, more to the point, the Wall Street gamblers and derivatives traders whose gains and losses – that is, the ability of trillions of dollars worth of computer-driven trading gambles – to collect their winnings and avoid losses.

Today’s financial markets are well personified in the classic Hollywood westerns. They typically are about towns taken over and run by a banker (“Wall Street” in miniature), for whom a retinue of outlaws and their gangs work (the boys in the back room). The banker runs the town, usually doing business from its biggest building, the local saloon or casino where most of the action occurs. It has a brothel upstairs (the usual Hollywood simile for Congress). The good-hearted prostitute (sometimes the madam) with a heart of gold usually is the movie’s only honest secondary character (a stand-in for one of the bleeding-heart Congressmen on the finance or mortgage-credit committees lisping well-scripted lines promising that all new legislation will benefit homeowners, not predatory mortgage lenders).

There also is a good-hearted investigative newspaper publisher-journalis. He almost always gets killed and his printing press destroyed. (Today his paper is simply bought out by a conglomerate and merged into the pro-Wall Street mass media.) The banker’s gang appoints the sheriff (on today’s larger scale, the Federal Reserve and Justice Department), and also the mayor (who rarely is seen except to sign papers). The sheriff’s job is the same as in today’s world: to evict debtors from homes and properties on which the land-greedy banker is foreclosing. This is the common theme of westerns, after all: They are all about the great American land grab – situated out West so as to protect the identities of the guilty here in the East on Wall Street.

Attentive readers will notice that I have left out of this script the hero. His role is to fight the banker/land grabber and the gang he has brought into town. Wearing a white hat, he rides into town to clean it up, and in the final showdown shoots the head gunslinger (or perhaps the banker himself, who is done for in any event). This is the position that Mr. Paulson portrays himself. But what the audience doesn’t see (at first) is that the bullets he is shooting are merely blanks. It is in fact only a movie after all! The showdown is staged! He works for the banker himself! Goldman Sachs turns itself into a big-fish bank and gobbles up all the little fish in a great financial squeeze.

An alien class of financial mock-heroic poseurs has taken over – land grabbers and banksters of various stripes. Almost unnoticed, an invasion of government snatchers, bank snatchers, money snatchers pretending to be Main Street, pretending to be “the economy” and now claiming to need to be rescued – at the cost of saying goodbye to public finance as we have known it, goodbye to Social Security, to peoples’ hope for upward economic mobility.

It looks like Wall Street will receive government support at Main Street’s expense. This is hardly surprising when you look at who the major campaign contributors are – to both parties. Understandably, Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke are trying to muddy the issue for their financial constituency. Hedge fund traders and kindred banksters have metamorphosized into “the financial system to be saved” and hence “the economy” itself. As if it is necessary to save peoples’ savings deposits and bank accounts by rescuing the casino companies with which the banks have merged – the predatory mortgage brokers, the insurance companies with their fraudulent accounting, the crooked asset-management firms, all of which have merged into conglomerates “too large to fail.” If they are too large, simply un-merge them. Restore Glass-Steagall, which worked for 65 years to prevent this kind of problem from erupting.

The most egregious pretense is that the problem is only temporary, not structural. We are merely “freeing up” the market for new loans. This is precisely the opposite of what the classical economists meant by “free markets.” What America has is a bad debt problem, not a “liquidity” problem. There is no “illiquidity” when people refuse to buy a junk mortgage on a property worth only a fraction of the mortgage’s face value. Many of these bad mortgage loans are fraudulent. The Treasury bailout seeks to make $700 billion of fictitious financial claims “real” – that is, way overvalued as compared to their actual worth(lessness) .

What is reducing real estate and corporate stocks and bonds to junk is the exponential growth in the economy’s debt overhead. Debts that cannot be paid have little market value at any price. The nation must make a choice:

If the government bails out the large financial institutions for having made bad loans – or to be more precise, for not being able to pawn off these bad loans on foreigners or other financial prey in a timely fashion – then the only way in which the government (or other new creditors) can be paid back is by not forgiving the debts owed by strapped homeowners.
This would tighten the debt terms on debtors at the bottom of the food chain – those against whom the bank-sponsored new bankruptcy has been aimed. This is why I deplore the government bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for the junk mortgages it has been packaging from predatory lenders such as Countrywide Financial, Washington Mutual and other deceptive lenders. The wrong parties have been gifted.

I should add that the solution does not lie simply in creating a new regulatory system, much less a single regulatory agency. After all, it was at Wall Street’s command that the Bush Administration installed deregulators in all the key regulatory positions. This meant that regulations didn’t matter at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at the Fed under Alan Greenspan, at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Mr. Cox (after William H. Donaldson resigned when the White House would not let him regulate as much as he thought necessary) or at the Department of Justice under Bush yes-men such as Alberto Gonzales. Politics and people have turned out to be more important than the law. We have seen the Supreme Court scrap the Constitution in the 2000 election – with acquiescence from the Democrats, starting with Mr. Gore’s refusal to contest Florida.

To appoint a single regulator would prevent all other regulators – and law enforcement officers, attorneys general, the SEC and so forth – from enforcing honest financial policies in the event that an incoming president should appoint another Greenspan, Gonzales or other ideological extremist averse to the idea of applying existing regulations and honest laws. Under these conditions “consolidated regulation” would mean a free ride for crooks much like J. Edgar Hoover gave the Mafia under his tenure.

My alternative solutions are as simple as Mr. Paulson’s, but of course are quite different. The public interest does indeed call for maintaining the economy’s basic credit, money-transfer, credit card and depository checking and savings functions. But not under the current venal and predatory management practices. It is this management that has lobbied so hard for deregulation, and whose industry representatives have insisted so strongly to place extremist ideological deregulators into the economy’s major positions. Therefore, the Treasury only should buy junk mortgages at current market price. The losses should be taken in order to re-even out the wealth pyramid that has become so much steeper under the Greenspan-Bernanke ploys. The banks knew full well that these mortgages lacked underlying value. The price of making use of this borrowing facility is to forfeit all equity stock to the government. The Treasury should prohibit any financial institution that sells or swaps securities to the Fed from paying any dividends to shareholders or stock options and bonuses to managers. It also should give the government priority over other creditors. Otherwise, firms that have negative equity will benefit purely at public expense, using the money to pay dividends, bonuses and exorbitant salaries.

Second, we need to restore the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial banks from risk-taking investment banks, mortgage brokers and other financial-sector flotsam and jetsam. Break up the mergers between banks and casino sell-side financial and real estate institutions. Just the opposite is occurring: On Monday, Sept. 22, the financial universe was transformed by the announcement that Mr. Paulson’s Wall Street firm, Goldman Sachs, was transforming itself into a bank holding company. The casinos are to take over the banking system as big fish eat little fish in the present financial emergency. It looks like new giants are emerging, already larger than the government in terms of the magnitude of the debts they have run up – and certainly in their earning power. Indeed, who is to say that extracting interest from the U.S. economy will not emerge as the new form of taxation?

Third, re-write the bankruptcy laws to favor debtors once again, not creditors. This means reversing the current bankruptcy code sponsored by lobbies from the credit-card companies. The interests of the five million mortgage debtors faced with foreclosure and expropriation this year should rightly be placed above the interest (literally) of predatory creditors.

Fourth, sharply increase property taxes, shifting them back off labor and sales. We need to return to the classical idea of taxing unearned and unproductive income instead of adding to the price of labor and industry. What has been freed from the tax collector by the shift of taxes off property has not lowered the cost of housing and other real estate, or corporate costs of doing business. The income “freed” has ended up being paid to the banks as interest. The government still has had to raise money – but in the form of taxes that fall on labor’s wages and industry’s profits. So labor and industry now pay twice for what they formerly paid only once. They still pay the same overall amount of taxes, but also pay an equivalent amount of interest. The financial system is crowding out the government.

In the fifth place, we need to start discussing whether we really need a banking system that behaves in the way the present one does. In recent decades banks have made loans mainly to inflate asset prices by loading real estate and industry with interest-bearing debt. What if all banks were to be organized along the lines of savings banks, with 100% reserves. This is the Chicago Plan from the 1930s (currently revived by the American Monetary Institute, which holds its annual meeting this week in Chicago, by the way). This at least would go back to basics to provide a foundation from which to re-begin to discuss just what kind of credit the economy needs and what would be the best terms on which to structure financial markets.

Any solution does indeed need to be radical. But it can be much less radical than Mr. Paulson’s power grab for his Morgan Stanley firm and the rest of Wall Street in the closing days of the Bush administration just before the Republicans look like losing power. The indicated solution is to reverse predatory finance, not bail it out at permanent taxpayer expense. Government funds are not unlimited. Is it worth wiping out hopes for Social Security and public health care, for renewed national infrastructure spending and industrial restructuring in order to bail out a banking and financial system that has not contributed to economic growth but has weighed it down with reckless debt regardless of the economy’s ability to pay?

Is it right to blame the five million homeowners now in arrears and facing foreclosure, but rewarding the irresponsible bankers and outright fraudulent institutions who have used Enron accounting to make a once-in-a-lifetime rip-off? That is what Mr. Paulson would do in insisting that Congress pass his legislation without taking time to discuss the issue and above all without “assigning blame.” But without such assignation, how do we know where to go from the current mess caused by financial deregulation, repeal of Glass-Steagall, the financial system’s Enron-style accounting and predatory mortgage lending?

Before leaving from his post as Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan’s speeches sounded like “Apres moi, le deluge.” We are living in a world whose economic and political pressures are much like those in the interregnum between Louis XIV and the French Revolution. Where are the revolutionists today?

Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist specializing in the balance of payments and real estate at the Chase Manhattan Bank (now JPMorgan Chase & Co.), Arthur Anderson, and later at the Hudson Institute (no relation). In 1990 he helped established the world’s first sovereign debt fund for Scudder Stevens & Clark. Dr. Hudson was Dennis Kucinich’s Chief Economic Advisor in the recent Democratic primary presidential campaign, and has advised the U.S., Canadian, Mexican and Latvian governments, as well as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). A Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) He can be reached via his website, mh@michael-hudson. com


August 03, 2008

Privatizing resources seen as "solution": Global Research.ca

Roads, airports on the block as budgets tighten

Fri Aug 1, 2008 12:37pm EDT

By Jonathan Stempel

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Cash-strapped U.S. state and city governments are likely to sell or lease more highways, bridges, airports and other assets to investors desperate for stable returns after being frazzled by the credit crisis.

The trend is set to pick up speed given worsening budget deficits in state capitals and city halls nationwide.

It will also be welcomed by Wall Street bankers hoping to help create and market so-called "infrastructure" transactions at a time many debt markets remain paralyzed, and after major U.S. stock indexes fell into bear market territory.

"When you are nervous about everything else, you put your money in a toll road,"
said John Schmidt, a partner at the law firm Mayer Brown LLP in Chicago.
"That's the logic of infrastructure. Returns are stable and predictable. You won't get fabulously rich, but you'll get stable cash flow."

The latest enthusiasm for at least partially privatizing infrastructure assets came on July 30 from New York Gov. David Paterson, who is trying to plug a budget deficit caused in part by lower tax revenue as Wall Street retrenches.

"We're just looking at ways to be more efficient and that's why I used the term public-private partnerships -- trying to find some creative solutions,"

Paterson said.

"The reason I'm avoiding taxes is because I think taxes are addictive."

Bankers and others in the industry say there is pent-up demand from dedicated infrastructure funds and public pension funds to invest in hard assets -- perhaps $75 billion to $150 billion of equity capital -- but not enough supply.

"Economic conditions are tough, and are going to be very harsh on the performance of state budgets in 2008 and 2009," said Greg Carey, co-head of infrastructure banking at Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz). "States are looking for long-term solutions in running businesses. A public-private partnership is a tool in their toolboxes."

A high-water mark came in May, when a group led by Spain's Abertis Infraestructuras SA (ABE.MC: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Citigroup Inc (C.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) agreed to pay $12.8 billion to lease the Pennsylvania Turnpike for 75 years. The total could reach $18.3 billion, including promised improvements. Legislators must approve the lease.

Other transactions have included the $1.8 billion lease of the Chicago Skyway toll road bridge in 2005, and a $3.8 billion lease of the Indiana Toll Road the next year. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley is preparing to lease Midway Airport this year.

For Wall Street, infrastructure can be a bright spot at a time of deep job cuts and expected declines in bonuses.

"We've seen an unprecedented number of headhunters recruiting for positions on the buy and sell sides," said Rob Collins, head of Americas infrastructure banking at Morgan Stanley (MS.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz). "Infrastructure investing can be counter-cyclical to economic trends."

John Ma, the other Goldman infrastructure chief, added: "We're very committed to this space. Our business activity has increased dramatically, even this year."

ALTERNATIVE TO TAX HIKES

According to the nonprofit Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 29 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia may face a combined $48 billion of budget deficits in fiscal 2009.

But politicians might be loathe to cut spending or raise taxes at a time mortgage debt, $4-a-gallon gas and rising food prices leave consumers -- of whom many vote -- dispirited. Tapping public debt markets might also be too costly.

Meanwhile the American Society of Civil Engineers estimates $1.6 trillion is needed over five years to raise the often aged U.S. infrastructure to "good" condition.

Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell in July called for the United States to establish a capital budget to pay for such repairs. It was a year ago August 1 that the Interstate 35W bridge in Minneapolis plunged into the Mississippi River, killing 13.

Critics say some infrastructure transactions are short-term budget fixes that deprive governments of steady cash streams from taxpayer-funded assets. There is also the risk that private operators won't do their jobs well.

Advocates of privatization say entities might do better managing assets than a government answering to voters.

Politicians could also get a boost if they can take credit for reinvesting sale or lease proceeds in needed projects.

"The argument for a public-private partnership is the private sector is a lot smarter about paying attention to costs, and because it has skin in the game will be more attentive to maintaining an asset over its life," said Joseph Giglio, a privatization expert and professor at Northeastern University's College of Business Administration in Boston.

"Elected officials often shortchange funding of maintenance because they don't want to increase user fees or taxes to pay for it," Giglio added. "Their election cycle is four years. They can pass it on to someone else's watch."

Collins, who also advised Pennsylvania on the turnpike, said infrastructure can also go beyond roads and airports. He said Morgan Stanley is advising Akron, Ohio, on exploring the leasing of its wastewater system, and Indiana on the possibility of private management for its state lottery.

"Lotteries have infrastructure characteristics in that they have stable cash flows and high barriers to entry," he said. "They could even attract private equity investment because they are self-financeable and require minimal capital expenses."

BIG NAMES

At Goldman, Carey and Ma replaced Mark Florian, who is moving to First Reserve Corp, a private equity firm specializing in energy, a person close to the matter said.

Goldman itself raised a $6.5 billion infrastructure fund in 2006, and is reportedly trying to raise a $7.5 billion fund.

Morgan Stanley raised a $4 billion fund in May. Global Infrastructure Partners, a joint venture between Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN.VX: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and General Electric Co (GE.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), raised a $5.6 billion fund the same month. Private equity firm Carlyle Group CYL.UL last year raised a $1.15 billion fund.

And Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co KKR.UL, which is preparing to go public, in May lured George Bilicic from Lazard Ltd (LAZ.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), where he led power, energy and infrastructure efforts worldwide, to run its own infrastructure investments.

Two of the largest specialists in the area are Australian: Macquarie Group Ltd (MQG.AX: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Babcock & Brown Ltd (BNB.AX: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz).

Schmidt, the Mayer Brown partner, said if the Midway transaction succeeds, other airports could also go private, perhaps leading to "lower and more predictable landing fees and terminal rentals for airlines, which certainly aren't flush."

That, he said, could bring the value of roads, bridges and airports that could be privatized to half a trillion dollars.

(Additional reporting by Joan Gralla in New York and Elizabeth Flood Morrow in Albany, New York, editing by Dave Zimmerman)


July 07, 2008

Banking Dossier: Collapse of Bear Stern story

Bringing Down Bear Stearns

On Monday, March 10, the rumor started: Bear Stearns was having liquidity problems. In fact, the maverick investment bank had around $18 billion in cash reserves. But soon the speculation created its own reality, and the race was on to keep Bear’s crisis from ravaging Wall Street. With the blow-by-blow from insiders, Bryan Burrough follows the players—Bear’s stunned executives, trigger-happy reporters at CNBC, a nervous Fed, a shadowy group of short-sellers—in what some believe was the greatest financial scandal in history.

by Bryan Burrough

August 2008

On Monday, March 10, Wall Street was tense, as it had been for months. The mortgage market had crashed; major companies like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch had written off billions of dollars in bad loans. In what the economists called a “credit crisis,” the big banks were so spooked they had all but stopped lending money, a trend which, if it continued, would spell disaster on 21st-century Wall Street, where trading firms routinely borrow as much as 50 times the cash in their accounts to trade complex financial instruments such as derivatives.

Still, as he drove in from his Connecticut home to the glass-sheathed Midtown Manhattan headquarters of Bear Stearns, Sam Molinaro wasn’t expecting trouble. Molinaro, 50, Bear’s popular chief financial officer, thought he could spot the first rays of daylight at the end of nine solid months of nonstop crisis. The nation’s fifth-largest investment bank, known for its notoriously freewheeling—some would say maverick—culture, Bear had pledged to fork over more than $3 billion the previous summer to bail out one of its two hedge funds that had bet heavily on subprime loans. At the time, rumors flew it would go bankrupt. Bear’s swashbuckling C.E.O., 74-year-old Jimmy Cayne, pilloried as a detached figure who played bridge and rounds of golf while his firm was in crisis, had been ousted in January. His replacement, an easygoing 58-year-old investment banker named Alan Schwartz, was down at the Breakers resort in Palm Beach that morning, rubbing elbows with News Corp.’s Rupert Murdoch and Viacom’s Sumner Redstone at Bear’s annual media conference.

It was an uneventful morning—at first. Molinaro sat in his sixth-floor corner office, overlooking Madison Avenue, catching up on paperwork after a week-long trip visiting European investors. Then, around 11, something happened. Exactly what, no one knows to this day. But Bear’s stock began to fall. It was then, questioning his trading desks downstairs, that Molinaro first heard the rumor: Bear was having liquidity troubles, Wall Street’s way of saying the firm was running out of money. Molinaro made a face. This was crazy. There was no liquidity problem. Bear had about $18 billion in cash reserves.

Yet the whiff of gossip Molinaro heard that morning was the first tiny ripple in what within hours would grow into a tidal wave of rumor and speculation that would crash down upon Bear Stearns and, in the span of one fateful week, destroy a firm that had thrived on Wall Street since its founding, in 1923.

The fall of Bear Stearns wasn’t just another financial collapse. There has never been anything on Wall Street to compare to it: a “run” on a major investment bank, caused in large part not by a criminal indictment or some mammoth quarterly loss but by rumor and innuendo that, as best one can tell, had little basis in fact. Bear had endured more than its share of self-inflicted wounds in the previous year, but there was no reason it had to die that week in March.

What happened? Was it death by natural causes, or was it, as some suspect, murder? More than a few veteran Wall Streeters believe an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission will uncover evidence that Bear was the victim of a gigantic “bear raid”—that is, a malicious attack brought by so-called short-sellers, the vultures of Wall Street, who make bets that a firm’s stock will go down. It’s a surprisingly difficult theory to prove, and nothing short of government subpoenas is likely to do it. Faced with a thicket of lawsuits and federal investigations, not a soul in Bear’s boardroom will speak for the record, but on background, a few are finally ready to name names.

“I don’t know of any firm, no matter the capital, that could have withstood that kind of bombardment by the shorts,” says a vice-chairman of another major investment bank. “This was not about capital. It was about people losing confidence, spurred on by rumors fueled by people who had an interest in the fall of Bear Stearns.”

He pauses to let the idea sink in. “If I had to pick the biggest financial crime ever perpetuated,” he concludes, “I would say, ‘Bear Stearns.”’

At Phi Kappa Wall Street, most of the frat boys are instantly recognizable. There’s the big, backslapping Irishman, Merrill Lynch, the humorless grind, Goldman Sachs, and the straitlaced rich kid, Morgan Stanley. And then, off in the corner, wearing its beat-up leather jacket and nursing a cigarette, was the tough-guy loner, scrawny Bear Stearns, who disdained secret handshakes and towel snapping in favor of an extended middle finger toward pretty much everyone. Bear was bridge-and-tunnel and proud of it. Since the days when the Goldmans and Morgans cared mostly about hiring young men from the best families and schools, “the Bear,” as old-timers still call it, cared about one thing and one thing only: making money. Brooklyn, Queens, or Poughkeepsie; City College, Hofstra, or Ohio State; Jew or Gentile—it didn’t matter where you came from; if you could make money on the trading floor, Bear Stearns was the place for you. Its longtime chairman Alan “Ace” Greenberg even coined a name for his motley hires: P.S.D.’s, for poor, smart, and a deep desire to get rich.

Bear Stearns was an investment bank, but the traditional banking roles, such as advising on corporate mergers and trading stocks, were always an afterthought there. What the P.S.D.’s at Bear Stearns did best was trade bonds. The firm’s executive history was the story of three bond traders, each with his own outsize personality. From the mid-1930s till the late 1970s, Bear was the province of Salim “Cy” Lewis, the cantankerous Wall Street legend who forged a cutthroat culture run less as a modern corporation than as a series of squabbling fiefdoms, each vying for his approval. Ace Greenberg, an avuncular sort who kept his desk on the trading floor and answered his own phone, took over after Lewis’s death, in 1978, and while his edges were softer, Bear remained a Mametesque pressure cooker where top traders could pull down $10 million a year while runners-up were tossed into the alley.

The third man, the one who oversaw Bear’s demise after nudging Greenberg aside in 1993, was his longtime protégé, Jimmy Cayne. Cayne was a cigar-chomping kid from Chicago’s South Side, who in his early years sold scrap metal for his father-in-law. After a divorce, he found himself driving a New York taxi while pursuing his beloved pastime, playing bridge. It was at a bridge table, in fact, that Greenberg, himself an ardent player, met Cayne and lured him to Bear Stearns. “If you can sell scrap metal,” Bear lore quotes Greenberg telling Cayne, “you can sell bonds.” Cayne found his life’s calling on the trading floor, earning his bones by moving huge numbers of New York municipal bonds during the city’s financial crisis of the 1970s. He became the embodiment of Bear Stearns, a go-it-alone maverick who hunkered down in his smoke-filled sixth-floor office, not giving a rat’s ass what Wall Street thought so long as Bear made money. When an early hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, collapsed in 1998, losing $4.6 billion and triggering fears of a global financial meltdown, Cayne famously refused to join the syndicate of Wall Street firms that bailed it out. Instead, while much of the Street reaped billions trading stocks during the booming 1990s, Cayne kept Bear focused on bonds and the grimier corners of Wall Street plumbing, clearing trades for just about anyone, however notorious their reputation.

Through it all, Bear remained proudly independent, refusing to sell out to larger firms. Cayne listened to lots of offers, especially after his pal Don Marron sold rival PaineWebber to U.B.S. for $12 billion, in 2000, but Cayne preferred life as it was. Senior managers had wide autonomy, and in good years Bear all but ran itself, allowing Cayne to spend weeks away from his desk at bridge tournaments or playing golf near his vacation home on the Jersey Shore. In recent years much of the oversight fell to Cayne’s two co-presidents, Alan Schwartz, a onetime pitcher at Duke University who specialized in media mergers, and another bridge aficionado, a talented trader named Warren Spector. Bear continued to thrive, piling up record profits all through the 2000s, and Bear’s stock price rose nearly 600 percent during Cayne’s 14 years as C.E.O.

From left: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, J. P. Morgan Chase C.E.O. Jamie Dimon, and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.

Eventually Bear, like most on Wall Street, branched into asset management, forming a series of large funds that put investor money to work in a variety of stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Unlike some firms, however, Bear promoted its own traders rather than outsiders to run these funds, and decided that each would specialize in a specific type of security, rather than a diversified mix. As co-president, Alan Schwartz, for one, questioned the move, thinking it was a bit risky, but deferred to the thinking of Spector and others.

Everything went swimmingly, in fact, until poor Ralph Cioffi ran into trouble.

Cioffi, 52, was a Bear lifer, a wisecracking salesman who commuted to Midtown from Tenafly, New Jersey, to oversee two hedge funds at Bear Stearns Asset Management, an affiliate known as B.S.A.M. His main fund, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies fund, plowed investor cash into complex derivatives backed by home mortgages. For years he was spectacularly profitable, posting average monthly gains of one percent or more. But as the housing market turned down in late 2006, his returns began to even out. Like many a Wall Street gambler before him, Cioffi decided to double-down, creating a second fund. Whereas the first borrowed, or “leveraged,” as much as 35 times its available money to trade, the new fund would borrow an astounding 100 times its cash.

It blew up in his face. As the housing market worsened during the winter of 2006–7, Cioffi’s returns for both funds plummeted. He urged investors to stay put, promising an imminent turnaround. (Cioffi and a colleague, Matthew Tannin, were indicted in June for misleading investors.) When the market downturn accelerated last spring, leaving Cioffi with billions of dollars in money-losing mortgage-backed securities no one would take off his hands, he concocted an audacious way to rescue himself, planning an initial offering for a new company called Everquest Financial that would sell its shares to the public. Everquest’s main asset, it turned out, was billions of dollars of Cioffi’s untradable securities, or, as Wall Street termed it, “toxic waste.”

Foisting his garbage onto the public might have worked, but financial journalists at BusinessWeek and The Wall Street Journal discovered the scheme in early June. Once the truth was out, B.S.A.M. had no choice but to withdraw Everquest’s offering, at which point Cioffi was all but doomed. Investors were beginning to flee. Worse, some of Cioffi’s biggest lenders, firms like Merrill Lynch and J. P. Morgan Chase, were threatening to seize his collateral, which was about $1.2 billion. In a panic, Cioffi and his aides convened a meeting of creditors, where they asked for more time and more money. The gathering turned angry when several in the audience urged Bear to pony up its own money to save the funds, an alternative Bear executives dismissed out of hand. Afterward, Warren Spector got on the phone with a series of Cioffi’s lenders, including a group of J. P. Morgan executives. “I’ll never forget this,” one recalls. “Spector gets on and goes, ‘You guys don’t know what you’re talking about—you don’t understand the business; only [Cioffi and colleagues] understand the business; only we are standing in the way of them finishing this [rescue] deal.”’ It was a classic display of Bear-style arrogance, and it incensed the Morgan men. Steve Black, Morgan’s head of investment banking, telephoned Alan Schwartz and said, “This is bullshit. We’re defaulting you.”

Merrill Lynch, in fact, did confiscate Bear’s collateral—an aggressive and highly unusual move that forced Cayne into the unthinkable: using Bear’s own money, about $1.6 billion, to bail out one of Cioffi’s two troubled funds, both of which ultimately filed for bankruptcy. It was a massive blow not only to Bear’s capital base but to its reputation on Wall Street. Inside the firm, much of the blame fell squarely on Spector, who oversaw Cioffi and other B.S.A.M. managers.

“Whenever someone raised a question, Warren would always say, ‘Don’t worry about Ralph—he’ll be fine,”’ one top Bear executive recalls. “Everybody assumed Warren knew what was going on. Well, later, after everything happened, Warren would say, ‘Well, I never knew his actual positions.’ It was one of those things where everyone thought someone else was paying attention.”

As one of Bear’s lenders told me, “The B.S.A.M. situation confirmed to me my impression, which was that [Bear’s] subsidiary businesses were run in silos—basically the guys ran their sub-businesses as they saw fit. So long as they were hitting their P&L targets, no one asked any real questions. To my mind, that contributed in a very large part to what happened later.”

For the rest of the summer of 2007, Bear was buffeted by rumors that the bailout might force it into bankruptcy, or worse. For the most part, Cayne rode out the storm at the bridge table and his golf club, though by late July he began to sour on Spector. “Warren never showed any real remorse or contrition,” says another Bear executive. “That just drove Jimmy mad.” For three solid hours Alan Schwartz sat down with Cayne and argued against firing Spector, whom he genuinely liked, a conversation that ended when Cayne said of Spector, “Do you know he’s never once said, ‘I’m sorry’?” Schwartz replied, “That’s kind of shocking.”

Cayne forced Spector to resign on August 5. Bear Stearns had survived what many came to call a “near-death experience,” but its troubles were only just beginning.

As summer turned to fall, mortgage-related losses hit scores of big banks just as they had Bear, yet Bear, for reasons that eluded Cayne and others, seemed to remain the poster boy for the credit crunch. Every story about other firms’ losses seemed to carry a mention of Bear’s, dredging up memories Bear executives would just as soon have buried. The perception of Bear’s weakness put Cayne and Alan Schwartz in a bind. The bailout had blown a sizable hole in Bear’s bottom line, and while the firm was in no immediate danger, everyone expected it would seek some kind of capital infusion.

Both Cayne and Schwartz, however, were deeply ambivalent about accepting a big chunk of money from another bank or private-equity fund. Cynics would later snipe that this was because Cayne didn’t want to dilute his own substantial share of Bear’s stock. In fact, it was more complicated. If they accepted outside help, Schwartz argued, they risked looking as if they needed it, which would only worsen the whispers about their financial health. In those early weeks of fall, Cayne and Schwartz engaged in a lengthy negotiation with private-equity veteran Henry Kravis in which he considered buying 20 percent of Bear’s stock. The deal died, however, when Schwartz pointed out that Bear’s own private-equity clients might not be thrilled to see Kravis on the board.

In the following months Cayne and Schwartz held a series of discussions with potential investors, at one point hiring a top investment banker, Gary Parr, of Lazard, to help out. There were discussions with private-equity investment company J. C. Flowers, a long set of talks with Jamie Dimon, J. P. Morgan Chase’s C.E.O., who wasn’t interested, and even a flirtation with legendary investor Warren Buffett that left Bear executives feeling Buffett was averse to risk. “Warren Buffett will only take nickels from dead people,” one snipes. In the end, Cayne managed to arrange one deal: a strategic partnership with a leading Chinese securities firm, citic, which agreed to invest $1 billion in Bear in return for Bear’s investing $1 billion with it. The market yawned.

Then, in November, came back-to-back body blows. On November 1, The Wall Street Journal, in a widely read front-page story, excoriated Cayne for his relaxed management style, portraying him as a bridge-crazy, pot-smoking Nero who fiddled while Bear burned. A few weeks later the firm was forced to disclose it would write down another $1.2 billion (which ended up being $1.9 billion) in mortgage-related securities and post the first quarterly loss in its history. The stock went into a prolonged dive—down 40 percent for the year. By January many executives were openly calling for Cayne’s head. A few slipped into Schwartz’s 42nd-floor office with an ultimatum: if Cayne wasn’t gone by the time bonuses were paid in late January, they would leave. Schwartz was conflicted. He loved Cayne, but he couldn’t afford to lose a group of top people, not at this point. He canvassed Bear’s board, found them open to a change, then broke the news to Cayne himself. To Schwartz’s surprise, Cayne took the news peacefully. He resigned as C.E.O. on January 8, but remained chairman of the board.

Schwartz was named the new C.E.O. His immediate priority was making sure Bear posted a profit in its current quarter, which ended February 29. There were still whispers out there about Bear’s financial health, many fanned by rumors of federal investigations into the hedge-fund collapse, and Schwartz badly needed some good news to report. As mortgage-related losses struck firm after firm that winter, Schwartz kept his fingers crossed, watching the calendar tick off the days until February’s end. He sweated out an entire extra day—leap day, February 29—but Bear made it. Preliminary figures showed they would report a quarterly profit of $1.10 or so a share. With luck, Schwartz said, that would end the whispers.

Nevertheless, by Wednesday, March 5, Schwartz wasn’t breathing any easier. The rumors continued, faint but insistent, now fueled by the troubles at a trio of hedge funds, Carlyle Capital, Peloton Partners, and Thornburg Mortgage. At a weekly risk-assessment meeting that day, Schwartz queried his people about Bear’s exposure to the three funds, all of which were thought near collapse. Bear had lent to all three. Still, Bear’s risk, Schwartz was told, was believed to be minimal.

The next day, Thursday, Schwartz flew to Palm Beach, where the firm’s annual media conference was poised to start the following Monday at the Breakers hotel. The conference, one of Bear’s best-attended events, brought together a host of media titans, many of them Schwartz’s longtime clients: Murdoch, Redstone, Viacom’s Philippe Dauman, Time Warner’s Jeff Bewkes, Disney’s Robert Iger. On Friday, while checking in with headquarters, Schwartz heard the rumors again, now a bit stronger: Bear was having liquidity problems. He trained his eye on a key auction of municipal bonds that Friday afternoon. Bear was providing $2 billion in liquidity to various buyers. “That was the trip wire,” another Bear executive recalls. “If anyone refused to take our name there, we knew we were in real trouble.” All through the afternoon and into the evening, Schwartz monitored the note sales. To his relief, they went off without a hitch.

The storm struck full force without warning on Monday. That morning, when Sam Molinaro returned to his sixth-floor corner office from a week-long trip in Europe, he expected a normal day, nothing special; they would release the new, positive earnings the following week. After the trading day opened, at 9:30, one of the rating agencies, Moody’s, downgraded another grouping of Bear’s bonds. It was to be expected; the agency had been downgrading most of its offerings. Then, around 11, Bear’s stock suddenly began to fall, gradually at first, then sharply. All the “financials”—Lehman, Merrill, Citi—were falling. Molinaro shrugged. But as he checked with the trading floor, he heard the rumors: Bear was having liquidity problems. Molinaro rolled his eyes. Not again.

Bear’s P.R. man, Russell Sherman, heard the rumors, too. As the stock continued to slide, Sherman began calling reporters, trying in vain to pin down their source. As he did, Molinaro checked to see what could be fueling the rumor. Bear itself had no liquidity problem—he knew that. That morning the firm sat atop $18 billion in cash reserves. Molinaro checked with his finance desk, the repo desk, his treasurer. Had anyone heard of anything like a margin call (in which a lender was demanding a huge chunk of cash back)? A trade gone bad? Was anything out of the ordinary? “Across the board, it was ‘No, no, no, no—no problems,”’ a Bear executive says.

At one point, Schwartz called in from Palm Beach to assess the situation. “I’m getting a little nervous,” he said. Molinaro assured him there was no substance to the rumor.

At that point the rumor went public—on CNBC, the cable network that serves as Wall Street’s daily backdrop. On every trading floor dozens of TV sets, mounted high on the walls, are perpetually tuned to the network, which runs nothing but shows about finance and money—from Squawk Box to Closing Bell to Jim Cramer’s Mad Money.

By noon, when CNBC anchor Bill Griffeth opened Power Lunch, Bear’s stock was down more than $7, to $63. “There are rumors out there that some unnamed Wall Street firm might be having liquidity problems,” Griffeth noted. A correspondent on the show, Dennis Kneale, a veteran of The Wall Street Journal, said, “The speculation at this point is that it’s Bear Stearns. They’re down the most in the market today. Supposedly, a couple of weeks ago, they started looking at a way to try to shop their clearing operations [They] couldn’t find a buyer. At least that’s what one guy says.”

At Bear Stearns, 80-year-old Ace Greenberg was already pelting senior officials with phone calls, demanding that someone go public to rebut the rumor. “Ace was kind of freaking out that morning,” one senior Bear executive says with a sigh. “He just couldn’t contain himself.”

A few minutes past 12, another CNBC correspondent, Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, reached Greenberg at Bear. He told her the rumor was “totally ridiculous.” CNBC reported his comments within minutes, then incorporated them into a running headline—bear stearns’ ace greenberg tells cnbc liquidity rumors are “totally ridiculous”—the rest of the hour. In his office, Molinaro saw the headline and fumed. Addressing the rumor at this stage, he and others felt, merely appeared to legitimize it.

From Palm Beach, Schwartz telephoned Greenberg in frustration. “Ace, you can’t just do that!” he said.

“Well, I had to!” Greenberg replied.

Once the CNBC headline began running, reporters began calling Russell Sherman’s office. Sherman told the Bloomberg reporter the rumor was untrue, but Bear’s stock was going crazy. The total volume was over 50 million shares; on a normal day it might trade 7 million.

At a little after one CNBC correspondent Charlie Gasparino, an especially aggressive reporter who for months had been suggesting Bear’s possible indictment on criminal charges in the hedge-fund collapse, joined an on-air roundtable to discuss the rumor. Gasparino was the bane of Bear Stearns; more than once he had predicted that the firm would go under. “I don’t believe there is a liquidity problem at Bear Stearns,” Gasparino said on-air. “Bear Stearns has a problem with whether they should exist or not in the future in this sense.… What do they have left? A clearing business, a second-rate investment bank?” If the credit crisis continued, Gasparino said a few moments later, “I don’t see how they could survive independently. They don’t have enough horses out there.” Sitting on a stool beside him, Bill Griffeth appeared startled at the strength of the statement.

“You’re on record, then,” he remarked.

Gasparino laughed. “Wouldn’t be the first time I was wrong,” he said.

At Bear Stearns, no one was laughing. Publicly speculating on a firm’s liquidity is akin to shouting “Fire!!!” in a crowded theater; in catastrophic cases it can trigger panic selling. It risks, in other words, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

For the next hour the Bear Stearns rumor became a topic of conversation between CNBC correspondents and various market traders and analysts. At 1:50, Matthew Cheslock remarked, “The sentiment [on Bear] is pretty negative. The general consensus is ‘Where there’s smoke, there’s fire.’ ”

A few minutes later, Griffeth, perhaps sensing the network might have gone a bit too far, asked Dennis Kneale, “What about the jittery nature of this market right now? Are we starting to believe some rumors that may or may not be true?” Kneale agreed. “Someone,” he observed, “is always making money on the other side of that bad news or that rumor.”

Yet CNBC’s coverage remained anything but skeptical of the rumor. At two the network’s new “money honey,” Erin Burnett, headlined the hour by announcing “credit issues at Bear,” never mind that there was no such thing. She turned to correspondent David Faber, who observed, “Of course, no firm’s ever going to say that they are having trouble with liquidity, and, in fact, you’ve either got liquidity or you don’t. So if you don’t have it, you’re done. Those are the kinds of concerns in this market, concerns of confidence You can have crises of confidence, causing meltdowns.”

At 2:07 came shocking news: the first mention that New York governor Eliot Spitzer had had dealings with a prostitution ring. That news shoved Bear Stearns out of CNBC’s headlines, much to the relief of the firm’s executives. At day’s end, Sherman issued a formal statement denying any liquidity problems. On Monday night, Schwartz and Molinaro held their breaths, hoping the worst was over. In fact, it had just started.

Tuesday morning the Federal Reserve announced a novel new securities lending program for major Wall Street firms to help them weather the credit crisis. Most financial stocks rebounded, but not Bear. After lunch, Gasparino went on-air and said the Fed initiative was being interpreted as an effort to save one firm—Bear. By early afternoon the rumors were once again flying, now stronger than ever.

The first to pull their money from Bear were several major hedge funds. So Molinaro and his men canvassed the repo lenders, which give banks billions of dollars in overnight loans that have to be renewed each day. However, Molinaro found that all planned to “roll over” Bear’s loans the next morning. “Nobody was cutting us off,” says a Bear executive involved in the events. “There was a lot of chatter, though. The hedge funds were agitated. That was concerning, because they could influence the outcome by pulling out cash balances.” That same day Bear executives noticed a worrisome development whose potential significance they would not appreciate for weeks. It involved an avalanche of what are called “novation” requests. When a firm wants to rid itself of a contract that carries credit risk with another firm, in this case Bear Stearns, it can either sell the contract back to Bear or, in a novation request, to a third firm for a fee. By
Tuesday afternoon, three big Wall Street companies—Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank—were experiencing a torrent of novation requests for Bear instruments. Alan Schwartz thought it strange that so many requests were being channeled to the same three firms, but did his best to assure them all that Bear remained on sound footing. “Deutsche Bank we talked to, and they said, ‘We’re getting killed!”’ says a Bear executive. “We said, ‘We’ll take you out of your positions,’ and we did. But it was too late.”

Too late—because, before Bear could calm the waters, executives at both Goldman and Credit Suisse told their traders to hold up all novation requests dealing with Bear Stearns, pending approval by their credit departments. The Credit Suisse memo, a “blast” e-mail to much of its trading staff, quickly became the subject of widespread rumor and gossip. Both memos were essentially routine, a way to handle the deluge of novation requests rather than comments on Bear’s viability, but they nevertheless served as the first concrete sign that some of Wall Street’s biggest firms were having concerns about doing business with Bear.

Sam Molinaro felt it was time for another public assurance. CNBC’s Charlie Gasparino had been peppering him with phone calls seeking comment. Molinaro talked to Russell Sherman, who felt Gasparino could be played. “He’ll say something negative if you shut him out. But if you talk to him, he’ll go positive,” one Bear executive told me.

Around three, Molinaro spoke to Gasparino, telling him, “I’ve spent all day trying to track down the source of the rumors, but they are false. There is no liquidity crisis. No margin calls. It’s all nonsense.” Gasparino’s on-air comments were mild, but for the first time he raised the specter of a nightmare scenario: “They are really worried about this inside [Bear], that these rumors are taking a very nasty turn, and they might cause a run on the bank.” Still, by day’s end, there was no rush among Bear’s lenders to withdraw cash from the firm. At that point, this executive says, “the notion of a liquidity crisis seemed silly.”

That night Schwartz, Molinaro, and others discussed what to do. The talks centered on whether Schwartz should go public in an interview with CNBC. “We debated putting Alan on the air a long time,” says one board member. “Yes, it might draw attention to the rumors. But it would definitely answer the questions. Our view was: we had to get him out.”

Schwartz, though, wanted some assurances first. From experience, he knew he faced a risk in picking the wrong CNBC correspondent for the interview. All the network’s talent—Gasparino, Maria Bartiromo, Faber, Larry Kudlow—had requested the interview, and whoever didn’t get it, Schwartz feared, might retaliate on the air. “Each of these correspondents has his own producer, and they all seem to hate each other,” one Bear executive told me. “If you choose Faber, you know Bartiromo will bash you the next day.” Schwartz directed Russell Sherman to identify the CNBC executive who supervised the correspondents, explain the situation, and ask that the correspondents who didn’t get the interview refrain from attacks. Sherman, however, couldn’t identify a single CNBC executive who seemed to have control over the correspondents. “Everyone on Wall Street knows the joke,” says another Bear executive involved in the discussions. “At CNBC,
there is simply no adult supervision.”

In the end they chose the safest of the lot, Faber. Wednesday morning, all across Manhattan, Wall Street traders crowded around their monitors to see what Schwartz had to say. More than a few shook their heads that the Bear C.E.O. was not in his office, grappling with the emerging crisis, but in, of all places, Palm Beach! As a senior executive of one competing firm put it, “To come on CNBC from Palm Beach and, you know, tell everyone everything was going to be O.K., they had to be crazy.” (Schwartz was worried that an abrupt departure from his conference might raise even more questions.)

Faber’s first question was a bombshell. He told Schwartz he had direct knowledge of a trader—a single trader—whose credit department had held up a trade with Bear Stearns, citing concerns about its health. At Bear, many executives gasped. It was a killer statement: Faber was saying, in essence, that Bear’s status as a trader, the basis of its business, was in question. Schwartz answered as best he could, saying everything was fine; only later did Faber say on-air the trade in question had finally gone through. But the damage had been done.

“You knew right at that moment that Bear Stearns was dead, right at the moment he asked that question,” a Wall Street trader of 40 years told me. “Once you raise that idea, that the firm can’t follow through on a trade, it’s over. Faber killed him. He just killed him.”

At Bear Stearns, however, the sentiment on the sixth floor was that Schwartz had done a good job. The interview did nothing, however, to stop the rumors. When Schwartz returned to his office that afternoon, he tried calling customers, but nothing he did could stem the tide. By the end of the trading day, the first repo lenders had warned Molinaro they would not renew their loans the next morning.

“The tone of Wednesday afternoon was not positive—three days of rumors were starting to take their toll,” says a senior Bear executive. Mostly because of hedge-fund withdrawals, the firm’s reserves had shrunk to less than $15 billion. That evening, meeting in Molinaro’s conference room, the chief financial officer told Schwartz they could probably replace those reserves the following day. If the repo lenders began backing out, though, they were in serious trouble. Schwartz had a long-standing emergency plan in place, involving the sale of Bear assets, and for the first time Molinaro pulled it out and began studying it in earnest. Schwartz, meanwhile, got on the phone to Gary Parr at Lazard. They agreed to meet the next day. Late that night a Bear lawyer telephoned Tim Geithner, president of the New York Federal Reserve. He briefed him on Bear’s plight and urged him to have the Fed accelerate its plan to provide liquidity to the market.

The next morning, on his drive in from Connecticut, Molinaro began calling the repo and finance desks to check the tone of their early calls. The Journal had a story suggesting that any number of Bear’s lenders, including the all-important repo lenders, were growing nervous. Still, those first calls went as well as could be hoped. Other firms were still trading with Bear. Few of the repo lenders were talking about refusing to roll over their daily loans. “Thursday morning, things looked good,” says one Bear executive.

Then, just as they had the day before, the rumors began to multiply—and with them the withdrawals. By midafternoon the dam was breaking. One by one, repo lenders began to jump ship. As word spread of the withdrawals, still more repo lenders turned tail. The hedge-fund cash was almost all gone. “A lot of people were pulling out,” one Bear executive remembers. “The nail in the coffin was the repo capacity.”

Molinaro and Robert Upton, Bear’s treasurer, ended the day toting up the withdrawals. By five, Molinaro could see his worst fears had been realized. He picked up the phone and called Schwartz in his 42nd-floor office. “You need to get down here,” he said.

The numbers, scribbled out on a yellow legal pad, told the story. Standing in Molinaro’s conference room, Schwartz listened as Robert Upton guided them through the wreckage. A full $30 billion or so of repo loans would not be rolled over the next morning. They might be able to replace maybe half that in the next day’s market, but that would still leave Bear $15 billion short of what it needed to make it through the day. By seven it was obvious they had only two options: an emergency cash infusion or a bankruptcy filing the next day. The one thing everyone agreed upon was the need for secrecy. “If word gets out, it might be the end,” one participant recalls saying.

Schwartz was stricken. He had genuinely thought they would make it. By early evening, realizing that Bear’s life expectancy might now be numbered not in days but hours, he hit the phones. The regulators—the S.E.C., Treasury, the Fed—had been watching the situation all day and were waiting when he called to brief them. Gary Parr, the Lazard banker, had already touched base with J. P. Morgan’s C.E.O., Jamie Dimon, that afternoon, letting him know where Bear stood. J. P. Morgan was the obvious candidate for overnight cash. The two firms had long-standing ties. Their headquarters faced each other across 47th Street.

That day was Dimon’s 52nd birthday, and he was celebrating with a quiet family dinner at Avra, a Greek restaurant on East 48th Street. He was irked when his private cell phone rang; it was to be used only in emergencies. On the line was Parr, who put Schwartz on as Dimon stepped outside onto the sidewalk. Schwartz quickly explained the depth of Bear’s plight and said, “We really need help.” Still irked, Dimon said, “How much?”

“As much as 30 billion,” Schwartz said.

“Alan, I can’t do that,” Dimon said. “It’s too much.”

“Well, could you guys buy us overnight?”

“I can’t—that’s impossible,” Dimon replied. “There’s no time to do the homework. We don’t know the issues. I’ve got a board.”

The people he should call, Dimon said, were at the Fed and the Treasury—the only place Bear could get $30 billion overnight. Still, Dimon promised to see what he could do to help. He hung up and dialed Tim Geithner at the New York Fed downtown. Twenty-first-century Wall Street is a highly interconnected world, with just about everyone lending billions of dollars to everyone else, and Geithner worried that Bear’s collapse might trigger a domino effect, taking down scores of other firms around the world; he urged Dimon in the strongest terms to think about somehow helping Bear. “Tim, look, we can’t do it alone,” Dimon said. “Just do something to get them to the weekend. Then you’ll have some time.”

Dimon hung up, reluctantly realizing Morgan was in this, like it or not. He knew everyone involved would push Morgan to consider buying Bear, but while there were certain of its businesses he coveted—prime brokerage, energy, correspondent banking—he wasn’t thrilled at the prospect of taking aboard its massive mortgage-related problems. Still, in short order, he dispatched a credit team of a half-dozen traders to Bear to begin looking at its books. Then he realized he had a problem.

It was Steve Black, his investment-banking chief. The Morgan man who probably knew Bear best, Black was on a family vacation on the Caribbean island of Anguilla. That evening, in fact, Black was looking forward to three days of peace and quiet with his wife, Debbie. At her insistence, he had left his cell phone at the hotel when they went for a late dinner at a beachside restaurant. Midway through their meal, Black looked up and saw a man marching toward the table.

“Oh, shit,” Black said under his breath.

“Are you Mr. Black?” the man asked. When Black nodded, the man said, “I have an emergency call from your hotel.”

Black told the hotel to have Dimon call him at the restaurant. He was waiting in its bustling kitchen when the phone rang. “It’s for me,” he told a cook. By nine Black was back in his hotel, orchestrating the teams beginning to study Bear’s situation. A Morgan jet would arrive in the morning to ferry him back to New York.

The first team of Morgan executives reached Bear’s sixth-floor executive suite around 11 that night. It didn’t take long for them to realize the danger in what they were being asked to do. If Dimon lent Bear $15 billion or so and the firm imploded the next day, they could lose it all. A little after midnight Dimon told Schwartz in a phone call, “We’ve got to get the Fed in on this.”

Downtown, Tim Geithner was waiting when Dimon telephoned. Any bailout, Dimon reiterated, was too big, too risky, for Morgan to handle alone. Both men knew that meant only one thing: somehow Bear had to be given access to the Fed “window,” that is, the spigot of cash that was available to the nation’s commercial banks, but not its investment banks. The only way for the Fed to help, to give Bear access to the “window,” was to lend Morgan the money, allowing the bank to act as a bridge across which the Fed cash could stream into Bear’s vaults.

Geithner, quickly grasping the wisdom of the move, got on the phone with Washington, going through the details with the Fed’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, and the Treasury secretary, Hank Paulson, and his counterparts at the S.E.C. If they could just get Bear through the next day, perhaps a bigger and better deal could be forged over the weekend. By two a.m. teams from the Fed and the S.E.C. had joined the Morgan bankers at Bear, poring over the numbers. In Molinaro’s conference room, Schwartz and Molinaro paced, occasionally taking bites of cold pizza; their fate, they now realized, was largely out of their hands.

By four a.m. the outlines of a deal were taking shape. Morgan would give Bear a credit line; the money would come from the Fed. It took three more hours for the details to be pounded out. At the last minute Morgan’s general counsel, Stephen Cutler, inserted a line into the press release stating the credit line would be good for up to 28 days.

At Bear, Schwartz and Molinaro allowed themselves a few nervous smiles. They were saved—for 28 days. “We all thought this was a huge win,” remembers one Bear executive. “We were all pretty pleased, thinking we had averted our potential deaths.”

They wouldn’t be so sanguine for long.

When the markets opened Friday morning, traders greeted the news from Bear with surprise but not, at least initially, with panic. For the first hour or so of trading, the stock remained where it had been the day before, in the low 60s. In Anguilla, Steve Black furrowed his brow. “This is nuts,” he remarked to his wife as they headed for the airport. “No one understands what happened here. This stock should be half that.” By the time the Blacks arrived at the airport, it was.

By four o’clock the firm’s capital reserves, which had been $18 billion that Monday, had dwindled to almost nothing. “The balances leaving was a flood,” remembers one Bear executive. “By Friday afternoon we couldn’t even keep track of the money going out. Friday afternoon, I have to say, caught everyone by surprise. Because Friday morning we thought we had bought some ‘stop, look, and listen’ time.”

Gary Parr, meanwhile, was already on the phones, canvassing every prospective rescuer he could think of. Just about anything was on the table: a merger, a sale of prime brokerage or other valuable assets, even an outright sale of Bear itself. The only way to stop the run, everyone knew, was to find what Parr kept calling a “validating investor”—a big name, hopefully with big money, who would send a message that Bear was still solid. Warren Buffett, with his unmatched reputation for identifying value, was the ideal solution. “If Buffett had put in a hundred dollars, that would’ve been enough,” says one person involved that day. “That would have sent the message.” But there was no rush, at least not at first.

Around six Schwartz slipped into the back of a black town car for the drive home to Greenwich. Somehow Bear was still alive, if barely. Thanks to the Morgan credit line, they could probably open on Monday. Now he had 28 days—28 days to raise new capital, find a merger partner, or sell Bear outright. It wouldn’t be easy, he knew, but it was doable. Then, as the car cruised northeast, Schwartz’s phone rang. It was Tim Geithner of the Fed, with the Treasury secretary, Hank Paulson. Paulson came right to the point. “You’ll recall I told you when we cut this facility [that] your fate was no longer in your hands,” he told Schwartz. “Well, we don’t plan on being here on Sunday night like we were last night. You’ve got the weekend to do a deal with J. P. Morgan or anyone else you can find. But if you’re not done by Monday, we’re pulling the plug.” And, like that, Bear’s 28-day cushion evaporated. The Fed’s credit line was good only
till Sunday night.

Schwartz hung up the phone, stunned. He telephoned Molinaro, who was also on his way home, at that moment buying a cup of coffee at a rest stop on the Merritt Parkway. “You’ve got to be kidding me,” Molinaro said.

To this day, top Bear officials aren’t sure whether they misread the “28-day” language or whether Paulson simply had a change of heart after the events of Friday afternoon. “Everyone thought we had 28 days,” says one senior Bear executive. “Do we think they thought that? We think so. But, look, when this was done, we just got a piece of paper that said, ‘If you agree to this, you’ll be O.K.’ We signed. No one spent a lot of time going over all the little details.”

In fact, no one—not even Federal Reserve officials—had been sure what the credit line or the “28-day” mention actually meant. “They took hope in that language,” says a Fed official. “I don’t know why they did. We made it very clear at the time, ‘This is not the be-all end-all.’ Then again, this whole thing was done so fast. We didn’t think through all the details of what would happen next.”

When Schwartz returned to his office Saturday morning, one of his first calls was to Geithner. He appealed for more time, explaining that Bear thought it had 28 days. Geithner held firm. Sunday night, he repeated. By that point, representatives of prospective suitors were already streaming through Bear’s hallways, poring over financial documents. Their efforts switched into overdrive as word spread of the Sunday deadline. A team from Flowers was there, a team representing Henry Kravis, plus another half-dozen or so groups from major banks. J. P. Morgan alone had 16 different teams meeting with all of Schwartz’s top people.

It was a sobering process: as the day wore on, the bidders began dropping out, one by one. Everyone had an excuse: they didn’t have the time or the money or the balls to do such a risky deal in so short a time. The two best possibilities, it appeared, were Morgan and Flowers. The latter told Parr on Saturday afternoon it was prepared to buy 90 percent of Bear for about $30 billion, or $28 a share—that is, if it could scrape up $20 billion from a bank consortium by the next day. No one thought Flowers could possibly get such a deal done in time.

From the outset, Schwartz assumed Morgan was the bridegroom. Across the street, in Morgan’s eighth-floor executive suite, Jamie Dimon and Steve Black fielded nonstop reports from their due-diligence teams, now numbering more than 300 people. The key, everyone knew, was Bear’s mortgage “book,” that is, its inventory of mortgage-backed securities. Much of it was illiquid—it couldn’t be sold. How to value these Rube Goldberg devices was anyone’s guess. The more Black studied Bear’s book, the more worried he grew. He and another Morgan executive, Doug Braunstein, got on the phone with Schwartz and Parr that night and told them that, if Morgan did bid, it wouldn’t be much.

Bear’s stock had closed Friday at $32. “The fact you’re at 32 doesn’t mean much at this point,” Black said. He suggested that a Morgan bid might be in the range of $8 to $12 a share. “We said, ‘That’s all there is, and that’s with a lack of due diligence and a lot of other issues,”’ says a person involved in the call. “Alan asked, ‘Will you do it come hell or high water?’ That was their key issue.”

At nightfall everyone hunkered down for long hours studying Bear’s numbers, especially its mortgage book. By dawn, however, many Morgan executives were having second thoughts. The more they studied the securities Bear owned, the worse it looked. Bear, for instance, had initially estimated it had $120 billion in so-called risk-weighted assets, those that might go bad. By Sunday morning, Morgan executives felt the actual number was closer to $220 billion.

“We all kind of slept on it,” says one executive involved in the talks, “or not slept on it, kind of closed our eyes for a half-hour, and realized that if you take a step back and remove yourself from the enormity of it, what we were being asked to take over, from a risk factor, was gargantuan.” And it wasn’t just the financial risk. The morning’s New York Times carried a piece on Bear, by veteran reporter Gretchen Morgenson, that dredged through all the seamiest aspects of Bear’s recent history. Steve Black walked around the eighth floor making sure everyone read it. “That article certainly had an impact on my thinking,” remembers one Morgan executive. “Just the reputational aspects of it, getting into bed with these people.” He shudders.

Dimon had to agree. It was just too much. Steve Black broke the news to Schwartz. “Whatever other things you are working on, you should actively pursue them,” he said. Downtown, at the Fed, Tim Geithner stepped out of his conference room to hear the news from Dimon. “I remember he came back in a minute later, with this look on his face that said, ‘Huh?”’ recalls a member of the Fed team.

“They’re not going to do it,” Geithner said.

Geithner believed he couldn’t let Bear die. The repercussions were unthinkable. “For the first time in history the entire world was looking at the failure of a major financial institution that could lead to a run on the entire world financial system,” a Fed official recalls. “It was clear we couldn’t let that happen.”

Within minutes Geithner was back on the phone with Dimon. There ensued a series of conversations where, in one Fed official’s words, “they kept saying, ‘We’re not going to do it,’ and we kept saying, ‘We really think you should do it.’ This went on for hours. Finally, [the conversation] shifted to ‘Well, maybe if.’ They kept saying, ‘We can’t do this on our own.”’ All through these talks, Geithner kept a nervous eye on the clock. The Australian markets opened at six on Sunday evening, New York time. They had to have some kind of deal by then or risk chaos. Geithner had several long conversations with Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson. There was never any serious question whether the Fed would help out. Even though it had never attempted anything like this before, there was ample precedent for the move; both the German and British central banks had stepped up to rescue institutions laid low by the mortgage crisis in just the last year. Still, the details took hours to unspool. At one point, Paulson had to sign a document confirming that, yes, in the event Bear defaulted on its securities, the American taxpayer would pay the tab.

Meanwhile, at Bear, Alan Schwartz, now merely a spectator at his firm’s funeral, watched the clock. By one, Bear’s board was in session, many of its members, including Jimmy Cayne, present by phone; Cayne was in Detroit at a bridge tournament. At one point, Schwartz took a call from Morgan executives, who told him that any bid was likely to be less than the $8-to-$12 range mentioned the night before. In fact, they suggested the likely number was $4. When Schwartz relayed the $4 idea to his board, several, including Cayne, grew apoplectic. Cayne argued strenuously that Bear simply file for bankruptcy. “There were a lot of people at that point who were just saying, ‘Fuck ’em—let’s go 11,”’ remembers one person in the boardroom. It was then that Gary Parr and the bankruptcy attorneys patiently explained that bankruptcy was actually not an option, not for a major securities firm. Changes to the bankruptcy code in 2005 would force federal
regulators to take over customer accounts. All its securities would be subject to immediate seizure by creditors. Slowly, the humiliating inevitability of a $4-a-share buyout—for a firm whose shares had traded as high as $170 the year before—sank in. It was at that point, midafternoon, that Treasury secretary Paulson twisted the knife. As the ranking politician involved in the deal, he was concerned with appearances—both how it would look that the federal government was bailing out a well-heeled investment bank at a time when normal Americans were losing their homes, and the appearance of something lawyers call “moral hazard,” that is, the idea that a Bear deal, by appearing to “save” a bank whose poor judgment had pushed it to the brink of bankruptcy, might actually encourage risky behavior by other financial institutions. This deal, Paulson judged, had to hurt Bear. And it had to hurt badly. Paulson and Tim Geithner telephoned Dimon at
Morgan. He put them on speaker. Dimon said he was considering a price in the $4-to-$5 range. “That sounds high to me,” Paulson said. “I think this should be done at a very low price.” A little later, Morgan’s Doug Braunstein reached Gary Parr at Bear. A formal offer would be forthcoming, Braunstein said. “The number’s $2,” he said.

Parr nearly choked. “You can’t mean that,” he said. He did. Schwartz took the news quietly, which was more than one could say about some of his board members. Jimmy Cayne—whose 5.66 million shares, once worth nearly a billion, would now be worth less than $12 million—swore he would never accept such a humiliating offer. “The people around the table, some of them, their net worth was being wiped out,” says one person who was in the room. “There was every emotion you can think of: sadness, anger. They saw the tragedy. But the bottom line was, you know, when they got in a pickle, Bear Stearns didn’t have many friends.”

Schwartz took a half-hour explaining that the board really had no choice. It was Morgan or bankruptcy, which would mean liquidation, putting 14,000 employees out of work by noon the next day. “What can I say?” he said at one point. “It’s better than nothing.”

And like that, with the signatures on an unprecedented merger agreement, a major American investment bank vanished, along with $29 billion in shareholder value and the secure futures of 14,000 employees. In the following days the hallways of Bear Stearns & Co. erupted in rage. Longtime friends fumed and even screamed in Schwartz’s face—at a town-hall meeting he chaired, where one man hollered, “This is rape!”; in the hallway outside his office; even in the Bear gym. Shareholders were so angry that everyone was forced back to the negotiating table the next weekend, when Morgan and the Fed, in a second set of manic around-the-clock meetings, agreed to boost the price to $10 a share. Yet, for all the anger, all the frustration, no one could answer the one question on everyone’s mind: How on earth had this happened?

Even among the circle of top executives who lived through that frantic week, no two people see the crisis at Bear the same way. Many, though, agree with some version of the scenario Alan Schwartz has come to believe. Yes, Schwartz tells friends, mistakes were made. Yes, the firm was financially weakened. But the more he learned about what had happened behind the scenes that week, the more Schwartz came to believe that Bear’s collapse was a pre-meditated attack orchestrated by market speculators who stood to profit from its demise. According to those Schwartz has briefed, these unnamed speculators—several now being investigated by the S.E.C.—employed a complex scheme to force a handful of major Wall Street firms to hold up trades with Bear, then leaked the news to the media, creating an artificial panic.

“Something happened Monday that triggered this mess,” says one Bear executive who has spoken to the S.E.C. “It was as though a computer virus had been launched. Where the hell was this coming from? Who started it? We tried, believe me, but we could not track it down. We know lots of big hedge funds were spreading rumors, but how can you pursue that? Only the S.E.C. can, and they’re all over this.”

At the heart of this theory are the “novation” requests that began to pick up steam that Tuesday and Wednesday. As Bear executives later analyzed these trades, they discovered the overwhelming majority had been made with just three firms: Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank. Schwartz came to believe this was no accident. In his mind, the flood of novation requests was designed to force at least one of the three firms to put a temporary halt to accepting them, which is what happened: Goldman and Credit Suisse did. News of that halt not only swept Wall Street trading floors, it appeared to gain credence the next day when David Faber asked Schwartz about it on CNBC. “I like Faber, he’s a good guy, but I wonder if he ever asked himself, ‘Why is someone telling me this?”’ a top Bear executive asks. “There was a reason this was leaked, and the reason is simple: someone wanted us to go down, and go down hard.” (Faber says his
reporting was accurate, and arose from talks with a source he has known for 20 years.)

But who? According to one vague tale, initially picked up at Lehman Brothers, a group of hedge-fund managers actually celebrated Bear’s collapse at a breakfast that following Sunday morning and planned a similar assault on Lehman the next week. True or not, Bear executives repeated the story to the S.E.C., along with the names of the three firms it suspects were behind its demise. Two are hedge funds, Chicago-based Citadel, run by a trader named Ken Griffin, and SAC Capital Partners of Stamford, Connecticut, run by Steven Cohen. (A spokesman for SAC Capital said the firm “vehemently denies” any suggestion that it played a role in Bear’s demise. A Citadel spokeswoman said, “These claims have no merit.”) The third suspect, at least in Bear executives’ minds, is one of its main competitors, Goldman Sachs. (“Goldman Sachs was supportive of Bear Stearns,” says a Goldman Sachs spokeswoman. “There is no foundation to rumors that we behaved otherwise.”) Several Bear executives also named an individual they believed was spreading rumors about them that week, Jeff Dorman, who briefly served as global co-head of Bear’s prime brokerage business until resigning to take a similar position at Deutsche Bank last summer. “We heard Dorman was saying things last summer,” says a Bear executive. “At the time we reached out to Deutsche Bank and told them he better stop it.” (Asked about the allegation, a Deutsche Bank spokeswoman acknowledged that Bear had sent its executives a letter last August asking Dorman not to solicit its clients, as he had agreed upon leaving Bear. Deutsche Bank replied that he wasn’t. The exchange didn’t explicitly address what Dorman might have been saying about the firm, nor would the spokeswoman.)

Today, many of Bear Stearns’s former employees are out of work. The firm has effectively disappeared into the maw of J. P. Morgan along with a number of key executives, including Ace Greenberg, who became a Morgan vice-chairman, and Alan Schwartz, who will probably take a position in the investment-banking department. Maybe the S.E.C. will figure out whether Bear was murdered. But maybe it won’t. Even those who believe the firm was the victim of a predatory raid have their doubts it can ever be proved.

“Even with subpoena power, I’m not sure the S.E.C. will get to the bottom of this, because the standard of proof is just so difficult,” says a vice-chairman at another major investment firm. “But I hope they do. Because you can look at this as just another run on a bank or as a seminal point in the financial history of this country that could bring about a change, perhaps a drastic change, in the way we govern financial markets. If there is a solution to this kind of thing, it must be found in the roots of what happened at Bear Stearns. Because otherwise, I can guarantee you, it will happen again somewhere else.”

Bryan Burrough is a Vanity Fair special correspondent.

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