InfraGard to have conference on Cyber Attacks

Top Layer Networks Chief Strategy Officer to Join Panel on Battling the Next Generation of Cyber Attacks at RSA Conference 2008

RSA Conference 2008

WESTBOROUGH, Mass.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Top Layer Networks, a global leader for high performance intrusion prevention solutions, today announced that Mike Paquette, vice president and chief strategy officer, will discuss the next generation of cyber threats and the best methods and technologies for defending against them at the RSA Conference, taking place April 7 - 11, 2008.

In a panel session entitled, “What's to Come: The Next Generation of Attacks,” Paquette will be joined by executives from Juniper, Sourcefire, Spire Security and Tipping Point for a discussion about the next generation of attacks facing the enterprise and the technologies that provide protection against these emerging threats.

As Chief Strategy Officer for Top Layer, Mike Paquette leads the technology and product direction for the company and has addressed the topic of the next generation of threats at several past conferences, including InfraGard, SecureWorld and RSA Conference 2007.

When:		Tuesday, April 8, 2008, 1:30 p.m. - 2:40 p.m. PDT
Where:		RSA Conference 2008
		Green Room #104, Moscone Center, San Francisco,Calif.

Top Layer Networks will be exhibiting at the NSS booth #811 on Tuesday, April 8 (11 a.m. – 1 p.m.), Wednesday, April 9 (1:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.) and Thursday, April 10 (10 a.m. – 12 p.m.) for those interested in learning more about intrusion prevention. For additional event information, or to register, visit the RSA Conference website at http://www.rsaconference.com/2008/US/home.aspx.

About the RSA Conference

RSA Conference is helping drive the security agenda worldwide with annual events in the U.S., Europe and Japan. Throughout its 17 year history, RSA Conference has consistently attracted the world’s best and brightest in the field, creating opportunities for conference attendees to learn about IT security’s most important issues through first-hand interactions with peers, luminaries and both emerging and established companies. As the IT security field continues to grow in importance and influence, RSA Conference plays an integral role in keeping security professionals across the globe connected and educated. For more information and conference dates, visit www.rsaconference.com.

About Top Layer Networks

Top Layer Networks is dedicated to its role as the leading global provider of Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), developing and bringing to market network security infrastructure solutions that help commercial and government organizations protect their critical on-line assets from the losses and risks associated with cyber threats. Its family of IPS appliances is designed with “Three Dimensional Protection” that provides the most advanced protection capabilities against known and zero-day attacks at the highest performance rates. Top Layer Networks is headquartered in Massachusetts, USA with sales and support presence in Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Middle East, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

All trademarks, trade names, service marks, and logos referenced herein belong to their respective companies.

Contacts

Top Layer Networks, Inc.
Donna Rogers, 508-870-1300, ext. 127
drogers@toplayer.com
or
fama PR
Matt Flanagan, 617-758-4141
matt@famapr.com

Noah Shachtman on blogging and the military + some good links

Military Report: Secretly 'Recruit or Hire Bloggers'

By Noah Shachtman March 31, 2008 | 1:11:05 PMCategories: Info War

A study, written for U.S. Special Operations Command, suggested "clandestinely recruiting or hiring prominent bloggers."

Since the start of the Iraq war, there's been a raucous debate in military circles over how to handle blogs -- and the servicemembers who want to keep them. One faction sees blogs as security risks, and a collective waste of troops' time. The other (which includes top officers, like Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. William Caldwell) considers blogs to be a valuable source of information, and a way for ordinary troops to shape opinions, both at home and abroad.

This 2006 report for the Joint Special Operations University, "Blogs and Military Information Strategy," offers a third approach -- co-opting bloggers, or even putting them on the payroll. "Hiring a block of bloggers to verbally attack a specific person or promote a specific message may be worth considering," write the report's co-authors, James Kinniburgh and Dororthy Denning.

Lt. Commander Marc Boyd, a U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman, says the report was merely an academic exercise. "The comments are not 'actionable', merely thought provoking," he tells Danger Room. "The views expressed in the article publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM [Special Operations Command], or the Joint Special Operations University."

Denning, a professor at Naval Postgraduate School, adds in an e-mail, "I got some positive feedback from people who read the article, but I don't know if it led to anything."

The report introduces the military audience to the "blogging phenomenon," and lays out a number of ways in which the armed forces -- specifically, the military's public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations units -- might use the sites to their advantage.

Information strategists can consider clandestinely recruiting or hiring prominent bloggers or other persons of prominence... to pass the U.S. message. In this way, the U.S. can overleap the entrenched inequalities and make use of preexisting intellectual and social capital. Sometimes numbers can be effective; hiring a block of bloggers to verbally attack a specific person or promote a specific message may be worth considering. On the other hand, such operations can have a blowback effect, as witnessed by the public reaction following revelations that the U.S. military had paid journalists to publish stories in the Iraqi press under their own names. People do not like to be deceived, and the price of being exposed is lost credibility and trust.

An alternative strategy is to “make” a blog and blogger. The process of boosting the blog to a position of influence could take some time, however, and depending on the person running the blog, may impose a significant educational burden, in terms of cultural and linguistic training before the blog could be put online to any useful effect. Still, there are people in the military today who like to blog. In some cases, their talents might be redirected toward operating blogs as part of an information campaign. If a military blog offers valuable information that is not available from other sources, it could rise in rank fairly rapidly.

Denning, the report's author, has promoted controversial opinions before. In the early 1990s, when she was chair of the Georgetown University's computer science department, Denning emerged as the leading advocate for the so-called "Clipper Chip," a cryptographic device for protecting communications -- until the government wanted to listen in. The project was cancelled by 1996.

In her 2006 paper, Denning warns that blogs can and will be used by America's enemies. These sites, she argues, can also be used to serve U.S. government interests.

There are certain to be cases where some blog, outside the control of the U.S. government, promotes a message that is antithetical to U.S. interests, or actively supports the informational, recruiting and logistical activities of our enemies. The initial reaction may be to take down the site, but this is problematic in that doing so does not guarantee that the site will remain down. As has been the case with many such sites, the offending site will likely move to a different host server, often in a third country. Moreover, such action will likely produce even more interest in the site and its contents. Also, taking down a site that is known to pass enemy EEIs (essential elements of information) and that gives us their key messages denies us a valuable information source. This is not to say that once the information passed becomes redundant or is superseded by a better source that the site should be taken down. At that point the enemy blog might be used covertly as a vehicle for friendly information operations. Hacking the site and subtly changing the messages and data—merely a few words or phrases—may be sufficient to begin destroying the blogger’s credibility with the audience. Better yet, if the blogger happens to be passing enemy communications and logistics data, the information content could be corrupted. If the messages are subtly tweaked and the data corrupted in the right way, the enemy may reason that the blogger in question has betrayed them and either take down the site (and the blogger) themselves, or by threatening such action, give the U.S. an opportunity to offer the individual amnesty in exchange for information. (emphasis mine)

(Hook up: Cryptome.org; photo: Peter Starman / WIRED)

ALSO:

* Coast Guard Fires Blogger
* Coast Guard Hates the Internet, Maybe
* If You're Gonna Get Blocked by the Air Force...
* Air Force Blocks Access to Many Blogs
* Who Gets Through the Air Force's Blog Block?
* Facebook Threatens Soldiers, Canada Says
* Army: Wikis Too Risky
* U.S. Starting to Wake Up to Media War?
* AQI Leaders: Breaking Smokers' Fingers Backfiring
* Pentagon Plots Sim Iraq for Propaganda Tests
* Pentagon Panel: U.S. Must Sell 'Good News'
* Top General: Let Soldiers Blog
* Rummy Resurfaces, Calls for U.S. Propaganda Agency
* In Iraq, Psyops Team Plays on Iran Fears, Soccer Love
* How Technology Almost Lost the War
* Targeting the Jihadist Noise Machine
* 18 Months Later, Charges for Jailed Journo in Iraq
* U.S. Enlists Arab Bloggers for Info War
* Some of Her Best Friends Are Terrorists
* Inside Al-Qaeda's "Intranet"
* Intel Director Launches Qaeda Leak Probe
* Ex-Spies Blast Qaeda Breach
* Al-Qaeda "Intranet" Goes Dark After Leak
* Bloggers vs. Terrorists?
* Army Gearing Up for Info War (Finally)
* Osama: Back in Black
* Al-Qaeda Channels Pixar
* Inside the Insurgent Noise Machine
* Terrorists Keep Blogs, Too
* Al-Qaeda Ramps up Propaganda Push
* Army Bullies Blogger, Invades YouTube
* Al-Qaeda Propaganda at New High
* British Military Gags Blogs
* Army Audit: Official Sites, Not Blogs, are Security Threat
* Military Security Threat: Bogus Bomb-Zapper's Bogus Countermeasure
* Military Hypes, Bans YouTube
* Petraeus Hearts Milblogs
* No More YouTube, MySpace for U.S. Troops
* Milblogs Boost War Effort
* Pentagon Whispers; Milbloggers Zip Their Lips
* Clarifying the Blog Rule Clarification
* Army to Bloggers: We Won't Bust You. Promise.
* Army's Blog Rebuttal
* Stop Those Leaks!
* Strategic Minds Debate Milblog Crackdown
* Milblog Bust: AP Gets Snowed
* Army: Milblogging is "Therapy," Media is "Threat"
* Urban Legend Led to Army Blog-Bust?
* New Army Rules Could Kill G.I. Blogs (Maybe E-mail, Too)
* Reporters = Foreign Spies?
* Army's Info-Cop Speaks

The genesis of Government cyber war games

9:43AM Tuesday March 11, 2008

There'll be some nervous IT managers in Government departments in Wellington and in the offices of our big infrastructure providers around the country as their networks are poked and prodded by US officials posing as cyber criminals.

It's all part of Cyber Storm II, electronic war games the US is conducting with its military allies, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, who are also its partner in the ECHELON electronic surveillance network.

If you want a good insight into the motivations for setting up the Cyber Storm war games, read this excellent
>New Yorker profile of Michael McConnell, the US Government's director of national intelligence.

As the man coordinating the bodies that make up the US "intelligence community", McConnell was tasked by President Bush with formulating a cyber security strategy after he related the threat to the president in terms he could really relate to.

As the New Yorker puts it: "According to someone who was in the Oval Office, McConnell then said, "If the 9/11 perpetrators had focussed on a single US bank through cyber-attack and it had been successful, it would have an order-of-magnitude greater impact on the US economy."

The President blanched and turned to the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson.

"Is that true, Hank?" he said. Paulson said that it was. The President then charged McConnell to come up with a security strategy, not only for government systems but also for American industry and private individuals.

If the threat to infrastructure from hackers targeting increasingly centralised systems running telecoms and electricity networks as well as the mechanics of government, there's also the threat of electronic information theft.

According to the US Department of Defence, it receives three million unauthorised probes of its networks every day.

Only a tiny sliver of these approaches are successful - at least we only hear about the really bad exploits, like when the Pentagon last year had to shut down hundreds of computers to contain a hack attack. Here's an interesting if dubious YouTube video on that subject.

What's come hand in hand with the post-September 11 attempts to shake up the intelligence community is the use of some very Web 2.0 tools to make spies more efficient.

Again, from the New Yorker:

"In 2006, the community adopted Intellipedia, a secure version of Wikipedia. Blogging is now permitted on internal servers, giving contrarian opinion a voice. There is a new "A-Space"-based on sites such as MySpace and Facebook-in which analysts post their current projects as a way of creating social networks. The Library of National Intelligence is an online digest of official reports that will soon provide analysts who use it with tips, much the way Amazon and iTunes offer recommendations to their customers."

Imagine if someone figured out how to hack Intellipedia. The threats here are most likely of a different sort - attacks on critical infrastructure such as telephone and electricity are more likely than attempts to steal sensitive information, though the GCSB is taking the threat of this seriously.

Barring a major slip-up in which a simulated attack runs wild we're unlikely to hear too much about the results of Cyber Storm II until the US Government releases a progress report, as it did after the last war games exercise which New Zealand was involved in to a lesser extent.

That report pointed out many holes in security, in particular the deficiencies in communications strategies when a major cyber attack is identified.

BREAKING: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED in the closed door session

Yes, it is so dramatic that members of the US CONgress sworn to secrecy are leaking what is about to take place. Here are links and leaked information. Pass this information on as quickly as you can!!

read more | digg story

The number for the Capital Hill switchboard is 202-224-3121.

Start CALLING!! (Even if your phone is tapped and you won't be able to sue for the consequences of that .. )

Last real MSM story on this is: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/3/14/worldupdates/
2008-03-14T025602Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-324733-1&sec=Worldupdates

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED in the Closed Door Session last night

Addenda: Capitol Hill switchboard number

202-224-3121

This either REAL or a cause for real paranoia and should be

reported either way.


Why is there no lamestream media reporting??

http://news.google.ca/news?q=closed+door+session&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org
.mozilla:en-GB:official&client=firefox-a&um=1&sa=N&tab=wn

this link will take you to the last MSM

article written about the topic.

Did Pelosi keep her spine?

http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/3/14/worldupdates
/2008-03-14T025602Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-324733-1&sec=Worldupdates

Here is the pdf on secret sessions:

http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/98-718.pdf

Some days, you just gotta wonder ...

and Hall Turner has proven right on occasion, as

a valuable "leak" ..

BREAKING!!!===What really happened in the Closed Door Session ...

This was only the fourth time in 176 years that Congress has closed its doors to the public. What was it that they were discussing that they do NOT want us ... www.godlikeproductions.com/forum1/message520602/pg1 - 3 hours ago - Similar pages

Special "closed Session" Of U.s. House - Page 2 - David Icke's ...

LAST NIGHTS SESSION WAS ONLY THE FOURTH TIME IN 176 YEARS THAT CONGRESS CLOSED ITS DOORS TO THE PUBLIC Word has begun leaking from last nights special, ... www.davidicke.com/forum/showthread.php?p=303876 - 10 hours ago - Similar pages

Congress closed session

For only the fourth time in 176 years the public was shut out of congress so they could have a closed session with the announcement that it will discuss ... www.pocketfives.com/5CB78692-F97F-43EF-93BF-718D909F7A5F.aspx - 4 hours ago - Similar pages

SPECIAL "CLOSED SESSION" OF U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ...

Thursday, March 13, 2008 LAST NIGHTS SESSION WAS ONLY THE FOURTH TIME IN 176 YEARS THAT CONGRESS CLOSED ITS DOORS TO THE PUBLIC Word has begun leaking from ... www.fourwinds10.com/siterun_data/government/fraud/us_government/news.php?q=1205524843 - 23 hours ago - Similar pages

Sent: Friday, March 14, 2008 4:20 PM
Subject: CLOSED Congress Session Last Night: Only 4th Time In 176 Years !

SPECIAL "CLOSED SESSION" OF U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED A LOT MORE THAN
THE PENDING SECURITY SURVEILLANCE PROVISIONS!

This was only the fourth time in 176 years that Congress
has closed its doors to the public. What was it that they
were discussing that they do NOT want us to know about?

Word has begun leaking from last nights special, closed-door
session of the United States House of Representatives.

Not only did members discuss new surveillance provisions as
was the publicly stated reason for the closed door session, they
also discussed:

1. the imminent collapse of the U.S. economy to occur by
September 2008,

2. the imminent collapse of US federal government finances
by February 2009,

3. the possibility of Civil War inside the USA as a result of
the collapse,

4. advance round-ups of "insurgent U.S. citizens" likely to
move against the government,

5. the detention of those rounded-up at "REX 84" camps
constructed throughout the USA,

6. the possibility of retaliation against members of Congress
for the collapses,

7. the location of "safe facilities" for members of Congress
and their families to reside during expected massive civil
unrest,

8. the necessary and unavoidable merger of the United States
with Canada (for its natural resources) and with Mexico (for its
cheap labor pool),

9. the issuance of a new currency - THE AMERO - for all three
nations as the proposed solution to the coming economic
armageddon.

Members of Congress were FORBIDDEN to reveal what was discussed.
Several are so furious and concerned about the future of the country, they
have begun leaking info. More details coming later today and over the
weekend. SPREAD THE WORD!!!

Backgrounder on Infragard as per Heritage Foundation

Combating Enemies Online: State-Sponsored and Terrorist Use of the Internet

By James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, 2/10/2008 7:56:51 PM

Even before the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, security experts were becoming increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. computer systems and associated infrastructure. The 9/11 attacks amplified these concerns.

Recent cyber initiatives show promise, but a more concerted national effort is required, particularly in acquiring commercial capabilities and services, man­aging military intelligence and information technol­ogy programs, and developing a corps of professional national security practitioners.

Dangers Lurking

In recent years, government and private information networks have increasingly come under attack from a variety of state-sponsored and non-state actors.

State-Sponsored Threats. A widely publicized cyber assault against Estonia in 2007 increased suspi­cions that adversarial states are using online malicious activity as a tool of national policy. The assault disrupted public and private Estonian information networks with massive denial-of-service attacks. Recent revelations of Chinese cyber-espionage activities against sensitive information networks in the United States, Germany, and other countries have further heightened concerns that the World Wide Web is becoming just another battlefield.[1]

The Estonia attacks targeted the Web sites of banks, telecommunication companies, media outlets, and government agencies, eventually forcing the country to block all foreign Internet traffic.[2] Many Web sites were shut down by denial-of-service attacks, in which the attacker uses thousands of hijacked computers to bombard a Web site with use­less information until it is overloaded. For one bank, disruptions in cyberspace resulted in material losses of over $1 million after it was forced to shut down online services.[3] At one point, telephone service for fire and rescue units was suspended for over an hour.[4]

Estonia's defense minister described the attacks as "a national security situation.... It can effectively be compared to when your ports are shut to the sea."[5] The Estonia attacks vividly testify to the dis­ruptive power of a coordinated cyber offensive.

Chinese intentions also give cause for concern. Senior defense analysts believe that China has undertaken a sustained effort to develop informa­tion warfare capabilities to achieve "electromagnetic dominance" over the United States and other poten­tial competitors.[6] Security experts believe that the Chinese government orchestrated a sophisticated cyber-espionage effort known as Titan Rain, which downloaded information from hundreds of unclas­sified defense and civilian networks.[7]

U.S. government information systems are attacked every day from sources within the country and around the world. Some of these intrusions have been extremely serious, compromising security and costing millions of dollars. Penetration of computer networks at the National Defense University proved so pervasive that the university was forced to take the entire computer network offline and install new information system defenses.

In 2007, Der Spiegel alleged that Chinese pro­grammers had placed spy software on computers at the Foreign, Economics, and Research and Devel­opment Ministries as well as on computers used by the Chancellery office.[8] Such Trojan horse programs can capture data from host computers and transmit the information to external users. The immense scale of the Internet espionage operations suggests that they could not have occurred without the knowledge and at least the tacit support of an offi­cial Chinese entity.

Shortly after the Spiegel article was published, officials in Britain, France, the United States, and other countries indicated that they had found simi­lar evidence of Chinese cyber-espionage cam­paigns.[9] This evidence includes media reports of cyber penetration of the U.S. Department of Home­land Security (DHS) and U.S. Department of Defense from Chinese-language Web sites.[10]

Another concern is the surety of original software and computer components. In two recent reports, the Defense Science Board has warned about the potential vulnerability to intrusion, malicious activ­ity, and exploitation via malicious software and semiconductor components.[11]

Non-State Threats. Analysts have also docu­mented a steady increase in terrorists' use of the Internet.[12] In addition, transnational criminal orga­nizations routinely conduct cyber operations, including identity theft and fraud.

Internet Exploitation. One comprehensive sur­vey has identified specific ways that terrorists employ the Internet.[13] They use the Internet to:

• Wage psychological warfare by spreading disinfor­mation, delivering threats to instill fear and help­lessness, and disseminating horrific images. For example, the grisly murder of Daniel Pearl was videotaped by his captors and posted on several terrorist Web sites.
• Create publicity and spread propaganda.
• Gather intelligence. Details about potential targets -- such as transportation facilities, nuclear power plants, public buildings, ports, and airports -- and even counterterrorism measures are avail­able online. For example, the DHS maintains a password-protected online site called Tripwire, which provides information on how to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
• Fundraise. Many Islamic charitable organizations allow users to make a zakat contribution online. Some terrorist organizations use front companies and charitable organizations under their control to receive such donations.
• Recruit and mobilize supporters through chat rooms, cybercafés, and bulletin boards.
• Communicate and coordinate with operatives and supporters. Two terrorist cells in Florida and Can­ada, which were recently disrupted, passed mes­sages via the Internet.
• Share information, such as how to manufacture and use weapons, including bomb-making techniques.
• Plan attacks.To preserve their anonymity, the 9/11 attackers used the public Internet services and sent messages via free Web-based email accounts.

Al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist net­works rely heavily on the Internet to communicate with dispersed operatives. The organization's mes­sages appear on approximately 6,000 Web sites.[14] As-Sahab Institute, al-Qaeda's media component, has released a slew of video s-- about one every three days since the beginning of 2007 -- featuring Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders. Observers have been impressed by both the quan­tity of these releases and the institute's use of the lat­est commercial computer software and hardware in producing and distributing them.[15]

The Internet offers terrorists certain advantages over more traditional means of communication and operation:

• Easy access,
• Little government control,
• Potentially enormous domestic and foreign audiences,
• Anonymous communications,
• Rapid information exchanges,
• Low cost,
• Multimedia platforms, and
• The ability to influence other mass media that rely on the Internet for stories.[16]

The Internet also gives terrorists tremendous operational flexibility. When extremist Web sites have been identified, hacked, or shut down by Inter­net service providers (ISPs), the terrorists have turned to chat rooms and message boards for com­munication. Their Web sites commonly disappear from and return to the Web. Al-Qaeda operatives post their messages and videos on Islamist forums.[17]

Non-State Cyber Attacks. Islamist hackers have promoted the tactic of "electronic jihad," attacking "enemy" Web sites to harm the enemy's morale and economic and military infrastructure. Many Islamist Web sites host forums that discuss how to conduct such Web-based offensives.[18] The Web is a target-rich environment. The Department of Defense alone has 3.5 million computers and 35 internal networks located in 65 countries, many of which depend on commercial systems.[19]

Propaganda and Fundraising. One of the most troubling developments has been the use of the Inter­net by Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq. These groups use the Web to conduct media campaigns by dis­tributing videos, online magazines, blogs, video clips, full-length films, and online television programs. According at an authoritative study by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Arabic Language Service:

[These products are] undermining the authority of the Iraqi government, demoniz­ing coalition forces, fomenting sectarian strife, glorifying terrorism, and perpetrating falsehoods that obscure accounts of respon­sible journalists. Insurgent media seek to create an alternate reality to win hearts and minds, and they are having a considerable degree of success.[20]

These products are designed primarily for politi­cal activists who are native Arabic speakers and have high-speed Internet connections. The majority of downloads are in the Middle East but outside of Iraq. Insurgent media appear to be most effective in fundraising and influencing "opinion makers," and secondarily as a source of recruiting.[21]

The Response

The over 1 billion users on the Internet include threats to American security. Efforts to combat them have been increased as the danger has grown.

Federal Programs. The U.S. government took some measures before 9/11 to enhance cybersecurity and its capacity to combat malicious activity on the Web, including a 1987 requirement that govern­ment personnel protect their computer data and formulation of the first national cybersecurity strat­egy in 2000. However, strong resistance from civil liberties and privacy groups as well as anemic fund­ing from Congress prevented the establishment of a planned government network to detect intrusions.

After the 9/11 attacks, Washington took additional steps to improve the safety and security of its online information. In 2002, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act 2002, which requires agencies to develop policies and standards to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availabil­ity of Internet-based information. In February 2003, the Administration released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.[22]

Homeland Security. In 2003, DHS, in coopera­tion with Carnegie Mellon University, created a com­puter emergency response team (CERT) to coordinate emergency efforts and established an alert system for cyber threats. The US-CERT has also sought to facili­tate public-private cybersecurity partnerships, nota­bly by sponsoring the National Cyber Security Summit in December 2003.7 Today, most responsibil­ity falls under the National Cyber Security Division.

Intelligence Operations. The intelligence com­munity maintains a clandestine technical collection program. Although few operational details are pub­licly available, intelligence agencies are widely believed to have some capability to penetrate com­puter systems used by transnational terrorist net­works. These efforts include passively intercepting communications to identify cells and determine their activities. Presumably, the intelligence commu­nity also has the capacity to disrupt terrorist opera­tions by, for example, denying services, hacking computer programs, and altering terrorist messages.

More is publicly known about the intelligence community's defensive capabilities. Strengthening cybersecurity has been a key objective of the Informa­tion Sharing Environment (ISE), a collection of poli­cies, procedures, and technologies that permit the exchange of terrorism information, including intelli­gence and law enforcement data. The ISE aims to pro­mote a culture of data sharing among its participants to ensure that information is readily available to sup­port their missions. The ISE connects federal, state, local, and tribal governments. It also envisions a criti­cal role for private-sector and foreign actors in sharing information to counter terrorist threats.[23]

Military Responses. The military increasingly envisions cyberspace as a theater of operations. Defense operations range from field activities to strategic campaigns. For example, U.S. forces in Iraq have undertaken operations to suppress insur­gent propaganda networks that use the Internet against coalition forces.[24]

At the national level, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has played a role in global cyber operations since its creation in 1992. STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare was established in 2005 and is responsible for working with federal agencies on computer network defense and for planning offensive information warfare. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency also heads a Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations.

The military services, particularly the Air Force, have demonstrated an increased interest in cyber operations. The Air Force recently announced the creation of a Cyberspace Command on par with other Air Force major commands to develop infor­mation warfare capabilities and doctrine.[25] Lieuten­ant General Robert Elder, Commander of the 8th Air Force, is helping to set up the new command. He has emphasized the need to "ratchet up our capability" in cyberspace to challenge China's emphasis on information warfare.[26]

This military emphasis on cyberspace does not necessarily translate into protection against the kinds of disruptions experienced in Estonia. The Defense Department's policy on cyberwarfare spe­cifically emphasizes protecting the military infor­mation network and developing offensive cyberwar capabilities against potential adversaries.[27]

International Cooperation. The attacks against Estonia, a NATO member, have reenergized multina­tional cyber defense efforts. NATO information spe­cialists have traditionally concentrated on protecting the alliance's own networks, especially those that might support collective military operations. The Estonia incident led NATO to deploy some of its information specialists to provide immediate assistance.[28]

The Estonian CERT was effective in reducing the level of disruption caused by the attacks. By coordi­nating the work of foreign Internet service providers, local law enforcement, and network managers across the country, the CERT ensured that Estonia's infor­mation infrastructure responded in a coordinated manner. Without an empowered and properly funded CERT, the cyber attacks could have lasted much longer and been more disruptive.[29]

However, Estonia's cyber disruption highlighted the need to clarify both international and domestic responses to malicious cyber activities. Member governments are currently studying the question of precisely which conditions would cause such attacks to fall within the alliance's definition of self-defense, requiring a collective NATO response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[30]

NATO is not the only organization demonstrating renewed interest in combating cyber threats. The United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other international bodies have initiated programs aimed at countering information attacks through the Internet, including attacks by terrorist groups.

Public-Private Partnerships. In 2003, the White House issued Homeland Security Presiden­tial Directive 7, which emphasized that "critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essen­tial services that underpin American society."[31] The directive resulted in development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which was released in 2006. The NIPP details cooperative strategies for public-sector and private-sector infor­mation sharing and network protection.[32]

The NIPP relies on several institutions, partic­ularly Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), to facilitate the exchange of information with critical business sectors, such as financial institutions and energy companies. ISACs are established and funded by the private sector, and the data handled by ISACs are provided largely by private-sector participants. ISACs also receive information from other entities, including law enforcement agencies and security associations.[33] In addition to the ISACs, critical business sectors have Sector Coordinating Councils that develop policy recommendations in coordination with government agencies.[34] The NIPP and its associ­ated centers provide the backbone of the DHS cyber effort.

In addition to the strategies outlined by the NIPP, information sharing between government and the private sector receives considerable support from InfraGard, a program established by the FBI in 1996.[35] Originally developed to assist cybercrime investigations, InfraGard facilitates collaboration with law enforcement, business, and academia on a range of security-related issues. InfraGard chapters facilitate information collection, analysis, and train­ing and provide discussion forums to share best practices. InfraGard also provides a secure Web-based communications platform.[36]

Nongovernmental Efforts. Private-sector com­panies, universities, research centers, and nongov­ernmental groups have developed capabilities to combat malicious cyber activities and to investigate or disrupt terrorist operations on the Internet. Per­haps the best-known of these groups is the Internet Security Alliance, a collaboration between the Elec­tronic Industries Alliance, a federation of trade asso­ciations, and Carnegie Mellon University's CyLab. It was established to provide a forum for information sharing and to generate suggestions for strengthen­ing information security.

Many other organizations and private-sector companies support America's cyber defenses. The University of Arizona has conducted a multi-year project called Dark Web, which attempts to monitor how terrorists use the Internet. The university's Arti­ficial Intelligence Lab has accumulated the world's most extensive database of terrorist-related Web sites -- over 500 million pages of messages, images, and videos -- and has made it available to the U.S. military and intelligence communities. Some of its sophisticated software exposes social linkages among radical groups and seeks to identify and track indi­vidual authors by analyzing their writing styles. This knowledge enables researchers to assess which peo­ple are most susceptible to radicalization and which terrorist recruitment messages are most effective. The university recently received a $1.5 million fed­eral grant to concentrate on how extremists use the Internet to teach terrorists how to construct IEDs.[37]

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) publicizes extremist messages on the Inter­net, including terrorist Web sites, discussion forums, and blogs. After MEMRI published a comprehensive survey of Islamist Web sites in 2004, many them were closed down by their hosting ISPs.[38]

After 9/11, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point established a Combating Terrorism Center. Among the center's studies, The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda[39] provides a ready guide to commonly used terrorist graphics, symbols, icons, and photographs.

In addition to these efforts, nongovernmental organizations and private companies provide a vari­ety of analytical and investigative tools for penetrat­ing terrorist operations on the Internet. For example, the Washington-based SITE Intelligence Group rou­tinely monitors, translates, and posts information from terrorist Web sites and often shares that infor­mation with U.S. intelligence agencies.

Finally, software and hardware providers con­tinue to respond to the needs of the marketplace with new services and products to counter illicit online activity, from combating unauthorized intru­sions and countering denial-of-service attacks to preventing the disruption or exploitation of systems or data. Providing security services and products is a multibillion-dollar-a-year industry.

Reinforcing the Cyber Arsenal

A war is raging on the Internet -- a contest of action and counteraction between legitimate users and malicious actors that range from state-spon­sored hackers to terrorists and transnational crimi­nals. However, the perception that the United States is defenseless in the face of illicit exploitation of computer networks is far from accurate. Both the government and the private sector possess signifi­cant capabilities.

Nevertheless, there is little room for compla­cency. New computer advances create new vulnera­bilities. The surety of information systems and the capacity to deter, disrupt, or exploit malicious Inter­net activity will require developing capabilities pro­actively and responding in a timely manner to emerging threats.

Washington is struggling "with understanding and harnessing information technologies and the prospects for cyber-warfare, but these challenges may represent merely the dawn of an age in which military competition is defined by commercial research and development and consumer choice."[40] The federal government is a fairly minor customer in the multitrillion-dollar transnational information industry.

The initiatives that will likely best serve the United States and its friends and allies in the cyber conflicts of the 21st century will be those derived from the private-sector experience, coupled with emerging military and intelligence capabilities to conduct information warfare and law enforcement measures to combat cybercrime. What is required is a national framework that builds on these capabili­ties, encouraging them to collaborate and reinforce one another. They should form the cornerstone of smart strategies for fighting and winning against the cyber threats of the future.

Several principles for cyber security and com­petition should guide U.S. efforts. Specifically, the U.S. should:

• Adopt best practices. Both government agen­cies, such as the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the private sector should continue to develop best practices and lessons learned.[41] These can be effective tools. Ensuring that these practices are continuously updated and applied should be government's first priority. Only programs that establish clear tasks, condi­tions, and standards and that ensure rigorous application will keep up with determined and willful efforts to overcome surety efforts.
• Employ risk-based approaches.[42] All informa­tion programs should include assessments of criti­cality, threat, and vulnerability as well as measures to reduce risks efficiently and effectively.
• Foster teamwork. Cybersecurity is a national responsibility that requires global cooperation. The United States must maintain effective bilat­eral and multinational partnerships to combat cyber threats.[43] These efforts should include rig­orous measures to prevent the export of sensitive technologies to malicious actors, as well as per­sistent vigilance to ensure that adversarial states and transnational terrorist and criminal groups do not penetrate U.S. companies that provide essential national capabilities and sensitive national security services.
• Exploit emergent private-sector capabilities. Critical capabilities could come from many sources, including small companies and foreign countries.[44] The U.S. government needs to become a more agile consumer of cutting-edge commercial capabilities.
• Focus on professional development. Most gov­ernment information programs underperform because they lack clear requirements, have unreal­istic projections of the resources required to imple­ment them, and lack attentive senior leadership. All of these problems can be addressed by main­taining a corps of experienced, dedicated service professionals. National security professionals must have "familiarity with a number of diverse security-related disciplines...and practice in interagency operations, working with different government agencies, the private sector, and international part­ners."[45] These skills and attributes must include expertise in cyber operations, as well as in develop­ing and managing new systems.

Washington can do better in preparing to respond to current and future cyber threats. Long-term commitment and sound initiatives are needed, not massive reorganization and massive infusions of government cash. These initiatives should push for better and faster acquisition of commercial services; better and smarter management of military, intelli­gence, and information technology programs; and better and sustained professional development of federal, state, local, and private-sector leaders.

Next Steps

Washington needs to accept that cyberwar will be an enduring feature of the long war on terror­ism -- perhaps continuing even after the "long war" is won. Thus, Washington should:

• Fund cyber initiatives for the long term. In the past, funding and attention from Congress and the Administration have come in "fits and starts." This practice is counterproductive and should be ended. For example, DHS programs should be funded consistently at about $1 billion annually in constant dollars. In particular, Einstein, a sys­tem that monitors network gateways for com­puter viruses and other malicious computer activity, should be fully funded. Additionally, the budgets of the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State and the intelligence community should adequately reflect their cyber missions, including protecting U.S. infrastructure, fighting cyber­crime and network intrusions, and combating international espionage, sabotage, and disinfor­mation activities.
• Implement the Defense Science Board's rec­ommendations for improving the surety of critical software and microchip components. These recommendations include enhancing edu­cation and training for the acquisition commu­nity on cyber issues, ensuring robust resources for conducting risk assessments and assurance programs for mission-critical systems, improving the quality and surety of Defense Department software, and conducting advanced research on vulnerability detection and mitigation for soft­ware and hardware.
• Continue to emphasize the information-shar­ing environment, as well as various programs under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan that promote effective public-private coop­eration on cyber issues.

The Way Forward

There are no silver bullets to ensure that Ameri­cans can roam the information superhighway freely and safely in the 21st century. Nor are there any guarantees that malicious actors can be kept on the sidelines. On the other hand, consistent, adequately funded programs should give Americans the confi­dence that they can outcompete any adversary in the 21st century.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Dou­glas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of Program Management at the Hudson Institute.

[1]For more on Chinese cyber-espionage, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Trojan Dragon: China's Cyber Threat," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2016, Feb. 8, 2008, at

http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2016.cfm

[2]Peter Finn, "Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic," The Washington Post, May 19, 2007, p. A1, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/18/AR2007051802122.html

(Jan. 31, 2008), and Ian Traynor, "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia," The Guardian, May 17, 2007, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html (Jan. 29, 2008).

[3]Mark Landler and John Markoff, "Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia," The New York Times, May 24, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html (Jan. 31, 2008).

[4]"Newly Nasty," The Economist, May 24, 2007, at http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9228757 (Jan. 29, 2008).

[5]Landler and Markoff, "Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia."

[6]U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China: 2007, 2007, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[7]Bradley Graham, "Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites," The Washington Post, Aug. 25, 2005, p. A1, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/24/ AR2005082402318.html (Jan. 29, 2008).

[8]"Chinesische Trojaner auf PCs im Kanzleramt" (Chinese Trojans in Chancellor Office PCs), Der Spiegel, Aug. 25, 2007, at http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/tech/0,1518,501954,00.html (Jan. 28, 2008).

[9]Demetri Sevastopulo and Richard McGregor, "Chinese Hacked into Pentagon," Financial Times, Sept. 3, 2007, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dba9ba2-5a3b-11dc-9bcd-0000779fd2ac.html (Jan. 31, 2008).

[10]Ellen Nakashima and Brian Krebs, "Contractor Blamed in DHS Data Breaches," The Washington Post, Sept. 24, 2007, p. A1, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/23/AR2007092301471.html (Jan. 31, 2008).

[11]Defense Science Board, Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software, September 2007, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2007-09-Mission_Impact_of_Foreign_ Influence_on_DoD_Software.pdf (Jan. 31, 2008), and High Performance Microchip Supply, February 2005, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf (Jan. 31, 2008).

[12]For example, see Jim Melnick, "The Cyberwar Against the United States," The Boston Globe, Aug. 19, 2007, at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/08 /19/the_cyberwar_against_the_united_states (Jan. 31, 2008).

[13]Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 116, March 2004, at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[14]Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Al Qaeda on the Ropes?" The Washington Times, Sept. 28, 2007, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20070928/COMMENTARY/109 280001/1012/commentary (Jan. 31, 2008).

[15]Shaun Waterman, "Al Qaeda Tapes Grow in Number, Expertise," The Washington Times, Sept. 24, 2007, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070924/FOREIGN/109240065/1001 (Jan. 31, 2008).

[16]Weimann, "www.terror.net."

[17]Middle East Media Research Institute, "The Enemy Within: Where Are the Islamist/Jihadist Websites Hosted, and What Can Be Done About It?" Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 374, July 19, 2007, at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA37407 (Jan. 29, 2008).

[18]Ibid.

[19]"US and China Leaders Thursday Add Cyber Warfare to Agenda Including Trade and Global Warming," San Francisco Sentinel, Sept. 5, 2007, at http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=4759 (Jan. 29, 2008).

[20]Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Special Report, June 2007, p. 4, at http://realaudio.rferl.org/online/OLPDFfiles/insurgent.pdf (Jan. 31, 2008).

[21]Ibid., p. 62.

[22]The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[23]Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, November 2006, at http://ise.gov/docs/ise-impplan-200611.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[24]Jim Michaels, "U.S. Pulls Plug on 6 Al-Qaeda Outlets," USA Today, Oct. 5, 2007, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-10-04-Mediacenter_N.htm (Jan. 31, 2008).

[25]Mackenzie Eaglen, "The Air Force's Cyber Command: Combating Electronic and Network Threats," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1629, Sept. 20, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm1629.cfm

[26]"General: China Taking on U.S. in Cyber Arms Race," CNN, June 13, 2007.

[27]Clay Wilson, "Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated Sept. 14, 2006, at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31787.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[28]Jim Michaels, "NATO to Study Defense Against Cyberattacks," USA Today, June 15, 2007.

[29]Ben Arnoldy and Gordon Lubold, "Could US Repel a Cyberattack?" The Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 2007, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0607/p01s01-usmi.htm (Jan. 29, 2008).

[30]Greg Jaffe, "Gates Urges NATO Ministers to Defend Against Cyber Attacks," The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2007.

[31]George W. Bush, "Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection," Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, Dec. 17, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html (Jan. 29, 2008).

[32]U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006, at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[33]Ibid. ISACs exist for 14 types of critical infrastructures. For a current assessment of their effectiveness, see Eileen R. Larence and David A. Powner, "Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors," GAO-07-626T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 20, 2007, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07626t.pdf (Jan. 29, 2008).

[34]U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

[35]InfraGard, "About InfraGard," at http://www.infragard.net/about.php?mn=1&sm=1-0 (Jan. 31, 2008).

[36]Ibid.

[37]Eric Swedlund, "UA Effort Sifting Web for Terror-Threat Data," Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 24, 2007, at http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/202724.php (Jan. 31, 2008).

[38]Marie-Hélène Boccara, "Islamist Websites and Their Hosts Part I: Islamist Terror Organizations," Middle East Media Research Institute Special Report No. 31, July 16, 2004, at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR3104 (Jan. 29, 2008), and Marie-Hélène Boccara and Alex Greenberg, "Islamist Websites and Their Hosts Part II: Clerics," Middle East Media Research Institute Special Report No. 35, November 11, 2004, at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR3504 (Jan. 29, 2008).

[39]U.S. Military Academy, Department of Social Science, Combating Terrorism Center, The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda, March 2006, at http://ctc.usma.edu/imagery/imagery.asp (Jan. 29, 2008).

[40]James Jay Carafano, "Sustaining Military Capabilities in the 21st Century: Rethinking the Utility of the Principles of War," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 896, Sept. 6, 2005, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl896.cfm

[41]For example, see Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano, Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing and Surviving Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp. 200-202.

[42]Ibid., pp. 287-290.

[43]James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, "Enhancing International Collaboration for Homeland Security," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2078, Oct. 18, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2078.cfm

[44]For example, see James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, "Protecting Privacy and Providing Security: A Case of Sensible Outsourcing," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1810, Nov. 5, 2004, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1810.cfm

[45]James Jay Carafano, "Missing Pieces in Homeland Security: Interagency Education, Assignments, and Professional Accreditation," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1013, Oct. 16, 2006, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm

HawaiiReporter.com reports the real news, and prints all editorials submitted, even if they do not represent the viewpoint of the editors, as long as they are written clearly. Send editorials to mailto:Malia@HawaiiReporter.com

Less attention, however, has been paid to state sponsors of illicit computer activity, which are increasingly using the Internet to conduct espionage, deny services to domestic and foreign audiences, and influence global opinion. In addition, insufficient focus has been given to how terrorists exploit the Internet as a tool for recruiting, fund raising, propa­ganda, and intelligence collection and use it to plan, coordinate, and control terrorist operations. Combat­ing these malicious activities on the Internet will require the cooperation of federal entities, as well as friendly and allied countries and the private sector.

Pentagon: The internet needs to be dealt with as if it were an enemy "weapons system" WTF!!

Pentagon: The internet needs to be dealt with as if it were an enemy "weapons system". By Brent Jessop

Global Research, February 2, 2008

Knowledge Driven Revolution.com - 2007-11-19

Information Operation Roadmap Part 3 The Pentagon's Information Operations Roadmap is blunt about the fact that an internet, with the potential for free speech, is in direct opposition to their goals. The internet needs to be dealt with as if it were an enemy "weapons system". The 2003 Pentagon document entitled the Information Operation Roadmap was released to the public after a Freedom of Information Request by the National Security Archive at George Washington University in 2006. A detailed explanation of the major thrust of this document and the significance of information operations or information warfare was described by me here. Computer Network Attack From the Information Operation Roadmap: "When implemented the recommendations of this report will effectively jumpstart a rapid improvement of CNA [Computer Network Attack] capability." - 7 "Enhanced IO [information operations] capabilities for the warfighter, including: ... A robust offensive suite of capabilities to include full-range electronic and computer network attack..." [emphasis mine] - 7 Would the Pentagon use its computer network attack capabilities on the Internet? Fighting the Net "We Must Fight the Net. DoD [Department of Defense] is building an information-centric force. Networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity, and the Department must be prepared to "fight the net." " [emphasis mine] - 6 "DoD's "Defense in Depth" strategy should operate on the premise that the Department will "fight the net" as it would a weapons system." [emphasis mine] - 13 It should come as no surprise that the Pentagon would aggressively attack the "information highway" in their attempt to achieve dominance in information warfare. Donald Rumsfeld's involvement in the Project for a New American Century sheds more light on the need and desire to control information. PNAC Dominating Cyberspace The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) was founded in 1997 with many members that later became the nucleus of the George W. Bush administration. The list includes: Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz among many other powerful but less well know names. Their stated purpose was to use a hugely expanded U.S. military to project "American global leadership." In September of 2000, PNAC published a now infamous document entitled Rebuilding America's Defences. This document has a very similar theme as the Pentagon's Information Operations Roadmap which was signed by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. From Rebuilding America's Defenses: "It is now commonly understood that information and other new technologies... are creating a dynamic that may threaten America's ability to exercise its dominant military power." [emphasis mine] - 4 "Control of space and cyberspace. Much as control of the high seas - and the protection of international commerce - defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new "international commons" be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the "infosphere" will find it difficult to exert global political leadership." [emphasis mine] - 51 "Although it may take several decades for the process of transformation to unfold, in time, the art of warfare on air, land, and sea will be vastly different than it is today, and "combat" likely will take place in new dimensions: in space, "cyber-space," and perhaps the world of microbes." [emphasis mine] - 60 For more on Rebuilding America's Defences read this. Internet 2 Part of the Information Operation Roadmap's plans for the internet are to "ensure the graceful degradation of the network rather than its collapse." (pg 45) This is presented in "defensive" terms, but presumably, it is as exclusively defensive as the Department of Defense. As far as the Pentagon is concerned the internet is not all bad, after all, it was the Department of Defense through DARPA that gave us the internet in the first place. The internet is useful not only as a business tool but also is excellent for monitoring and tracking users, acclimatizing people to a virtual world, and developing detailed psychological profiles of every user, among many other Pentagon positives. But, one problem with the current internet is the potential for the dissemination of ideas and information not consistent with US government themes and messages, commonly known as free speech. Naturally, since the plan was to completely dominate the "infosphere," the internet would have to be adjusted or replaced with an upgraded and even more Pentagon friendly successor. In an article by Paul Joseph Watson of Prison Planet.com, he describes the emergence of Internet 2. "The development of "Internet 2" is also designed to create an online caste system whereby the old Internet hubs would be allowed to break down and die, forcing people to use the new taxable, censored and regulated world wide web. If you're struggling to comprehend exactly what the Internet will look like in five years unless we resist this, just look at China and their latest efforts to completely eliminate dissent and anonymity on the web." Conclusion The next article will examine the Pentagon's use of psychological operations or PSYOP and the final article in this series will examine whether or not there are any limits to using information operations on the American public or foreign audiences.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Research on Globalization. To become a Member of Global Research The CRG grants permission to cross-post original Global Research articles on community internet sites as long as the text & title are not modified. The source and the author's copyright must be displayed. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: crgeditor@yahoo.com www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner. For media inquiries: crgeditor@yahoo.com © Copyright Brent Jessop, Knowledge Driven Revolution.com , 2007 The url address of this article is: www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=7980

none of my posts about the internet lock down are showing up on google

A third undersea Internet cable has been damaged in the Middle East, adding to the disruption in online services after two other lines were cut earlier this week, the cable operating firm said.The Falcon cable was cut 56 kilometres (35 miles) from Dubai, between Oman and the United Arab Emirates, according to its owner, FLAG Telecom, which is part of India’s Reliance Communications.

The repair ship had been notified and was expected to arrive at the site in the next few days, the company said on its website.

Flag Telecom owns another cable that was damaged off Egypt on Wednesday. A repair ship was expected to arrive by Tuesday to restore that cable and repairs were expected to take a week, the company said.

The outages have disrupted business across the Middle East and South Asia, including in India, where businesses said it may take up to 15 days to return to norm.

Breitbart | February 2, 2008

How long before the World experiences a "Cyber 9/11?"

How long before the world experiences a "Cyber 9/11?"

As other more astute writers on WUFYS have pointed out, it doesn't take a genius to see where Weinmann wants to lead the U.S. and much of the world: Into a land where our thoughts and conversations are monitored 24/7. And those that don't meet secret guidelines for "political correctness" and thought control will be banished from the Web--like WUYFYS and www.whatreallyhappened.com/">What Really Happened. Or, tossed in prison, like Ernest Zundel.

Not if, but when this "Cyber 9/11" takes place, it will be used as an excuse to stomp on civil liberties and wage more wars for Empire and Israel, just like the WTC 9/11 attacks have been used.

"Terror" on the Internet by Haifa University professor Gabriel Weimann

Weimann is not only a professor at Haifa University, he is also a "fellow" at a place called the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)--which is funded by the U.S. Congress. USIP also receives gifts and contributions from private agencies, organizations, corporations, or other legal entities, except they fail to say who those agencies, etc. are.

USIP proclaims that their is mission to help prevent, manage and resolve violent international conflicts.

To that end, they pay "fellows" like Weinmann to write policy papers, stating USIP's dogma, such as "The Theater of Terror" and a book on Ernest Zundel.

Some other "fellows" at USIP have been: Daniel Benjamin; Jacob Berkovitch: Avner and Raymond Cohen; Shmuel Eisenstadt; Lily Feldman; Shlomo Gazit; Moshe Ma'oz; Donald Rothchid; Robert Rothstein and Mark Katz........... and on and on. Here's a complete list of these fellows.

Weinmann is good at finding non-existent threats and propping up the current state mandated boogieman, aL-Qaeda.

However, he says time and again thru his articles things such as: it is important to keep in mind that to date there are no documented examples of terrorists using the Internet to launch an attack.

But that doesn't stop Weinmann from promoting goverment monitoring and censorship of the web, like his following comments from the Christian Science Monitor.

Modify the Patriot Act to allow Internet monitoring similar to the way passengers are screened for airline travel.

(Like the screening now done in the U.S. by the thugs at the TSA?

Where people are held up for hours on end for no apparent reason? Yeah, that would work just fine on the 'Net. Connection speeds would go back to prehistoric times of around 8,000 kbps, while others would be kicked off the web.)

Many of the large ones now, he says, have requirements - no violence or pornography. They could monitor for the promotion of terror as well.

Form an international collaborative of Western countries, the ones that have more stable, advanced Internet services. They could better monitor or prevent these sites from running terror material.

(Wonder if "Israel" is one of these Western countries he speaks of that will be trusted to "monitor" the web?)

Weinmann is all in favor of government spying on people thru the Carnivore , AKA DCS 1000 and Magic Lanternprograms.

"Magic Lantern" is particularly invasive, as it is a

"keylogging software that is a combination computer worm/trojan horse. It installs itself on the target computer and allows for keystroke capturing."

As other more astute writers on WUFYS have pointed out, it doesn't take a genius to see where Weinmann wants to lead the U.S. and much of the world: Into a land where our thoughts and conversations are monitored 24/7. And those that don't meet secret guidelines for "political correctness" and thought control will be banished from the Web--like WUYFYS and www.whatreallyhappened.com/">

What Really Happened Or, tossed in prison, like Ernest Zundel.

Not if, but when this "Cyber 9/11" takes place, it will be used as an excuse to stomp on civil liberties and wage more wars for Empire and Israel, just like the WTC 9/11 attacks have been used.

From USIP's web site:

Gabriel Weimann is a prominent and prolific analyst of international terrorism and the mass media, and professor of communications at the University of Haifa, Israel. Since 1997, he has led a large research project that has catalogued and tracked hundreds of web sites used by terrorist organizations and their affiliates to recruit and mobilize supporters, to raise funds, and to plan and coordinate attacks. His publications include five books—among them The Theater of Terror: The Mass Media and International Terrorism, Communicating Unreality: Mass Media and Reconstruction of Realities, and Hate on Trial: The Zundel Case—and more than 100 book chapters and articles on conflict, terrorism, the mass media information technologies, and the Internet.

Cyberterrorism: Fact vs. Fiction

Cyberwar and cyberterrorism have been especially appealing to the media and the popular imagination because they combine two prime sources of fear—fear of technology and fear of terrorist violence. While there is some cause for concern about cyberterrorism, it is important to keep in mind that to date there are no documented examples of terrorists using the Internet to launch an attack (such as using a computer to disrupt power grids or take over the control of a plane). In contrast, Weimann presented several examples of more typical uses of the Internet by terrorists such as a web site run by Hezbollah with downloadable games for children and two distinct Tamil Tigers (LTTE) web sites tailored to a local and an international audience.

And yet, despite all the gloomy predictions of a cyber-generated doomsday, no single instance of real cyberterrorism has been recorded.

Amid all the dire warnings and alarming statistics that the subject of cyberterrorism generates, it is important to remember one simple statistic: so far, there has been no recorded instance of a terrorist cyberattack on U.S. public facilities, transportation systems, nuclear power plants, power grids, or other key components of the national infrastructure. Cyberattacks are common, but they have not been conducted by terrorists and they have not sought to inflict the kind of damage that would qualify them as cyberterrorism.

Source: USIP

How to Fight a 'Virtual' War Against Terrorism

According to Weimann, understanding terrorists' activities on the Internet is only the beginning of the problem; the challenge remains to balance the effort to control these activities with the need to preserve civil liberties. Several government counterterrorist measures have been implemented since the attacks of September 11, 2001. These include the use of "sniffers" such as Carnivore and Magic Lantern which can search for certain information or keywords. In addition, there have been efforts to remove material from web sites or even remove entire web sites. These and other countermeasures force officials and citizens to ask hard questions about what price they are willing to pay, and what opportunities are being lost, in the cyberwar against terrorism.

Realistically, the best approach to preventing abuse of the Internet by terrorists will require both the acceptance of some vulnerabilities and some constraints on civil liberties. Weimann's recommendations for such an "optimal compromise" include:

• Modifying the Patriot Act, especially to increase the transparency of Internet security measures;
• Applying the "social responsibility" model to the Internet (e.g., self-policing by ISPs);
• Encouraging international collaboration (to the maximal extent possible);
• Creating education and counterterrorism sites;
• Promoting peaceful uses of the Internet for conflict management and resolution (such as explored in the Institute's Virtual Diplomacy Initiative).

In closing, Weimann warned that efforts to fight the war against terrorism both off- and online, should not overshadow or take away from the potential benefits of the Internet to the international community. "Once we only look at the Internet as a battlefield, where they fight us and we have to minimize access," Weimann stressed, "we may miss the opportunity to look at the Internet as a peaceful place, as an arena where nonviolent exchange can take place and even the peaceful resolution of conflict."

For more information on this topic see Weimann's March and May 2004 Special Reports: www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.