Showing posts with label Putin Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Putin Russia. Show all posts

March 22, 2008

What's up in Earth science curricula today?

At the University of London Earth Sciences these days



Earth sciences courses - part-time and full-time study


MPhil/PhD courses, 2008/2009 entry (part-time and full-time study)

Postgraduate courses, 2008/2009 entry (part-time and full-time study)

Undergraduate courses, 2008/2009 entry (part-time study)

Non-award courses, 2007/2008 entry (part-time study)

Modules, 2007/2008 entry

March 20, 2008

Police raid British-Russian oil major in Moscow

Russian police raided the headquarters of British-Russian oil giant TNK-BP in the centre of Moscow on Wednesday, a spokeswoman for the interior ministry told AFP.

The spokeswoman, Irina Dudukina, said there had been "a seizure" of documents in the context of a police inquiry into a company linked to TNK-BP. A company spokesman would neither confirm nor deny the raid.

"The seizure is taking place within the framework of an ongoing investigation concerning the Sidanko group," Dudukina said, referring to one of the companies that was merged to form TNK-BP in 2003.

Just a brief news item for now.

I recently posted on the politicization of Russian oil via the St. Petersburg Times writer.

This is fascinating and we will undoubtedly be revisiting this story. There is more to the GLOBE than just Western economics and politics ..

Hopefully some good articles on this will appear from various sources so we can piece this all together as information becomes available. Remember: Putin's expertise is in OIL, and that was his brief at the KGB. This is MAJOR, I am sure of it, but of course more shall be revealed.

V


TNK-BP, which is jointly owned by British oil giant BP and by a group of Russian billionaires, has faced growing pressure in Russia, where the oil and gas business is coming increasingly under state control.

TNK-BP has been hit by tax claims for more than a billion dollars and has lost the rights to exploit the vast Kovytka gas field in Siberia. TNK-BP has also been the subject of inquiries by Russia's secret service.

"We are always ready to cooperate with the law enforcement authorities as we always do if that should become necessary," TNK-BP spokeswoman Marina Dracheva told AFP when asked about the raid.

Shares in TNK-BP fell by ten percent on the Russian stock exchange after news of the raid, Interfax news agency reported.

March 18, 2008

Russia politics and oil .. St. Petersburg Times

Here is an article to help you get the Russian political and oil picture all at once.

Excellent piece!!




NEWS ANALYSIS


How the State Got a Grip on Energy, Putting Natural Resources Back in the State’s Hands


Staff Writer

The Associated Press

President Vladimir Putin shaking hands with workers during a presidential campaign stop at an oil field in Surgut on March 3, 2000. His presidency saw a move to state ownership in the sector.

It was early March 2000 when Vladimir Putin landed in Surgut, one stop on a long campaign trail that would help take the acting president to the official seat in the Kremlin.

He toured the oil fields that surrounded the bleak west Siberian city, shaking hands with the men who toiled to produce the black gold that was the country’s lifeblood.

It was in Surgut — before the high-profile arrests and well before the days of $100-per-barrel oil — that Putin first gave a glimpse into what would become a defining strategy of his eight-year rule.

“We will support [oil and gas companies] by all means, but we will also control their work,” he said, hinting at a sector-wide review that would boost the state’s presence in an industry that had become the domain of dueling oligarchs.

Eight years later, two state champions — Rosneft in oil and Gazprom in gas — tower over a sector that provides for two-thirds of the federal budget and forms the foundation of the country’s swaggering foreign policy.

The road to majority state control was rough, leaving a number of private businessmen jailed or exiled and foreign companies largely sidelined. Most worrisome, insiders and analysts said, was that the strategy of state control has left production stagnating at near crisis levels, as the firms were encouraged to focus on acquisitions rather than making much-needed investments in new fields.

“We had high hopes that this period, an eight- to 10-year period, would be one of the major breakthroughs in developing certain very important projects,” said Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister.

Instead, Milov, who became a Kremlin critic after leaving the Energy Ministry in 2002, speaks of an era of

“disappointed expectations.”

“Putin’s legacy is largely a bunch of heavy discussions with few delivered projects,”
he said.
“Putin’s presidency has mostly focused on the redistribution of ownership and using energy resources as a tool for expanding Russia’s international influence.”

An Encouraging Start

When Putin came to power around 90 percent of the country’s oil production lay in private hands. Foreign oil companies, like Shell and ExxonMobil, ran huge projects in the east, after concluding preferential contracts in the mid-1990s that offered them favorable terms in order to compensate for the country’s volatile tax and legal system.

It was a total departure from the policy of the Soviet state that built Putin and an anathema to the powerful state that he hoped to rebuild. He took notice of the fact early, devoting a 1997 doctoral thesis at the St Petersburg Mining Institute to the state’s role in managing natural resources.

That role was impossible to realize while the country was run by a gaggle of oligarchs long used to pulling the Kremlin’s strings. Putin quickly moved to rein them in, calling a meeting in late 2000 to announce: Stay out of politics and business is yours.

Investors were encouraged. Putin appointed liberals to top government spots. In September 2000 he visited the far eastern island of Sakhalin and called for foreign investors to be supported.

He urged a revitalization of the energy industry by bringing online new oil and gas fields in the largely untouched eastern Siberia and offshore regions, as well as new export pipelines, such as a major route to the northern port of Murmansk.

The optimism reached its peak in February 2003, when a trio of oligarchs joined with British oil major BP to form TNK-BP, a 50-50 venture formed around the flagship gas field of Kovykta, in largely untapped eastern Siberia.

Announcing the deal, Mikhail Fridman, head of TNK-BP shareholder Alfa Group, said: “It is a reflection of the political change that has taken place in Russia over the past three years. Russia has stopped being associated with instability and nontransparency.”

The Yukos Attack

Five months later, Platon Lebedev, a major shareholder in oil firm Yukos, was arrested on suspicion of illegally acquiring shares in a fertilizer firm Apatit back in 1994. In October 2003, Khodorkovsky, Yukos CEO and then the country’s richest man, was arrested and the legal onslaught on the country’s largest oil company began, forever changing the landscape of the energy sector and the view of Russia and Putin’s Kremlin.

What precisely prompted the arrest is anybody’s guess — that Khodorkovsky was on the verge of selling a 25 percent stake in Yukos to a U.S. oil company, that he was planning to build a pipeline to China to bypass state-run pipeline monopoly Transneft, that he was openly funding opposition deputies ahead of December’s State Duma vote, or that he planned to grow even larger through a merger with Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft.

The final straw came in February 2003, when Khodorkovsky publicly criticized Putin for state-run Rosneft’s murky acquisition of medium-sized producer Severnaya Neft.

“We knew we would have serious problems,” said Alexander Temerko, a former Yukos vice president now living in self-imposed exile in London. “While they had a monopoly position in gas [with Gazprom], they didn’t have one in oil.”

Khodorkovsky was sentenced in 2004 to eight years in prison on charges of fraud and tax evasion, and the lion’s share of Yukos assets went to Rosneft in a series of orchestrated auctions, epitomized by the December 2004 sale of Yuganskneftegaz. He accused Igor Sechin, Putin’s powerful deputy chief of staff and chairman of Rosneft’s board, of orchestrating the attack on Yukos.

Yuganskneftegaz, which produces 11 percent of all Russian oil, went to an obscure company called Baikal Finance Group for just $9.4 billion. Rosneft bought Baikal weeks later, tripling its own production overnight and putting it on the path to becoming the country’s largest oil producer — a goal it achieved last year after buying the two remaining large Yukos units up for grabs.

“We are a state company and at the same time a public company, and one of our strategic priorities is to continue to improve our operations in order to demonstrate to our main shareholder that we are the best partner for developing new assets in Russia,” said Rosneft vice president Peter O’Brien, an American who was brought to the company ahead of its July 2006 initial public offering in London, which saw nearly 15 percent of the company sold off.

“During the IPO process, clearly some market participants, whether press or investors, did have a view toward the Yukos process which inhibited them from taking part in the IPO,” he said, but added, “Since the IPO, as we’ve followed through on increasing transparency and profitability, interest and share ownership by leading global institutions has accelerated.”

Alexanderr Belenky / The St. Petersburg Times


Rosneft’s Yukos acquisitions, plus Gazprom’s purchase of Sibneft in 2005, drastically boosted the state’s share in the energy game.

The approach was codified as early as May 2003, when the Cabinet passed an energy strategy through 2020 that signaled the beginning of the end of private reign over the sector.

Temerko, the former Yukos vice president, said that, after reading the strategy, “we knew they’d go after some company.”

The first line of the strategy reads: “Russia possesses great energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex that provide the basis of economic development and are the instrument for carrying out domestic and foreign policy.”

“It was then we realized the state runs everything,”

Temerko said.

It took foreign oil companies and foreign capitals longer to wise up.

The euphoria of the TNK-BP deal faded into widespread concern over the role foreign firms would play, as they functioned in a legal vacuum while the state carved out its strategy through practice rather than regulations.

“[TNK-BP] represented the end of that chapter, when foreign companies could get almost unrestricted access to Russia’s energy sector,” said Chris Weafer, chief strategist at UralSib.

A notable exception is ConocoPhillips’ 2004 acquisition of a small stake in private oil firm LUKoil, which it has since increased to 20 percent.

Foreign oil firms rushed the country in the mid-1990s, capitalizing on its chaotic industrial landscape to win major contracts in the country with the world’s largest proven gas reserves and vast untapped oil fields. For the most part, they were awarded production-sharing agreements, which ensured that the firms would win back all expenditures before paying out revenues to the state.

With the oil price inching ever higher on the back of instability in the Middle East and rising demand from China and India, Putin realized that the state was missing out on billions of dollars per year and soon joined the trend of global resource nationalism.

Sustained campaigns led by Oleg Mitvol, the deputy head of the Natural Resources Ministry’s environmental watchdog, cast shadows over Royal Dutch Shell’s PSA at Sakhalin-2 and TNK-BP’s flagship Kovykta project.

Months of pressure, during which Mitvol threatened to revoke the firms’ licenses over purported environmental violations, ended with Shell handing a controlling stake in Sakhalin-2 to Gazprom and TNK-BP selling the entirety of its 63 percent stake in Kovykta to Gazprom.

Rather than codifying a long-awaited law on strategic sectors, which would limit foreign involvement to 49 percent stakes, Putin laid out his strategy through practice.

“It’s a strategic sector and certain rules are being applied, like in every country of the world,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

“The situation with Sakhalin and Kovykta occurred when foreign companies, foreign major shareholders, were having problems with Russian law. It is easier for every company to have a joint venture with Russian partners to avoid that,” he said.

Gazprom’s stake in Sakhalin-2, a sprawling project in the Far East, gave it a foothold in the country’s first foray into liquefied natural gas, in which gas is cooled to liquid form so it can be easier stored and shipped on tankers, rather than confined to pipelines.

Yet it has failed to follow through on decades-long promises to develop much-needed fields on the Yamal Peninsula and has delayed plans to produce from Shtokman, a field in the Arctic offshore estimated to hold 3.7 trillion cubic meters of gas.

“It is much easier to use the windfall to acquire companies that already generate cash” than bring new projects online, Milov said. “I’ll quote a top Gazprom manager, who once said to me, ‘Why should we bury money in Yamal, in the development of projects that will start to deliver in a decade, when many Gazprom managers will be long gone?’”

This has prompted concern in Europe, which relies in Russia for one-quarter of its gas supplies — an amount expected to grow to half by 2030.

The Gazprom Behemoth

Many had held high hopes that Putin would seek to reform Gazprom after replacing Yeltsin’s management team with his own, led by St. Petersburg native Alexei Miller as CEO.

Yet, eight years later, Gazprom remains an unwieldy behemoth, employing some 500,000 people and the domain of competing clans eager to shape what has become the country’s largest firm by market capitalization, with a value of $312 billion. Its current chairman is President-Elect Dmitry Medvedev.

A politically tinged pricing dispute with Ukraine in January 2006 signaled to Europe the return of “the Russian bear.”

“EU fears of over-dependence on Russian gas are a concrete expression of the progressive breakdown of political relations with Moscow, stemming from a range of issues of Russian domestic and international politics,” said Jonathan Stern, gas expert at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies.

Just months after Ukraine’s Orange Revolution ushered in a Western-leaning government, Gazprom abruptly announced its own brand of shock therapy in December 2005, cutting subsidies to Kiev and drastically raising gas prices to its eastern neighbor. When Kiev couldn’t pay, Gazprom shut the taps, reducing shipments not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe, which gets some 80 percent of its Russian gas shipments through pipelines that crisscross the country.

“I don’t think it really led to any serious change with Europe, which is traditionally our biggest market,” said Ilya Kochevrin, executive director at Gazprom Export. “The only recognition is that we need to be more proactive in explaining our position.”

Igor Tabakov / The St. Petersburg Times

Mikhail Khodorkovsky on trial

Kochevrin said he did not believe that resistance to Gazprom expansion into Europe, as well as Brussels’ proposal last year to bar non-EU firms from owning majority stakes in pipelines or power grids in the absence of reciprocal agreements, were direct responses to Gazprom’s growing politicized clout.

Pricing disputes with neighboring countries prompted Gazprom to pursue a strategy of direct shipments to Europe, including the Nord Stream pipeline, which will pump gas directly to Germany, and South Stream, which will send gas to the Balkans.

Putin has spent the past few years eagerly pushing “strategic reciprocity,” hoping to gain a solid foothold in the European market beyond long-term gas supply deals and pipeline agreements.

Yet, with the notable exceptions of Germany and Italy, Europe’s two largest gas importers, the opposition has been stiff.

“When we talk about the energy sector in Russia it is impossible to separate politics and economics, and that’s never going to change,” said Weafer of UralSib.

It is also impossible to separate the personal and professional, since, as one former bureaucrat put it,

“everyone is trying to be the next Armand Hammer,”
referring to the U.S. oil magnate who won key deals during the Soviet era through strong relationships with the leadership.

Putin’s close relationship with Gerhard Schroeder put the former German chancellor at the head of the Nord Stream consortium.

Those who fall afoul of the regime and its energy champions tend to suffer. William Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital Management, then Russia’s biggest foreign portfolio investor, was denied entry into the country upon landing at Sheremetyevo Airport in November 2005, on the suspicion that he posed a threat to national security. The move was widely seen as retaliation for Browder’s outspoken calls to improve Gazprom’s transparency.

Supply Shortages

One of the most worrisome results of the past eight years, insiders and analysts said, is that Russia may soon face the prospect of failing to produce enough oil and gas supplies to feed growing markets both at home and abroad.

One hallmark of Putin’s presidency was the decision to liberalize gas prices inside the country, due to be achieved by 2011, in order to make the domestic market more attractive for its producers.

Yet, the fact remains that production at Soviet-era fields in western Siberia is dwindling, and political distraction, in addition to unfavorably high tax regimes, means that the Arctic and eastern offshores remain largely undeveloped.

“This is the result of the fact that private initiatives have been curbed and the advantage has been given to state companies, whose interest is not in production, but in the redistribution of control,” Milov said.

This has also increased Russia’s dependence on buying gas from Central Asia, in the absence of long-term supply contracts and amid signs that countries like Turkmenistan are seeking to raise their own prices to market levels.

Milov said Central Asian gas comprised 8 percent of Gazprom’s reserve base, up from 4 percent in 2002. And oil production, after years of a steady rising, faces the specter of falling flat this year.

“Without Rosneft, Russian production recently has basically been flat. With Rosneft, it’s growing 1 to 2 percent annually,” said O’Brien of Rosneft. “The vast majority of other oil producers are now fighting declining production.

“Ruble appreciation and inflation and a tax regime that is outdated will soon make it difficult to approve some potential projects,” O’Brien said. “Many projects look questionable in terms of future profitability, even with fairly optimistic, that is, low, inflation assumptions.”

“If something is not done soon, then many companies, particularly those with older portfolios, will need to reject investment proposals and as a result will see an accelerating decline in their oil production,” he said.

Putin has followed through on promises to reassert the state’s influence. Around 42 percent of Russian production now lies in state hands, versus 10 percent when he first took the reins, according to UralSib research.

That proportion is expected to rise if troubled oil producer Russneft, whose former owner Mikhail Gutseriyev last year accused the Kremlin of forcing him to sell, ends up in state hands. The fate of TNK-BP also remains unclear.

The world of energy reflects the broader state of the country. Its firms are staffed with Putin’s friends and FSB agents, from new Transneft chief Nikolai Tokarev to Andrei Patrushev, the younger son of Federal Security Service director Nikolai Patrushev who acts as an adviser at Rosneft.

It is fiercely controlled from the Kremlin. Before Putin announced that he would take the prime minister’s seat upon Medvedev’s election to the presidency, Moscow’s chattering classes proposed that he might move to chair Gazprom’s board. Beyond the importance of the state’s control over the energy sector, the energy sector’s control over the state is just as key.

Despite loud pronouncements on the need to diversify, Russia’s economy remains inextricably linked to the dipping production of oil and gas, with revenues squirreled away in a $168 billion stabilization fund that is intended in large part to encourage wider economic growth.

Yet the problem of its politicization remains.

“The government has become used to a high oil price that suits what it wants to do in the economy,” Weafer said.

An announcement last month that the three-year budget would boost its oil-price prediction to $74 per barrel — a sum that is, for the first time ever, higher than the previous year’s average — provoked worry. UralSib predicts that the country will begin eroding its surplus if the price dips to $64.

“It’s a real threat to the fiscal prudence we’ve had, which is part of the Russian story of the past eight years,” Weafer said.

“The legacy of the Putin era is that, at the end of it, Russia is even more dependent on energy than . It was at the start of it,”
he said

Energy Milestones

September 2000: Putin promises to support foreign investors and production-sharing agreements.

May 2001: Putin replaces Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev with longtime St. Petersburg ally Alexei Miller.

February 2003: TNK-BP formed through BP’s $6.75 billion investment into the joint venture with three oligarchs, the largest ever equity deal in Russia at the time.

February 2003: Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky publicly questions Putin on state-run Rosneft’s acquisition of mid-level producer Severnaya Neft.

May 2003: The Cabinet passes a state energy strategy through 2020, calling the energy sector an instrument for carrying out domestic and foreign policy.

July 2003: Major Yukos shareholder Platon Lebedev is arrested.

October 2003: Khodorkovsky is arrested.

December 2003: Yukos hit with a back tax bill of $3.5 billion, the first in a series that eventually reaches $33 billion.

July 2004: Putin’s powerful deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin replaces Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref as chairman of Rosneft.

September 2004: U.S. oil firm ConocoPhillips buys a 7.59 percent stake in LUKoil for $2 billion.

December 2004: Yukos’ largest production unit, Yuganskneftegaz, is sold at auction for a knockdown price to Baikal Finance Group, later bought by Rosneft.

December 2004: The Energy Ministry approves oil pipeline monopoly Transneft’s plans to build a major pipeline eastward, amid wrangling whether it will end in China or Japan.

May 2005: Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are found guilty of fraud and tax evasion and sentenced to eight years in prison.

May 2005: Gazprom and Rosneft call off a floated merger.

August 2005: Khodorkovsky accuses Sechin of orchestrating the attack on Yukos.

September 2005: Gazprom buys Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft for $13.01 billion in the biggest takeover deal in Russian history at the time.

September 2005: Germany and Russia agree to build Nord Stream pipeline, providing direct gas deliveries to Europe.

November 2005: William Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital Management and activist Gazprom minority shareholder, is barred from entering Russia on grounds that he poses a threat to national security.

January 2006: Gazprom cuts gas deliveries to Ukraine for three days following a pricing dispute.

March 2006: Putin, during a trip to China, signs a deal pledging to eventually sell gas to the country.

July 2006: Rosneft raises $11 billion during an initial public offering in London.

August 2006: A Moscow court declares Yukos bankrupt.

October 2006: Gazprom says it will develop the Shtokman gas field alone and retain 100 percent ownership, shutting down years of negotiations with foreign partners.

December 2006: Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi each halve their shares in Sakhalin-2 to hand Gazprom a controlling stake in the project for $7.45 billion following months of pressure from environmental authorities.

February 2007: Putin says he finds the idea of a gas OPEC “interesting.”

May 2007: Rosneft buys Samaraneftegaz and Tomskneft, Yukos’ final two production units, at auction for $13.2 billion.

June 2007: TNK-BP seals a deal to sell its 62.9 percent stake in its flagship Kovykta field to Gazprom for $700 million to $900 million following months of pressure from environmental authorities.

July 2007: Russneft owner Mikhail Gutseriyev flees the country after accusing the state of forcing him to sell his firm through the levying of politicized tax charges; Oleg Deripaska’s Basic Element says it is in talks to buy the firm.

July 2007: Reversing course, Gazprom gives France’s Total a 25 percent stake in developing Shtokman.

September 2007: The EU issues proposals on unbundling of its power industry, seen as a move to bloc Gazprom’s access.

October 2007: Gazprom gives Norway’s StatoilHydro a 24 percent stake in developing Shtokman.

— MT

January 15, 2008

hmmm.. Putin criticizes handling of inflation

MOSCOW — Russia needs to do more to deal with inflation, which soared to 11.9 percent last year and could exceed government's forecasts of 8 percent this year, President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday.

Putin, however, told members of Russia's upper house of parliament that he was confident the problem would be brought under control, and he made wide-ranging calls for improvements to the country's welfare system.

The remarks appeared aimed at setting a future agenda for Putin, who has said he will become prime minister if his favored successor, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, is elected in the March presidential election.

Although the economy has boomed under Putin's eight years in office, low-income earners and pensioners have struggled to keep pace with the rise in prices for staple goods.

Inflation reached 11.9 percent in 2007, exceeding the government's initial forecast of 8 percent. Economic Ministry projections released Monday said inflation could hit 1.8 percent this month, which puts the economy on target to exceed last year's figures.

Putin expressed concern about the drop in volume of savings accounts, saying that indicated inflation had begun to leave its mark. He also called for pensions and salaries of public sector employees such as teachers and healthcare workers to be raised and urged additional support to be provided for families.

Under Putin, the government has initiated a series of so-called "national projects" aimed at improving the country's public health, education, housing and agriculture sectors. The projects are overseen by Medvedev.

"We have gained experience in the development of social welfare while implementing the national projects," he said.

Government coffers are flush these days with oil and gas-tax revenues pouring in as a result of record high world oil prices and pressure has grown from some lawmakers to spend the money filling up the Stabilization Fund _ a fund designed to sop up extra oil money and keep inflation in check.

But Putin warned against resorting to populist measures.

"It is easy to promise everything, and even achieve it formally, but these promises can end up in dashed hopes and negative effects on people's welfare," he said.

December 21, 2007

Putin, The Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune

This is truly an IMPORTANT ARTICLE!! In fact the entire Guardian special file is a MUST READ at this point, imho. If Putin has anything like this amount of POWER, we must be sure he has the good of the PLANET on his mind, as the Russians are notorious for destroying the environment.

Veeger


Luke Harding in Moscow
Friday December 21, 2007
The Guardian


Vladimir Putin
Russian president Vladimir Putin, whose alleged accumulated wealth of $40bn would make him Europe's richest man. Photograph: Maxim Marmur/AP


An unprecedented battle is taking place inside the Kremlin in advance of Vladimir Putin's departure from office, the Guardian has learned, with claims that the president presides over a secret multibillion-dollar fortune.

Rival clans inside the Kremlin are embroiled in a struggle for the control of assets as Putin prepares to transfer power to his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in May, well-placed political observers and other sources have revealed.

At stake are billions of dollars in assets belonging to Russian state-run corporations. Additionally, details of Putin's own personal fortune, reportedly hidden in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, are being discussed for the first time.

The claims over the president's assets surfaced last month when the Russian political expert Stanislav Belkovsky gave an interview to the German newspaper Die Welt. They have since been repeated in the Washington Post and the Moscow Times, with speculation over the fortune appearing on the internet.

Citing sources inside the president's administration, Belkovsky claims that after eight years in power Putin has secretly accumulated more than $40bn (£20bn). The sum would make him Russia's - and Europe's - richest man.

In an interview with the Guardian, Belkovsky repeated his claims that Putin owns vast holdings in three Russian oil and gas companies, concealed behind a "non-transparent network of offshore trusts".

Putin "effectively" controls 37% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company and Russia's third biggest oil producer, worth $20bn, he says. He also owns 4.5% of Gazprom, and "at least 75%" of Gunvor, a mysterious Swiss-based oil trader, founded by Gennady Timchenko, a friend of the president's, Belkovsky alleges.

Asked how much Putin was worth, Belkovsky said: "At least $40bn. Maximum we cannot know. I suspect there are some businesses I know nothing about." He added: "It may be more. It may be much more.

"Putin's name doesn't appear on any shareholders' register, of course. There is a non-transparent scheme of successive ownership of offshore companies and funds. The final point is in Zug [in Switzerland] and Liechtenstein. Vladimir Putin should be the beneficiary owner."

Putin has not commented on Belkovsky's claims. The Guardian put the allegations to the Kremlin but was told Putin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, was not available.

Discussion of Putin's wealth has previously been taboo. But the claims have leaked out against the backdrop of a fight inside the Kremlin between a group led by Igor Sechin, Putin's influential deputy chief of staff, and a "liberal" clan that includes Medvedev.

The Sechin group is made up of siloviki - Kremlin officials with security/military backgrounds. It is said to include Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's KGB successor agency, his deputy Alexander Bortnikov, and Putin's aide Viktor Ivanov.

Those associated with the liberal camp include Roman Abramovich, the Russian oligarch and owner of Chelsea football club who is close to Putin and the Yeltsin family. Other members are Viktor Cherkesov, the head of the federal drug control service, and Alisher Usmanov, an Uzbek-born billionaire.

Insiders say the struggle has little to do with ideology. They characterise it as a war between business competitors. Putin's decision to endorse as president Medvedev - who has no links with the secret services - dealt a severe blow to the hardline Sechin clan, they add.

Some analysts have said Putin would like to retire but has been forced to carry on to shield Medvedev from siloviki plotting. Others disagree and say Putin wants to stay in power. On Monday Putin confirmed he intends next year to become Russia's prime minister.

"The siloviki are not at all nice,"
Yulia Latynina, a Russian political commentator said. Latynina, who hosts a political talkshow on the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy, was one of the first journalists to draw attention last month to Putin's reported links with Gunvor.

The company is based in Zug, a picturesque Swiss canton known as a bolthole for publicity-shy international businessmen. Gunvor has neither a website nor a Moscow office - but in 2007 posted profits of $8bn on a turnover of $43bn, an astronomic figure, according to industry experts. Like Putin, its reclusive owner, Timchenko, worked in the KGB's foreign affairs directorate. He is said to have met Russia's president in the late 1980s through KGB circles.

Gunvor, which has its head office in Geneva, failed to comment.

Critics say the wave of renationalisations under Putin has transformed Putin's associates into multimillionaires. The dilemma now facing the Kremlin's elite is how to hang on to its wealth if Putin leaves power, experts say. Most of its money is located in the west, they add. The pressing problem is how to protect these funds from any future administration that may seek to reclaim them.

"There's no point in having all this money if you can't travel to the Maldives or Paris and spend it,"
Elena Panfilova, the director of Transparency International in Russia said.

The first hints of the intra-clan warfare gripping the Kremlin emerged last month, when the FSB arrested General Alexander Bulbov, the deputy head of the federal drug agency, and part of the liberal group. His arrest saw a surreal standoff, with his bodyguards and FSB agents pointing machine guns at each other.

Earlier this month Russia's deputy finance minister, Sergei Storchak - another "liberal" - was also arrested and charged with embezzling $43.4m. He is currently in prison. His boss, Russia's finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, part of the liberal clan, says he is innocent.

But the liberal group - one of several competing factions inside the Kremlin - has struck back. Earlier this month Oleg Shvartsman, a previously obscure businessman, gave an interview to Kommersant newspaper claiming he secretly managed the finances of a group of FSB officers. Their assets were worth £1.6bn, he revealed.

The officers were involved in "velvet reprivatisations", Shvartsman, a fund manager, said - in effect forcibly acquiring private companies at below-market value and transforming them into state-owned firms. These assets were redistributed via offshore companies, he said.

According to Panfilova, the "randomised" corruption of the 1990s has given way to the "systemic and institutionalised corruption" of the Putin era. Members of Putin's cabinet personally control the most important sectors of the economy - oil, gas and defence. Medvedev is chairman of Gazprom; Sechin runs Rosneft; other ministers are chairmen of Russian railways, Aeroflot, a nuclear fuel giant and an energy transport enterprise.

Putin has created a new, more streamlined oligarchy, his critics say. "The crown jewels of the country's wealth have ended up in the hands of Putin's inner circle," Vladimir Rzyhkov - a former independent MP - wrote in Monday's Moscow Times.

Belkovsky - who published a book about Putin's finances last year, and who is the director of the National Strategic Institute, a Moscow thinktank - claims he is confident of his assessment of Putin's hidden wealth. "It's not a secret among the elites,' he said. "But please pay attention that Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] has never sued me."

Belkovsky adds that the west has misunderstood Putin and has been distracted by his "neo-Soviet" image. Putin, Belkovsky claims, is ultimately a "classic" businessman who believes money can solve any problem, and whose psychology was shaped by his experiences working in the St Petersburg mayor's office in Russia's crime-ridden early 1990s.

"He is quite sure of this. A problem that can't be resolved with $1bn can be resolved with $10bn, and if not with $10bn then $20bn, and so on,"
Belkovsky said.

In an interview on Wednesday with Time magazine, which named Putin its person of the year, the president vehemently denied that those inside the Kremlin were corrupt.

Asked whether "some of the people closest to you are getting rich", Putin said:

"Then you know who and how. Write to us, to the foreign ministry, if you are so confident. I presume you know the names, you know the systems and the tools.

"I can assure you and everyone who would listen to us, watch us and read us, that the reaction would be swift, immediate, [and] within the prevailing law."




Special reports
Russia
Chechnya

Useful links
Itar-Tass news agency
Moscow Times
Russia Today
St Petersburg Times
Caucasian Knot


Special report Russia

Go to...
Special report: Russia

Russia archived articles




In this section
Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune

Putin, scourge of the US, named person of the year by Time

Russia threatens academy's £1bn art show

New laws brought in to save academy's £1bn art show

Russia calls off major art loan as ties with UK worsen

Russia starts nuclear fuel deliveries to Iran

Surprise as Putin puts himself forward as PM

Letters: Too much at stake to put relations with Russia at risk

Litvinenko associate seeks political asylum in Britain

Iran receives nuclear fuel shipment from Russia

Putin's presidential favourite wins nomination

Europe's big four raise stakes on Kosovo

Kasparov says officials stopped presidential bid

EU leaders agree Kosovo mission

Russia orders British Council offices to be shut down

October 18, 2007

So how did it go at the Iran summit? A synopsis

[SOCUNMOD] Iran's Summit Success
trumps the retrograd efforts of the 'lonely superpower'. -Cord
Caspian Summit a Triumph for Iran

by Kaveh L Afrasiabi Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IJ18Ak01.html

October 17, 2007

Few regional summits have drawn closer attention, by both the media and world governments, than this week's summit of leaders of Caspian littoral [of or on a shore, especially a seashore] states in Tehran. The two day summit, coinciding with twin nuclear crises and escalating US-Iran tensions relating to Iraq and the Middle East, is bound to be regarded as a milestone in regional cooperation, with serious ramifications for a broad array of issues transcending the
Caspian Sea region.

Billed as a "great leap toward progress" by Mehdi Safari, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Iran's Caspian affairs, the summit has been a great success for Iran as well as Russia and the other participants (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), and Tehran is likely to capitalize on it as a stepping stone for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), considered a security counterweight to NATO and US "hegemony". Indeed, it is as much shared interests as common worries and concerns, eg, the US's unbounded interventionist policies, that have now brought Iran and Russia closer together and to the verge of a new strategic relationship. After all, both Iran and Russia are today objects of American coercion, their national security interests and objectives imperiled by the US's post-9/11 militarism and its feudalistic ossification of the international order.

The upshot of the Caspian summit is, in fact, a prominent message about the need to democratize the international order by erecting effective barriers to the American "leviathan", as shown by specific agreements reached at the summit, including prohibiting other countries from using the littoral states for attacks on one another "under any circumstances'', and disallowing any ship not flying the national flag of a littoral state on Caspian waters.

How did this summit come about? The answer is, first and foremost, by astute diplomatic efforts on Iran's part and, equally, by a strategic evolution of Russia's foreign policy that is no longer self-handicapped by prioritizing tactical or conjunctural interests above strategic ones.

Having reached this level, Moscow is now poised to enter into a new strategic relationship with Iran that will serve the geostrategic, security, and other shared interests of both nations. "Iran is an important regional and global power," President Vladimir Putin said after his initial meeting with Iran's President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who has been much vilified in the West and yet is respected in the Third World and beyond as an assertive leader of a developing nation standing up to world-domineering policies.

A major achievement for Iran's diplomacy and particularly for Amadinejad's embattled foreign policy team, the "good news" summit will likely serve as the hinge that opens new breathing space for Iran's diplomacy, and not just toward the Caspian, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iran's Persian Gulf policy is also bound to benefit from the improved image of Iran in the Middle East, making more attractive Iran's role as a corridor to Central Asia which the Arab world in general and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in particular can take advantage of in their external trade and energy policies.

Iran's summit diplomacy/ The most salient feature of Iran's summit diplomacy has been its multifaceted complexity, seeking to enhance regional cooperation
among the five Caspian littoral states by, for instance, initiating the idea of a Caspian regional organization to promote inter-region trade, and, simultaneously, pushing bilateral cooperation alongside multilateral cooperation. The net of bilateral and
multilateral agreements signed at this summit is quite extensive and a detailed examination belongs elsewhere.

Suffice to say, however, that from Iran's vantage point the summit has been a complete turnaround from the rather disastrous Caspian Sea summit of leaders in Ashghabat, Turkmenistan, in 2002, when Putin prioritized the issue of Caspian delimitation and division, a divisive issue. In comparison, at this summit, the thorny subject of Caspian ownership and "legal regime" was relegated to the background, with the attending leaders focusing on areas of shared interests, transboundry issues, and trade, hoping that in subsequent meetings the goodwill generated at this summit will carry over to those more divisive issues.

Various expert-level meetings of the Caspian states have so far failed to resolve the ownership question and, from Iran's vantage point, given the relatively minor energy interests at stake in Iran's sector of the Caspian Sea, it made more sense to draw the
right lesson from the Ashghabat failure and adopt a long-term view of things.

That approach by Iran has paid off handsomely, resulting in a sudden shift in the geostrategic climate in Iran's favor, in light of the joint communique of the other Caspian states regarding their refusal to allow their territory to be used for any militiary aggression against Iran, cemented by Putin's forceful statement against any such gambit.

Putin's other comment, regarding Russia's commitment to complete Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, represents yet another significant development for Iran, which has defied the UN Security Council's resolutions calling for a suspension of uranium
enrichment and reprocessing activities. By stating on record that there is no evidence to support the allegations of a nuclear weapon ambition on Iran's part, Putin looks to have provoked Washington's fury, as seen in Condoleezza Rice's instant counterpunch that Iran has been "lying" about its nuclear program. Yet more importantly Putin has signalled the beginning of the end of Rice-crafted "diplomatic consensus" vis-a-vis Iran.

As expected, the US government and mainstream media, unable to show any signs of adjustment to Russia's, and even China's, new line of thought toward Iran, have stepped up their Iran-bashing, with both the Washington Times and Wall Street Journal dedicating more of their opinion pages to the ritual anti-Iran commentaries.

Surely, the Tehran summit and its results represent a serious setback for Washington's Iran diplomacy, but they also show the defects of its Russia diplomacy and the fact that Moscow and Washington have reached a dead end. Putin has held his ground against his Washington detractors, wooing various European leaders such as Germany's Angela Merkel and snubbing the pro-US Nicolas Sarkozy, while working on a new model of Russia-EU relations that is not dominated by US prerogatives. There is undoubtedly an element of risk here and Putin's new Iran policy may backfire, particularly if he does not generate more Iranian cooperation on the nuclear issue.

Regarding the latter, Iran is apt to reciprocate Putin's gestures by accommodating itself to more IAEA demands, and next week's meeting of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, with the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, is an important occasion for Iran to appease Putin and his foreign policy circle, some of whom are openly worried about a parallel corrosion of US-Russia relations because of the new Iran-Russia developments.

Yet this is not a "zero-sum game" and US policy makers can draw the right impression about Iran's good neighborly policies benefiting regional and global peace, presently deepened in part thanks to Russia's singular influence on Iran. That is highly unlikely, however, and the continuation of the one-dimensional coercive policy toward Iran, so deeply entrenched in Washington, is the more likely scenario, no matter how out of sync with the rest of the world community.

The "lonely superpower" that Samuel Huntington once wrote about now appears dangerously on the verge of losing its "coalition of the willing" against Iran, both inside and outside the United Nations. The only choice is either stubborn refusal to make the necessary policy adjustments toward Iran, along the lines of a non-threatening civil diplomacy, or to face what is certain to be a diplomatic defeat in the global arena.

Iran's soft-power diplomacy should be given much credit for both the summit's success and the related frustration of the US's coercive diplomacy.

October 14, 2007

Central Asia: what you NEED to know


Central Asian Oil and Gas Pipelines
Map of Proposed Central Asian Pipelines
Central Asian Oil and Gas Pipelines:

Today, Central Asian Oil is transported along two routes: north through Dagestan and Chechnya to Novorossisk, and a second route west to the Georgian port of Supsa. Transport fees have ensured the safety of the pipelines in war-torn Chechnya.

The existing pipelines are only capable of getting a small fraction of the area's oil and gas wealth to market. Central Asian republics are anxious to sell more oil. Americans, Europeans, and Russians are anxious to buy more, especially from countries that do not belong to OPEC. Investors from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are also anxious to begin transporting more oil out of Central Asia. Only secure pipelines are lacking. The most promising routes have been identified:

1. Russia favors a northern route. Kazakhstan would expand its existing pipelines to link them with the Russian network of pipelines. Azerbaijan would build a pipeline from Baku to Novorossisk. Critics worry about the pipeline's path through Chechnya and charge that if the project was successful, Russia would enjoy too great a control over Central Asian oil.

2. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, and the United States favor a western route. According to one variation, oil and gas would flow to the Georgian port of Supsa. From there, it would be shipped through the Black Sea and the Bosporus to Europe. and then ship it through the Black Sea and the Bosporus to Europe. Turkey has expressed worries about tanker traffic in the Bosporus, and worries about the damage an accident there might do to Istanbul. According to the Turkish variation on the western route, a pipeline should run from Baku to the port of Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. At over US$3 billion, the cost of constructing such a pipeline may turn out to be too expensive.

3. The most direct, and cheapest, route is to south, across Iran to the Persian Gulf. Iran already has an extensive pipeline system, and the Gulf is a good exit to Asian markets. U.S. sanctions on Iran block this option.

4. Despite the staggering costs it would take to construct, China is willing to construct an oil pipeline across Kazakhstan to China.

5. The American oil company Unocal has proposed the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and later to India. Afghanistan's long war has prevented this project from moving forward. If some degree of stability returns to Afghanistan, the project may be resurrected.

The Sino-Russian Alliance:

Challenging America's Ambitions in Eurasia
by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Global Research, September 23, 2007

“But if the middle space [Russia and the former Soviet Union] rebuffs the West [the European Union and America], becomes an assertive single entity, and either gains control over the South [Middle East] or forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor [China], then America’s primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically. The same would be the case if the two major Eastern players were somehow to unite. Finally, any ejection of America by its Western partners [the Franco-German entente] from its perch on the western periphery [Europe] would automatically spell the end of America’s participation in the game on the Eurasian chessboard, even though that would probably also mean the eventual subordination of the western extremity to a revived player occupying the middle space [e.g. Russia].”

-Zbigniew Brzezinski (The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1997)


Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion states that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.” These precepts of physics can also be used in the social sciences, specifically with reference to social relations and geo-politics.

America and Britain, the Anglo-American alliance, have engaged in an ambitious project to control global energy resources. Their actions have resulted in a series of complicated reactions, which have established a Eurasian-based coalition which is preparing to challenge the Anglo-American axis.


Encircling Russia and China: Anglo-American Global Ambitions Backfire


“Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force military force — in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible. We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.”

-Vladimir Putin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Germany (February 11, 2007)


What American leaders and officials called the “New World Order” is what the Chinese and Russians consider a “Unipolar World.” This is the vision or hallucination, depending on perspective, that has bridged the Sino-Russian divide between Beijing and Moscow.

China and Russia are well aware of the fact that they are targets of the Anglo-American alliance. Their mutual fears of encirclement have brought them together. It is no accident that in the same year that NATO bombarded Yugoslavia, President Jiang Zemin of China and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia made an anticipated joint declaration at a historic summit in December of 1999 that revealed that China and the Russian Federation would join hands to resist the “New World Order.” The seeds for this Sino-Russian declaration were in fact laid in 1996 when both sides declared that they opposed the global imposition of single-state hegemony.

Both Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin stated that all nation-states should be treated equally, enjoy security, respect each other’s sovereignty, and most importantly not interfere in the internal affairs of other nation-states. These statements were directed at the U.S. government and its partners.

The Chinese and Russians also called for the establishment of a more equitable economic and political global order. Both nations also indicated that America was behind separatist movements in their respective countries. They also underscored American-led amibitions to balkanize and finlandize the nation-states of Eurasia. Influential Americans such as Zbigniew Brzezinski had already advocated for de-centralizing and eventually dividing up the Russian Federation.


Standing in the Way of America and Britain: A “Chinese-Russian-Iranian Coalition”


As a result of the Anglo-American drive to encircle and ultimately dismantle China and Russia, Moscow and Beijing have joined ranks and the SCO has slowly evolved and emerged in the heart of Eurasia as a powerful international body.

The main objectives of the SCO are defensive in nature. The economic objectives of the SCO are to integrate and unite Eurasian economies against the economic and financial onslaught and manipulation from the “Trilateral” of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, which controls significant portions of the global economy.

The SCO charter was also created, using Western national security jargon, to combat “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” Terrorist activities, separatist movements, and extremist movements in Russia, China, and Central Asia are all forces traditionally nurtured, funded, armed, and covertly supported by the British and the U.S. governments. Several separatist and extremist groups that have destabilized SCO members even have offices in London.


Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia are all SCO observer members. The observer status of Iran in the SCO is misleading. Iran is a de facto member. The observer status is intended to hide the nature of trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China so that the SCO cannot be labeled and demonized as an anti-American or anti-Western military grouping.


The stated interests of China and Russia are to ensure the continuity of a “Multi-Polar World.” Zbigniew Brzezinski prefigured in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and the Geostrategic Imperatives and warned against the creation or “emergence of a hostile [Eurasian-based] coalition that could eventually seek to challenge America’s primacy.” [3] He also called this potential Eurasian coalition an “‘antihegemonic’ alliance” that would be formed from a “Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition” with China as its linchpin. [4] This is the SCO and several Eurasian groups that are connected to the SCO.


In 1993, Brzezinski wrote “In assessing China’s future options, one has to consider also the possibility that an economically successful and politically self-confident China — but one which feels excluded from the global system and which decides to become both the advocate and the leader of the deprived states of the world — may decide to pose not only an articulate doctrinal but also a powerful geopolitical challenge to the dominant trilateral world [a reference to the economic front formed by North America, Western Europe, and Japan].” [5]

Brzezinski warns that Beijing’s answer to challenging the global status quo would be the creation of a Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition: “For Chinese strategists, confronting the trilateral coalition of America and Europe and Japan, the most effective geopolitical counter might well be to try and fashion a triple alliance of its own, linking China with Iran in the Persian Gulf/Middle East region and with Russia in the area of the former Soviet Union [and Eastern Europe].” [6] Brzezinski goes on to say that the Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition, which he moreover calls an “antiestablishmentarian [anti-establishmentarian] coalition,” could be a potent magnet for other states [e.g., Venezuela] dissatisfied with the [global] status quo.” [7]


Furthermore, Brzezinski warned in 1997 that “The most immediate task [for the U.S.] is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitration role.” [8] It may be that his warnings were forgotten, because the U.S. has been repealed from Central Asia and U.S. forces have been evicted from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.


“Velvet Revolutions” Backfire in Central Asia


Central Asia was the scene of several British-sponsored and American-sponsored attempts at regime change. The latter were characterised by velvet revolutions similar to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.

These velvet revolutions financed by the U.S. failed in Central Asia, aside from Kyrgyzstan where there had been partial success with the so-called Tulip Revolution.

As a result the U.S. government has suffered major geo-strategic setbacks in Central Asia. All of Central Asia’s leaders have distanced themselves from America.

Russia and Iran have also secured energy deals in the region. America’s efforts, over several decades, to exert a hegemonic role in Central Asia seem to have been reversed overnight. The U.S. sponsored velvet revolutions have backfired. Relations between Uzbekistan and the U.S. were especially hard hit.


Uzbekistan is under the authoritarian rule of President Islam Karamov. Starting in the second half of the 1990s President Karamov was enticed into bringing Uzbekistan into the fold of the Anglo-American alliance and NATO. When there was an attempt on President Karamov’s life, he suspected the Kremlin because of his independent policy stance. This is what led Uzbekistan to leave CSTO.
But Islam Karamov, years later, changed his mind as to who was attempting to get rid of him.


According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Uzbekistan represented a major obstacle to any renewed Russian control of Central Asia and was virtually invulnerable to Russian pressure; this is why it was important to secure Uzbekistan as an American protectorate in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan also has the largest military force in Central Asia. In 1998, Uzbekistan held war games with NATO troops in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan was becoming heavily militarized in the same manner as Georgia was in the Caucasus. The U.S. gave Uzbekistan huge amounts of financial aid to challenge the Kremlin in Central Asia and also provided training to Uzbek forces.


With the launching of the “Global War on Terror,” in 2001, Uzbekistan, an Anglo-American ally, immediately offered bases and military facilities to the U.S. in Karshi-Khanabad.

The leadership of Uzbekistan already knew the direction the “Global War on Terror” would take. To the irritation of the Bush Jr. Administration, the Uzbek President formulated a policy of self-reliance. The honeymoon between Uzbekistan and the Anglo-American alliance ended when Washington, D.C. and London contemplated removing Islam Karamov from power. He was a little too independent for their comfort and taste. Their attempts at removing the Uzbek President failed, leading eventually to a shift in geo-political alliances.


The tragic events of Andijan on May 13, 2005 were the breaking point between Uzbekistan and the Anglo-American alliance. The people of Andijan were incited into confronting the Uzbek authorities, which resulted in a heavy security clampdown on the protesters and a loss of lives.

Armed groups were reported to have been involved. In the U.S., Britain, and the E.U., the media reports focused narrowly on human rights violations without mentioning the covert role of the Anglo-American alliance. Uzbekistan held Britain and the U.S. responsible accusing them of inciting rebellion.


M. K. Bhadrakumar, the former Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998), revealed that the Hezbut Tahrir (HT) was one of the parties blamed for stirring the crowd in Andijan by the Uzbek government. [9] The group was already destabilizing Uzbekistan and using violent tactics. The headquarters of this group happens to be in London and they enjoy the support of the British government. London is a hub for many similar organizations that further Anglo-American interests in various countries, including Iran and Sudan, through destabilization campaigns. Uzbekistan even started clamping down on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because of the tragic events of Andijan.

The Anglo-American alliance had played its cards wrong in Central Asia. Uzbekistan officially left the GUUAM Group, a NATO-U.S. sponsored anti-Russian body. GUUAM once again became the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldava) Group on May 24, 2005.

On July 29, 2005 the U.S. military was ordered to leave Uzbekistan within a six-month period. [10] Literally, the Americans were told they were no longer welcome in Uzbekistan and Central Asia.

Russia, China, and the SCO added their voices to the demands. The U.S. cleared its airbase in Uzbekistan by November, 2005.

Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO alliance on June 26, 2006 and realigned itself, once again, with Moscow. The Uzbek President also became a vocal advocate, along with Iran, for pushing the U.S. totally out of Central Asia. [11] Unlike Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan continued to allow the U.S. to use Manas Air Base, but with restrictions and in an uncertain atmosphere. The Kyrgyz government also would make it clear that no U.S. operations could target Iran from Kyrgyzstan.

Major Geo-Strategic Error

It appears that a strategic rapprochement between Iran and America was in the works from 2001 to 2002. At the outset of the global war on terrorism, Hezbollah and Hamas, two Arab organizations supported by Iran and Syria, were kept off the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Iran and Syria were also loosely portrayed as potential partners in the “Global War on Terror.”

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran expressed its support for the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government. During the invasion of Iraq, the American military even attacked the Iraqi-based Iranian opposition militia, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK/MOK/MKO). Iranian jets also attacked the Iraqi bases of the MEK in approximately the same window of time.

Iran, Britain, and the U.S. also worked together against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning that the Taliban were never allies of Iran. Up until 2000, the Taliban had been supported by the U.S. and Britain, working hand in glove with the Pakistani military and intelligence.

The Taliban were shocked and bewildered at what they saw as an American and British betrayal in 2001 — this is in light of the fact that in October, 2001 they had stated that they would hand over Osama bin Laden to the U.S. upon the presentation of evidence of his alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks.

Zbigniew Brzezinski warned years before 2001 that “a coalition allying Russia with both China and Iran can develop only if the United States is shortsighted enough to antagonize China and Iran simultaneously.” [12] The arrogance of the Bush Jr. Administration has resulted in this shortsighted policy.

According to The Washington Post, “Just after the lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three years ago [in 2003], an unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at the Near East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from Iran for a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax suggested everything was on the table — including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” [13]


The White House impressed by what they believe were “grand victories” in Iraq and Afghanistan merely ignored the letter sent through diplomatic channels by the Swiss government on behalf of Tehran.

However, it was not because of what was wrongly perceived as a quick victory in Iraq that the Bush Jr. Administration pushed Iran aside. On January 29, 2002, in a major address, President Bush Jr. confirmed that the U.S. would also target Iran, which had been added to the so-called “Axis of Evil” together with Iraq and North Korea. The U.S. and Britain intended to attack Iran, Syria, and Lebanon after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In fact immediately following the invasion, in July 2003, the Pentagon formulated an initial war scenario entitled “Theater Iran Near Term (TIRANNT).”

Starting in 2002, the Bush Jr. Administration had deviated from their original geo-strategic script. France and Germany were also excluded from sharing the spoils of war in Iraq.

The intention was to act against Iran and Syria just as America and Britain had used and betrayed their Taliban allies in Afghanistan. The U.S. was also set on targeting Hezbollah and Hamas. In January of 2001, according to Daniel Sobelman, a correspondent for Haaretz, the U.S. government warned Lebanon that the U.S. would go after Hezbollah. These threats directed at Lebanon were made at the start of the presidential term of George W. Bush Jr., eight months before the events of September 11, 2001.


The conflict at the United Nations Security Council between the Anglo-American alliance and the Franco-German entente, supported by Russia and China, was a pictogram of this deviation.

American geo-strategists for years after the Cold War had scheduled the Franco-German entente to be partners in their plans for global primacy. In this regard, Zbigniew Brzezinski had acknowledged that the Franco-German entente would eventually have to be elevated in status and that the spoils of war would have to be divided with Washington’s European allies.

By the end of 2004, the Anglo-American alliance had started to correct its posture towards France and Germany. Washington had returned to its original geo-strategic script with NATO playing an expanded role in the Eastern Mediterranean. In turn, France was granted oil concessions in Iraq.

The 2006 war plans for Lebanon and the Eastern Mediterranean also point to a major shift in direction, a partnership role for the Franco-German entente, with France and Germany playing a major military role in the region.


It is worth noting that a major shift occurred in early 2007 with regard to Iran. Following U.S. setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as in Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, and former Soviet Central Asia), the White House entered into secret negotiatiations with Iran and Syria. However, the dye has been cast and it would appear that America will be unable to break an evolving military alliance which includes Russia, Iran, and China as its nucleus.


The Baker-Hamilton Commission: Covert Anglo-American Cooperation with Iran and Syria?


“America should also strongly support Turkish aspirations to have a pipeline from Baku in [the Republic of] Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean cost serve as [a] major outlet for the Caspian Sea basin energy sources. In addition, it is not in America’s interest to perpetuate American-Iranian hostility. Any eventual reconciliation should be based on the recognition of a mutual strategic interest in stabilizing what currently is a very volatile regional environment for Iran [e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan]. Admittedly, any such reconciliation must be pursued by both sides and is not a favor granted by one to the other. A strong, even religiously motivated but not fanatically anti-Western Iran is in the U.S. interest, and ultimately even the Iranian political elite may recognize that reality. In the meantime, American long-range interests in Eurasia would be better served by abandoning existing U.S. objections to closer Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation, especially in the construction of new pipelines...”

-Zbigniew Brzezinski (The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1997)


The recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission or the Iraq Study Group (ISG) are not a redirection in regards to engaging Iran, but a return to the track that the Bush Jr. Administration had deviated from as a result of the delusions of its hasty victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, the Baker-Hamilton Commission was about damage control and re-steering America to the geo-strategic path originally intended by military planners that the Bush Jr. Administration seems to have deviated from.

The ISG Report also subtly indicated that adoption of so-called “free market” economic reforms be pressed on Iran (and by extension Syria) instead of regime change. The ISG also favoured the accession of both Syria and Iran to the World Trade Organization (WTO). [14] It should also be noted, in this regard, that Iran has already started a mass privatization program that involves all sectors from banking to energy and agriculture.

The ISG Report also recommends an end to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the establishment of peace between Israel and Syria. [15]

The joint interests of Iran and the U.S. were also analysed by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. The ISG recommended that the U.S. should not empower the Taliban again in Afghanistan (against Iran). [16] It should also be noted that Imad Moustapha, the Syrian ambassador to the U.S., the Syrian Foreign Minister, and Javad Zarif, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, were all consulted by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. [17] The Iranian Ambassodor to the U.N., Javad Zarif, has also been a middle man between the U.S. and Iranian governments for years.


It is worth mentioning that the Clinton Administration was involved in the track of rapprochement with Iran, while also attempting to keep Iran in check under the “dual-containment” policy directed against Iraq and Iran. This policy was also linked to the 1992 Draft Defence Guidance paper written by people within the Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. Administrations.

It is worth noting that Zbigniew Brzezinski had stated as far back as 1979 and again in 1997 that Iran under its post-revolutionary political system could be co-opted by America. [18] Britain also ensured Syria and Iran in 2002 and 2003 that they would not be targeted and encouraged their cooperation with the White House.

It should be noted that Turkey has recently signed a pipeline deal with Iran that will take gas to Western Europe. This project includes the participation of Turkmenistan. [19] It would appear that this cooperation agreement between Tehran and Ankara points to reconciliation rather than confrontation with Iran and Syria. This is in line with what Brzezinski in 1997 claimed was in America’s interest.

Also, the Anglo-American sponsored Iraqi government has recently signed pipeline deals with Iran.

Once again, America’s interests in this deal should be questioned, as should the high opinions being given about Iran by the puppet leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Something’s Amiss...

The media attention given in North America and Britain to the positive comments made about Tehran by Anglo-American clients in Baghdad and Kabul is sinister.

Although these comments from Baghdad and Kabul about the positive role Iran plays in Iraq and Afghanistan are not new, the media attention is. President George W. Bush Jr. and the White House criticized the Iraqi Prime Minister for saying Iran plays a constructive role in Iraq in early-August of 2007. The White House and North American or British press would usually just ignore or refuse to acknowledge these comments. However, this was not the case in August, 2007.

The Afghani President, Hamid Karzai, during a joint press conference with George W. Bush Jr. stated that Iran was a positive force in his country. It is not odd to hear that Iran is a positive force inside Afghanistan because the stability of Afghanistan is in Iran’s best interests. What comes across as odd are “when” and “where” the comments were made. White House press conferences are choreographed and the place and time of the Afghani President’s comments should be questioned. It also so happens that shortly after the Afghani President’s comments, the Iranian President arrived in Kabul in an unprecedented visit that must have been approved by the White House.


Iran’s Political Leverage

In regards to Iran and the U.S., the picture is blurry and the lines between cooperation and rivalry are less clear. Reuters and the Iranian Student’s News Agency (ISNA) have both reported that the Iranian President may visit Baghdad after August 2007. These reports surfaced just before the U.S. government started threatening to label the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a special international terrorist organization. Without insinuating anything, it should also be noted that the Revolutionary Guard and the U.S. military have also had a low-key history of cooperation from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

The Iranian President has also invited the presidents of the other four Caspian states for a Caspian Sea summit in Tehran. [20] He invited the Turkmen president while in Turkmenistan and later the Russian and Kazakh presidents at the August of 2007 SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan. President Aliyev, the leader of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Azarbaijan) was also personally invited during a trip by the Iranian President to Baku. The anticipated Caspian Sea summit may be similar to the one in Port Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan between the Kazakh, Russian, and Turkmen presidents where it was announced that Russia would not be cut out of the pipeline deals in Central Asia.

Iranian leverage is clearly getting stronger. Officials in Baku also stated that they will expand energy cooperation with Iran and enter the gas pipeline deal between Iran, Turkey, and Turkmenistan that will supply European markets with gas. [21] This agreement to supply Europe is similar to a Russian energy transport deal signed between Greece, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation. [22]

In the Levant, Syria is involved in energy-related negotiations with Ankara and Baku and important talks have started between American officials and both Tehran and Damascus. [23]

Iran has also been involved in diplomatic exchanges with Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Additionally, starting in August 2007, Syria has agreed to reopen Iraqi oil pipelines to the Eastern Mediterranean, through Syrian territory. [24] The recent official visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki to Syria has also been described as historical by news sources like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Also, Syria and Iraq have agreed to build a gas pipeline from Iraq into Syria, where Iraqi gas will be treated in Syrian plants. [25] These agreements are being passed as the sources of tensions between Baghdad and the White House, but they are doubtful. [26]

Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are also planning on starting the process for creating an Iranian-GCC free trade zone in the Persian Gulf. In the bazaars of Tehran and amongst the political circle of Rafsanjani there are also discussions about the eventual creation of a single market between Iran, Tajikistan, Armenia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The American role in these processes in regards to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the GCC should be explored.

Under President Nicholas Sarkozy, France has indicated that it is willing to engage the Syrians fully if they gave specific guarantees in regards to Lebanon. These guarantees are linked to French economic and geo-strategic interests.

In the same period of time as the French statements about Syria, Gordon Brown indicated that Britain was also willing to engage in diplomatic exchanges with both Syria and Iran. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the German Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, has also been involved in talks with Damascus on mutual projects, economic reform, and bringing Syria closer to the European Union. These talks, however tend to be camouflaged by the discussion between Syria and Germany in regards to the mass exodus of Iraqi refugees, resulting from the Anglo-American occupation of their country. The French Foreign Minister is also expected in Tehran to talk about Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Despite the war-mongering by the U.S. and more recently by France, this has all led to speculation of a potential about-turn in regards to Iran and Syria. [27]

Then again, this is part of the two-pronged U.S. approach of preparing for the worst (war), while suing for the diplomatic capitulation of Syria and Iran as client states or partners. When large oil and weapons deals were signed between Libya and Britain, London said that Iran should follow the Libyan example, as has the Baker-Hamilton Commission.

Has the March to War been Interrupted?

Despite talks behind closed doors with Damascus and Tehran, Washington is nonetheless arming its clients in the Middle East. Israel is in an advanced state of military preparedness for a war on Syria.

Unlike France and Germany, Anglo-American ambitions pertaining to Iran and Syria are not one of cooperation. The ultimate objective is political and economic subordination.

Moreover, either as a friend or foe, America cannot tolerate Iran within its present borders. The balkanization of Iran, like that of Iraq and Russia, is a major long-term Anglo-American goal.

What lies ahead is never known. While there is smoke in the horizon, the U.S.-NATO-Israeli military agenda will not necessarily result in the implementation of war as planned.

A “Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition” — which forms the basis of a global counter-alliance — is emerging. America and Britain rather than opting for outright war, may choose to reel in Iran and Syria through macro-economic manipulation and velvet revolutions.

War directed against Iran and Syria, however, cannot be ruled out. There are real war preparations on the ground in the Middle East and Central Asia. A war against Iran and Syria would have far-reaching worldwide implications.


Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is an independent writer based in Ottawa specialising on the Middle East and Central Asia. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).


NOTES

[1] Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, signed and entered into force July 16, 2001, P.R. of China-Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm


The following are treaty articles that are relevant to the mutual defence of China and Russia against American-led encirclement and efforts to dismantle both nations;


ARTICLE 4

The Chinese side supports the Russian side in its policies on the issue of defending the national unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

The Russian side supports the Chinese side in its policies on the issue of defending the national unity and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China.


ARTICLE 5

The Russian side reaffirms that the principled stand on the Taiwan issue as expounded in the political documents signed and adopted by the heads of states of the two countries from 1992 to 2000 remain unchanged. The Russian side acknowledges that there is only one China in the world, that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian side opposes any form of Taiwan’s independence.


ARTICLE 8


The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc nor shall they embark on any such action, including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party. Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used by a third country to jeopardize the national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.

Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow the setting up of organizations or gangs on its own soil which shall impair the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contrasting party and their activities should be prohibited.


ARTICLE 9

When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.


ARTICLE 12

The contracting parties shall work together for the maintenance of global strategic balance and stability and make great efforts in promoting the observation of the basic agreements relevant to the safeguard and maintenance of strategic stability.

The contracting parties shall actively promote the process of nuclear disarmament and the reduction of chemical weapons, promote and strengthen the regimes on the prohibition of biological weapons and take measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and their related technology.


[2] Ibid.

[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (NYC, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), p.198.

[4] Ibid., pp. 115-116, 170, 205-206.

Note: Brzezinski also refers to a Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition as a “counteralliance” (p.116).

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century (NYC, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), p.198.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.198.

[9] M. K. Bhadrakumar, The lessons from Ferghana, Asia Times, May 18, 2005.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GE18Ag01.html

[10] Nick Paton Walsh, Uzbekistan kicks US out of military base, The Guardian (U.K.), August 1, 2005.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1540185,00.html

[11] Vladimir Radyuhin, Uzbekistan rejoins defence pact, The Hindu, June 26, 2006.

http://www.thehindu.com/2006/06/26/stories/2006062604491400.htm

[12] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.116.

[13] Glenn Kessler, In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran’s Offer of Dialogue, The Washington Post, June 18, 2006, p.A16.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727.html

[14] James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward A New Approach Authroized ed. (NYC, New York: Random House Inc., 2006), p.51.

[15] Ibid., pp.51, 54-57.

[16] Ibid., pp.50-53, 58.

[17] Ibid., p.114.

[18] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.204.

[19] Iran, Turkey sign energy cooperation deal, agree to develop Iran’s gas fields, Associated Press, July 14, 2007.

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/14/business/ME-FIN-Iran-Turkey-Energy-deal.php


[20] Tehran to host summit of Caspian nations Oct.18, Russian News and Information Agency (RIA Novosti), August 22, 2007.
http://en.rian.ru/world/20070822/73387774.html

[21] Azerbaijan, Iran reinforce energy deals, United Press International (UPI), August 22, 2007.

[22] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, The March to War: Détente in the Middle East or “Calm before the Storm?,” Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), July 10, 2007.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6281

[23] Ibid.

It is worth noting that Iran has been involved in pipeline deals with Turkey and in negotiation between Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the possible creation of an energy corridor in the Eastern Mediterranean. These deals occurred in the same time frame that both Syria and Iran started talks with the U.S. after the Baker-Hamilton Commission’s report.


[24] Syria and Iraq to reopen oil pipeline link, Agence France-Presse (AFP), August 22, 2007.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Roger Hardy, Why the US is unhappy with Maliki, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), August 22, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6958440.stm

[27] Hassan Nafaa, About-face on Iran coming?, Al-Ahram (Egypt), no. 859, August 23-29, 2007.

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/859/op22.htm


Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya




ShareThis