Showing posts with label POWs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label POWs. Show all posts

June 17, 2008

IMPEACHMENT TOOLKIT: US POWs claim ANOTHER reason to impeach

American POWs lose claim vs. Iraq

Supreme Court denies $1 billion penalty over Gulf War torture

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

(04-26) 04:00 PDT Washington -- American pilots and soldiers who were taken prisoner and tortured by the Iraqis during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 have lost their legal bid to hold Iraq liable, as the Supreme Court turned away their final appeal Monday.

The justices heeded the advice of the Bush administration and let stand an appeals court ruling that threw out a nearly $1 billion verdict won by the prisoners of war two years ago.

The high court's refusal to hear the case spares the administration from having to go before the justices to argue against American POWs who were tortured. The 17 former POWs had sued Iraq and the government of Saddam Hussein under the terms of a 1996 anti-terrorism law that opened the courthouse door to claims from Americans who had been injured or tortured at the hands of "state sponsors of terror."

Their story was little known, because the Persian Gulf War was witnessed by most Americans as a TV spectacular in which U.S. forces pounded and destroyed Iraq's army within weeks. But during that time, the POWs said, they were beaten and had their bones broken by Iraqi captors. Several of the men nearly starved in the weeks they were held in cold, filthy cells, including at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.

By the time the onetime POWs won their claim in federal court in 2003, the United States had invaded Iraq and toppled Hussein's government. To the surprise of the former U.S. prisoners, the Bush administration went to court seeking to nullify the award they had won.

The government's lawyers argued that Iraq, now under U.S. occupation, was no longer a state sponsor of terror. Moreover, President Bush had canceled sanctions against Iraq and moved to shield its $1.7 billion in frozen assets. The money was needed to rebuild the nation, Bush said.

Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington agreed with the administration and ruled that "weighty foreign policy interests" called for dismissing the POWs' lawsuit.

The former prisoners had won the support of a bipartisan group of lawmakers, including Sens. George Allen, R-Va., Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, and Patty Murray, D-Wash. They filed a friend-of-the-court brief urging the Supreme Court to restore the verdict won by the former POWs.

But last month, Bush administration lawyers urged the justices to dismiss the case. "The presidential determination reflects a most profound shift in the foreign policy toward Iraq -- from viewing it as an enemy to a state subject to our protection," they wrote.

In its one-line order Monday, the high court turned down the appeal.

"The court's decision is unfortunate," said Paul Kamenar, counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation, which had filed the brief for the lawmakers on behalf of the former POWs. "(It) sends the wrong message to those who would torture or kill Americans."

While the judge who originally heard the case had awarded the POWs damages that totaled nearly $1 billion, their attorneys had told government officials that they would have settled the claim for a fraction of that amount.

Monday's dismissal ends the lawsuit with no money for the plaintiffs.

The case is Acree vs. Iraq, 04-820.

See also:

Iraq: Whose Ox Is Gored?

Huffington Post

Posted April 26, 2008 | 12:40 PM (EST)

The pictures had been taken by Iraqi TV and transmitted worldwide by the Arab news channel Al Jazeera. They showed Americans lying dead and wounded in pools of blood, and U.S. captives being questioned by Iraqis, including one American POW who was lying badly wounded being seized by the hair and forced to sit up by his interrogator.

CBS broadcast some of the video on Face the Nation, NBC showed a dead U.S. soldier and an interview with one of the POWs, and other networks including ABC, CNN and Fox News broadcast still frames taken from the video. So did Matt Drudge on his website.

The Bush administration was outraged by release of the pictures. Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that Iraq and Al Jazeera broke international law by making them available. "The Geneva Convention makes it illegal for prisoners of war to be shown and pictured and humiliated," he said, "it's something the United States does not do...we treat our prisoners well...and the United States, of course, avoids showing photographs of prisoners of war."

That last turned out not to be true (not to mention the line about treating our prisoners well). Pictures of Iraqi POWs had already been shown on American television.

Rumsfeld's spokeswoman, Victoria Clarke, was as angry as her boss. She called Iraq's release of the pictures of U.S. POWs "a blatant violation of the Geneva Convention." "Disgusting," added Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, then Deputy Commander of CENTCOM. "I regard the showing of those pictures as unacceptable."

And President Bush warned that anyone who abused captured Americans would be treated as a war criminal. "I do know that we expect them to be treated humanely," Bush said, "just like we'll treat any prisoners of theirs that we capture humanely."

The authors of those comments seem to have ignored a memo by then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. On January 25, 2002, more than a year before the Iraq invasion, Gonzales had advised Bush that "the war on terrorism is a new kind of war" that "renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitation on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders some of its provisions quaint."

So even as they were criticized Saddam's violations of the Geneva Conventions, Bush's lawyer ("mi abogado," as Bush cutely referred to him) had made the judgment that those rules were "quaint" and "obsolete," a judgment Bush confirmed at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Bagram and in other torture chambers around the world.

In view of the long and frightening list of horrors that the United States has committed on hundreds of prisoners we've taken in Iraq and elsewhere, before and since then, the administration's comments on American POWs are beyond ironic, almost beyond hypocrisy. It really does depend on whose ox is gored, doesn't it?

We've come a long way since March 2003. A long way down.

Whenever I hear some new disclosure of torture or other abuse committed in the name of my country, I think back to something I remember near the start of the war in Iraq. On March 23, 2003, just days after the American invasion, the first pictures of U.S. soldiers killed, wounded and taken captive were broadcast on television.

June 12, 2008

WAR CRIMES DOSSIER: Supreme Court Rules in Favor of the Detainees in Massive Blow to Bush Administration

From the Jonathan Turley blog ..

Supreme Court Rules in Favor of the Detainees in Massive Blow to Bush Administration

In a massive blow to the Bush Administration, the Supreme Court has ruled 5-4 in favor of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the opinion below, Justice Kennedy delivers the opinion of a lifetime: holding faithfully to the Constitution in a time of prolonged crisis.

Kennedy writes:
“We hold that Art. I, §9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full
effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas
corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us,
Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of
the Suspension Clause.”
Amen, Brother, amen.

For a copy of the opinion, click here.

May 31, 2008

WAR CRIMES DOSSIER: Recent WAR CRIMES developments this week following Scott McClellan's disclosures

The timing of a key DoD email to the White House shows the President and others wanted to deflect criticism of POW abuse, and focus on favorable aspects of information warfare.

These were not narrow public relations efforts. White House counsel was involved to ensure public information moved away from war crimes problems.

The DoD email shows the White House, State, and NSC were well aware of the military analysts, and their role in providing White House messages. One email provides no introduction, suggesting there were regular meetings within the White House to explore how to use military analysts to distract attention from the White House Press corps.

Ongoing Strategy Meetings To Spin Illegal Presidential Programs

In 2005, the Guantanamo abuses were prompting calls for its closure. The White House has a problem with war crimes.

The trip to Guantanamo was to dissuade public criticism of Guantanamo, precipated by the POW abuses. In parallel, the White House and DoJ were suppressing FBI efforts to retain war crimes evidence files.

The key phrase on page 120 is:

"As you may know", indicates DoD PA knew the White House and others had been told previously about what was going on. Before this transcript was provided, White House staff knew enough about the details to not require much background information.

"Once again" suggests DoD provided (another) example for the White House of a quick response to the President's public war crimes problem.

There would be no little reason to CC: White House legal Bartlet unless war crimes legal issues discussed.

The email is not an introduction, but a status report of things they were well aware. The email provides no information, as it should, if this was the first time the White House, State, and NSC were informed.

The comment isn't saying, "As you may know, we have a program," but does the opposite: It is very specific about a recent trip. The White House and others well knew what was going on. The trip was related to recent criticisms about the detention center in Cuba. Two weeks earlier, McClellan was hammered on Guantanamo.

Trips were planned to manage unfavorable public information about illegal activity. This trip was designed to repaint this Guantanamo story. McClellan: "there is a hundred substantiated charges of allegations of abuse and a little more than a hundred people that have been held to account. You're talking about less than 1 percent that have been found to have committed illegal acts against detainees"

It was only a "small" war crimes problem.

DoD PA to White House: "If you go there" it is "much more difficult to criticize the program." The White House used the analysts to focus on the benefits "intelligence gathering", and distract attention from the illegal activity, war crimes, and POW abuse.

WAR CRIMES DOSSIER: Recent WAR CRIMES developments this week following Scott McClellan's disclosures

The timing of a key DoD email to the White House shows the President and others wanted to deflect criticism of POW abuse, and focus on favorable aspects of information warfare.


These were not narrow public relations efforts. White House counsel was involved to ensure public information moved away from war crimes problems.

The DoD email shows the White House, State, and NSC were well aware of the military analysts, and their role in providing White House messages. One email provides no introduction, suggesting there were regular meetings within the White House to explore how to use military analysts to distract attention from the White House Press corps.

Ongoing Strategy Meetings To Spin Illegal Presidential Programs

In 2005, the Guantanamo abuses were prompting calls for its closure. The White House has a problem with war crimes.

The trip to Guantanamo was to dissuade public criticism of Guantanamo, precipated by the POW abuses. In parallel, the White House and DoJ were suppressing FBI efforts to retain war crimes evidence files.

The key phrase on page 120 is:

"As you may know", indicates DoD PA knew the White House and others had been told previously about what was going on. Before this transcript was provided, White House staff knew enough about the details to not require much background information.

"Once again" suggests DoD provided (another) example for the White House of a quick response to the President's public war crimes problem.

There would be no little reason to CC: White House legal Bartlet unless war crimes legal issues discussed.

The email is not an introduction, but a status report of things they were well aware. The email provides no information, as it should, if this was the first time the White House, State, and NSC were informed.

The comment isn't saying, "As you may know, we have a program," but does the opposite: It is very specific about a recent trip. The White House and others well knew what was going on. The trip was related to recent criticisms about the detention center in Cuba. Two weeks earlier, McClellan was hammered on Guantanamo.

Trips were planned to manage unfavorable public information about illegal activity. This trip was designed to repaint this Guantanamo story. McClellan: "there is a hundred substantiated charges of allegations of abuse and a little more than a hundred people that have been held to account. You're talking about less than 1 percent that have been found to have committed illegal acts against detainees"

It was only a "small" war crimes problem.

DoD PA to White House: "If you go there" it is "much more difficult to criticize the program." The White House used the analysts to focus on the benefits "intelligence gathering", and distract attention from the illegal activity, war crimes, and POW abuse.

February 06, 2008

Khadr secret document released by accident

Five-page memo reveals that Toronto-born man not the only one alive in compound when U.S. soldier killed
Feb 04, 2008 06:00 PM

National Security Reporter

GUANTANAMO BAY — A classified document mistakenly released to reporters today revealed that Omar Khadr wasn't the only one alive in an Afghan compound when an American soldier was fatally wounded.

Toronto-born Khadr was captured in Afghanistan at the age of 15 following a lengthy firefight with U.S. forces. The Pentagon has charged Khadr with five war crimes, including the murder of Christopher Speer, a Delta Force soldier and medic who died 10 days after the firefight from grenade wounds.

The five-page secret document is based on an interview with the man who shot Khadr twice in the back. Identified only as OC-1, the witness described to an interviewer what he saw after the grenade was thrown in the July 27, 2002 attack.

"He heard moaning coming from the back of the compound. The dust rose up from the ground and began to clear, he then saw a man facing him lying on his right side," the report states.

"The man had an AK-47 on the ground beside him and the man was moving. OC-1 fired one round striking the man in the head and the movement ceased. Dust was again stirred by this rifle shot. When the dust rose, he saw a second man sitting up facing away from him leaning against the brush. This man, later identified as Khadr, was moving . . . OC-1 fired two rounds both of which struck Khadr in the back."

A Pentagon spokesperson would not confirm whether OC-1 was part of Speer's Delta Force team, the other military units involved in the attack, or from another U.S. agency such as the CIA.

The report also states that OC-1 deduced that it was Khadr who threw the grenade due to his position, and because the other man was firing a rifle at the same time.

"Based on his extensive combat experience, OC-1 believed that Khadr and the man at the back of the alley with the AK rifle were the only two alive at the time of the assault. He felt that due to the grenade being thrown simultaneously to the directed rifle fire that the grenade was thrown by someone other than the man who was firing the rifle."

Controversy erupted outside the military courthouse when it was revealed the document was inadvertently given to reporters attending the trial. At first, a court security official said the document must be returned and that reporters might not be allowed to attend future hearings if they didn't comply. After reporters refused, and following 90 minutes of negotiation, it was agreed that only the names of the soldiers and their units, Khadr's prison number and specific dates and locations in the report couldn't be revealed. With the exception of three names in the document, all those facts have already appeared in media reports.

The document had accidentally been attached to pretrial motions that were given to reporters by a spokesperson for the Office of Military Commissions and Guantanamo's Chief of Defence. If the document had not been released by mistake it would noy have been made public, leaving some to question the Pentagon's assertion that the Guantanamo trials will be transparent.

"There's no openness about this process," said Khadr's military lawyer Navy Lt.-Cmdr. Bill Kuebler after the hearing. "It's not that the government shouldn't be able to protect information when there is a legitimate need to protect it, it's the government's overuse of classification . . . that basically keep one hundred percent of the evidence in the case outside of the public's view except if the government decides to sort of dribble it out to you."

Khadr appeared at the hearing this morning wearing a white prison uniform, indicating he is one of Guantanamo's "highly compliant" detainees. His hair was cut short and his beard was full. Unlike his November appearance where he seemed relaxed and confident, Khadr spent most of the morning session writing notes to his Canadian lawyer Dennis Edney and drawing with a pen the guards gave him.

In addition to the charge of "murder in violation of the laws of war," Khadr is charged with attempted murder, spying, conspiracy and providing material support to terrorism.

His lawyers argued today that his upcoming May trial should be dismissed, challenging among other things the legitimacy of the process and whether crimes such as conspiracy and spying constituted war crimes.

Kuebler also argued that when Congress endorsed the Military Commission Act, under which Khadr is charged, it didn't envision the prosecution of detainees under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offence. Prosecutors countered that Congress was aware of Khadr's case when approving the 2006 law and did not specify an age requirement for trials.

Col. Peter Brownback, the military judge presiding over Khadr's case, did not render any decisions on the motions before recessing for the day.

January 17, 2008

BLACKWATER: Legal Remedy Recommendation


Personal Opinions

Disclaimer: These are not statements of fact, but private, personal opinions which may or may not be widely held, and are not statements of law; nor are they assertions of any judicial findings from any tribunal.

It doesn’t matter if there are “holes” in US laws; Geneva remains unblemished.

Blackwater can be adjudicated under Geneva


The laws of war are binding on all combatants, regardless their willingness to be bound by the laws of war; or their belief about their accountability to any law. Combatants acting with the belief that they are not accountable to any law impermissibly allows combatants to descend to barbarism, in contravention to the objectives of Geneva in regulating combat operations.

When combatants ignore the laws of war; or, through their conduct and statements, show they are not willing to be bound by the laws of war, then the protections of the laws of war may be denied by a competent tribunal. Justice is not served when employees presuming that no laws of war hold them accountable; and/or act outside the law, yet are granted shields and immunities not afforded to similarly situated prisoners. It appears the following legal conclusions are reasonable by a grand jury, inter alia:

All evidence gleaned from the Blackwater employees was made without any _lawful_ promise by a competent _tribunal_ to grant that immunity;

All promises Blackwater employees, while under interrogation for alleged war crimes, were or should have been known to be methods to induce intelligence gathering, and secure information in a combat environment; and any method to glean information should foreseeably been known to include any method, including "foreseeable torture or abuse" including false or unenforceable promises by interrogators outside the tribunal;

Blackwater employees knew, or should have known, that the grant of immunity was not by a competent tribunal; any promise of immunity they knew could only be enforce by a tribunal; any promise of immunity by an interrogator or fact finding was or should have been known to be not enforceable as a right of any defendant acting outside US laws, or conducting their military affairs as if US laws or Geneva were not applicable;

Blackwater employees were not lawful combatants; were not protected by US law; nor were they in a position in this situation in Iraq to negotiate for protections of any laws related to immunity, shields, agreements, or contracts;

Blackwater employees and legal counsel did not reasonably conduct themselves within all legal requirements; in doing so, they do not appear to be entitled to privileges afforded only to lawful combatants;

Adverse inferences are warranted. The destruction of the evidence on the vehicles was, or should have been known to be related to an alleged effort to spoil evidence, in contravention to reasonable standards of conduct Blackwater employees knew or should have known were applicable in a serious incident; competent counsel should have immediately known that the vehicles should have been safeguarded as evidence; assertions that the vehicles "had" to be returned immediately are not supported by a reasonableness standard, especially given their alleged involvement with a serious alleged war crime involving non-combatant Iraqi civilians;

All evidence gleaned from Blackwater should be admissible; all evidence of spoliage should be fully admissible to The Hague and or war crimes tribunal, with adverse inferences. The information was obtained under interrogation conditions where Blackwater employees knew, or should have known, they might be subject to promises that were not enforceable, or they were not entitled; therefore,

Blackwater employees should be DENIED the chance to rely on any promise of immunity; the evidence gleaned through these interrogations should not be shielded; and the promised immunity is not enforceable.

Geneva does not recognize, as a defense to war crimes, that conduct is a "state secret". Such a legal conclusion would impermissibly permit perpetrators of war crimes to hide evidence of their Geneva violations behind a shield they knew, or should have known they could not reasonably expect any tribunal to recognize. Until the United States court system is brought fully under Geneva, it is our view that all judicial proceedings related to Blackwater, rendition, Guantanamo, and prisoner abuse are not competent; and not consistently enforcing Geneva relative to all detaining powers, combatants, non-combatants, and civilians.

Any court which refuses to enforce fully the laws of war, including on issues of Rendition, and inconsistently grant immunities and privileges to lawful or unlawful combatants should be subject to the same Nuremberg proceedings of the Justice Trial.

It is foreseeable that Members of the US Supreme Court could be adjudicated with war crimes before The Hague in re their alleged refusal to fully enforce Geneva against all combatants and detaining powers. The Hague appears fully positioned to impose like retaliation and reciprocal action, as permitted under Geneva: It too may assert its rendition program is a "state secret" of The Hague. The US Supreme Court, and for the most part US federal Courts and lawyers appear to be on the wrong side of the laws of war and Geneva Conventions; and the Justices and current/former US government legal counsel, in failing to fully enforce Geneva against all detaining powers, could foreseeably be rendered to The Hague/ICC. Whether The Hague seeks and secures the assistance of foreign powers outside the United States to enforce its "state secret rendition program to enforce Geneva before the ICC" remains to be seen.

If the above personal opinions and private views are not supported by US courts, then the best approach is to forward these cases to The Hague for adjudication. There is no statute of limitations.

Recommendation:
We urge the US to turn over to The Hague the Blackwater defendants; and release to The Hague all POWs held at Guantanamo for adjudication. The Hague can decide whether their detention was or was not lawful; and whether the evidence justifying their continued detention has or has not been a subsequent war crime. Then, The Hague can decide whether Blackwater leadership, US legal counsel, and US civilian policy advisors and civilian leadership should or should not be indicted for permitting, not stopping, or advising of these alleged war crimes.

Disclaimer: This is a draft opinion and personal view; not to be construed as a statement of law, nor a discussion of non-public information. All information below is gleaned through open sources and subject to revisions. Blackwater is not being accused of any crimes; all mentions of illegal warfare are to be construed as "alleged" war crimes; or "alleged unlawful combatants." All Blackwater employees are presumed innocent until proven guilty before a competent tribunal.

Some Blackwater employees are under investigation because they allegedly killed Iraqi civilians. The issue before the US Congress, Court, and Department of justice is the promise of immunity the State Department granted Blackwater: In exchange for truthful testimony, the Blackwater defendants allegedly involved were granted immunity. In December 2007, DOJ Staff briefed Congress about the problem: The State department immunity was not planned nor desired.

The question is whether evidence needed to convict the Blackwater employees could have been obtained without the grant of immunity; and, now that immunity has been granted, is there no possible way to prosecute any of the Blackwater employees.

In a broader context, the problem facing the US government is the issue of contractors used in a combat zone. This note is intended to provoke discussion and not be a legal argument for or against the US government policy or the Blackwater defendants.

The problem of operating outside US law and Geneva, yet expecting legal protections to be available

What is striking with the Blackwater situation and grant of immunity is Blackwater is alleged to be sitting on both sides of US Law: First asserting US laws do not apply to their conduct, or that they are subject to any prosecution; yet, also taking the opposite view: That regardless the ability of US prosecutors to prosecute Blackwater employees, Blackwater employees should rely on, and have the promise of immunity respected.

The inconsistency between US treatment of Guantanamo POWs and how Blackwater wants to be treated

Blackwater is asking that POWs held at Guantanamo not be a precedent for US treatment of Blackwater. This note argues the precedent -- rightly or wrongly -- of treatment of POWs and/or "unlawful combatants" at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib should be relevant. The US cannot credibly ask that some be deprived of protections; while similarly situated personnel be entitled to unreasonable privileges outside their combatant status.

Using the precedent of US treatment of prisoners as a legal basis to revoke the promised immunity for Blackwater

When the US interrogated the Blackwater employees, the US granted immunity. However, let's consider the larger legal issues: When Blackwater was operaring in Iraq, they knew or should have known that the the legal nexus -- rightly or wrongly -- did not place them under any US jurisdiction.

This means -- focusing narrowly on the issue of whether the US could or could not prosecute; or whether the Blackwater employees could or could not rely on US laws -- the Blackwater employees should have have known they were niether subject to US laws for either prosecution nor protection.

Blackwater wants it both ways: They want to be immune to the US laws on issues of war crimes; yet, when it comes to legal protections, Blackwater wants to enjoy the US privilege of immunity in exchange for truthful testimony.

Blackwater legal counsel duties to fully prepare Blackwater employees for the legal nexus

This note argues that the proper legal framework which the Blackwater legal counsel should have made clear to the employees was: Since we are in Iraq and not subject to US laws, then we are not entitled to any protections; if you are promised anything under US laws to induce you to provide information, that promise -- because we are operating outside US laws -- is not a promise that is enforceable.

The specifics of Blackwater employees Combatant status

Under the laws of war, one requirement for a combatant to be a "lawful combatant" is that they are under the command of an organization leader, and subjected to various other standards including a system of discipline. That'ts the theory.

In practice, Blackwater is a special case:It's a contractor, but it is arguing -- and the US has implicitly accepted -- that Blackwater employees are "not under any US laws" while in Iraq.

Fine, let's accept that assertion: That, contrary to Geneva requirements in re "lawful combatants," Blackwter employees -- because they were acting utside US laws; and the US laws are asserted to be not applicable to their conduct -- should be classified as unlawful combatants: They were not acting under lawful authority responsible to a system of laws. Blackwater would argue that "no law" applies to them: Neither the laws of War in Geneva; nor US laws.

The problem with this assertion: _some_ laws must apply, otherwise we have barbarism. The issue is subtle: Just because "Blackwater and the US government agree that there are problems regulating Blackwater under US laws" it doesn't mean that Blackwater cannot be held accountable. The question becomes: Which standards would or should guide blackwater? The answer: Geneva and the Nuremberg precedents. Said another way: Even if the DOJ briefed Congress in December 2007 that they would have problems prosecuting Blackwater because of the immunity agreement, Geneva would be a source of law to guide the discipline process.

This note argues that a grant of immunity to a contractor deemed to be an unlawful combatant in this legal nexus -- is not one Blackwater should have relied on. Rather, when a contractor knows, asserts, and acts as if it is outside the law, for the purposes of privileges: It is outside the protections of those privildge. However, Blackwater appears to want it both ways: To be both "not subject to" either US law or Geneva as a standard of conduct; but entitled to protections of Geneva and US law respecting the promise of immunity.

This note argues the opposite: Once Blackwater acted outside the law, and agreed to engage in combat that was "not" subject to any law; and understood to be "not regulated" by Geneva, then BLackwater was stripped of any reasonable expectation that it could rely on any promise, agreement, or grant of immunity through US law.

Comparing Interrogations of POWs at Guantanamo to the INterrogation of Blackwater Employees

Let's revisit the US precedent of how the US treated POWs at Gurantanamo. Rightly or wrongly, the US DOJ said in Federal Court that the prisoners' evidence -- gleaned from alleged torture or waterboarding -- was "foreseeable"; and this was within the rules which the US was "allowed" to operate when interacting with the prisoners. They were deemed unlawful combatants while in custody, and were asserted to not enjoy any Geneva protections.

Let's take the above argument -- rightly or wrongly -- as the legal foundation or precedent the US government set. Whether that precedent was legal is secondary to the larger principle of Geneva: That similarly situated prisoners should be treated the same. Under Geneva, this principle was intended to mean that any protection provided to US troops under the UCMJ should be provided to prisoners held at Guantanamo; in practice this has been turned on its head. We leave that for another day.

Let's focus not on what Geneva intended, but what the US first did. Geneva creates a checking mechanism: If an army or military refuses to enforce, abide by, follow, respect or adhere to Geneva Convention requirements, constraints, or protections, then other nations on the principles of retaliation and reciprocity can commit like abuses.

Despite this principle of reciprocity, the US continued to mistreat Prisoners at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and Eastern Europe. Putting that aside, the issue with respect to Blackwater is: Should a "similarly situated" combatants be Blackwater employees and POWs at Guantanamo?

This note argues with a resounding, "Yes." Similarly situated means: Do the prisoners substantially enjoy the same conditions; have they engaged in the same kinds of conduct; and are they being subject to the same system of justice. If what was imposed on the Guantanamo POWs was "good enough" -- rightly or wrongly -- then those conditions should also be imposed on Blackwater.

Review

Blackwater's reliance on the promise of immunity is not reasonble. Legal counsel knew, or should have known, that Blackwater was acting outside US law and Geneva; and in doing so, could not reasonably rely on any promise only enforceable by US law. Once Blackwater agreed to allegedly violate Geneva, it lost all reasonable expectation that it could enjoy protections of US law; or that any promise made to any Blackwater employee was enforceable, or would be honored.

Rather, Blackwater employees, as the Gurantanamo POWs, were subjected to a system of interrogation. Under the balancing test of Geneva, once the US set the precedent for collecting evidence against Guantanamo POWs using coercion, then all other similarly situated prisoners -- including Blackwater employees -- should also expect to be subjected to similar coercive techniques, including false promises.

Once the US set the bar so low for the Guantanamo POWs that any evidence -- however obtained -- could be used against them, then this should have clearly told all Blackwater legal counsel and employees that they could be subjected to similar coercive techniques. Conversely, it would be inconsistent for the US to deprive POWs, protected under Geneva, of a right to challenge evidence; but then grant Blackwater, operating outside Geneva, privileges not afforded to similarly situated interrogation targets.

World Response

If we contrast the US approach to the Geneva POWs with how the Blackwater employees want to be treated, we'll understand the world reaction to the abuses in Iraq. Broadly, Geneva exists to ensure despite warfare, the treatment of non-combatants -- civilians, POWs, and others -- is humane and free from all abuse.

However, once the US treats one set of prisoners at Guantanamo -- who should be protected, because they are acting within the law -- yet, the US provides special favors to Blackwater -- despite their agreeing to operate outside the law, and not be subject to GEneva, despite its relevance -- the World views this as double dealing on the laws of war.

The US's problem is that its abused prisoners in contravention to Geneva; yet its granting legal protections to Blackwater that should not be granted to those operating outside the law. Once Blackwater crossed the line and agreed to operate outside US law, it lost a reasonable expectation that its employees could enjoy any protections of US laws.

Going Forward

A. Review Reasonableness of Reliance in this legal nexus

Blackwater employees have a problem. They've agreed to operated in a combat zone on the assumption that they are "outside" US laws and Geneva; yet, in truth, _some_ sort of legal system must be applicable. Indeed, even if Blackwater "agreed" to be immune to all prosecution as a condition of employment in Iraq, no reasonable person could rely on this promise as it would mean they "could" commit Genocide and not be prosecuted. This is unreasonable on its face; and in contravention to what Nuremberg established: There are some things, regardless the legal excuses, that are not legal and are war crimes.

This case appears to be such a case: A reasonable person working for Blackwater should have known there was some conduct -- regardless any promise of immunity as a condition of employment -- they could not engage. ANy promise that they were "not" subject to US laws is not reasonable in that it creates the false illusion that _no law_ would constrain them.

Putting that aside, this is what appears to have happened: Blackwater employees through they were, indeed, outside the law; and not subject to either the laws of war, UCMJ, or US Law. This is not only impermissible, but not reasonable. Because in asserting that "we are not subject to any law"-argument, Blackwater employees -- under the laws of war -- have allegedly engaged in unlawful combat: They've agreed to operate, rightly or wrongly, _outside_ a system of discipline, leadership, and laws that _is_ subject to rigorous oversight, command, and a legal foundation.

B. Review US Precedent At Guantanmo As Guidance For Reasonableness of Blackwater Assumptions As An Alleged Unlawful Combatant

Because they have stripped themselves of the status of "lawful combatant", we turn back to the US precedents of how "unlawful combatants" -- rightly or wrongly categorized -- _were_ treated; and what a _reasonable_ Blackwater employee and Geneva Counsel _should_ have done once they were legally no longer lawful combatant, but an alleged "unlawful combatant, subject to the Geneva principle of reciprocity."

Reasonable counsel should have said: "The US precedent at Guantanamo is relevant: Those alleged to be unlawful combatants were mistreated; if our employees are also unlawful combatants, we should reasonably expect to be mistreated in the same way." Recall, at Guantanamo, the POWs were subject to coercive interrogation: This should have told Blackwater employees: "Unlawful combatants will be treated harshly"; thus, when they were detained after allegedly killing the Iraqi civilians, those Blackwater employees were not reasonably relying on any grant under US law; rather, they were -- for purposes of this note only -- being subject to the same "interrogation tactics" which the Guantanamo POWs were subject: Deception.

C. Review Doctrine of Evidence Spoliage

Once they were "granted immunity" they should have known here was a formal investigation; and that the evidence in the vehicles should not be destroyed.

D. Examine Reasonableness of Expecting Any Privilege or Immunities While Allegedly Knowingly Operating Outside Geneva Protections, And Beyond A Reasonable Expectation of That Shield

Again, the Blackwater employees should have known the following: They were acting outside US laws and Geneva; they were not, as required of lawful combatants, acting under a system of discipline that _was_ consistent with Geneva; and yet were _unreasonably_ expecting to enjoy privileges of promises, immunity, and protections not afforded to similarly situated prisoners at Guantanamo.

Blackwater is asking that it stand on both sides of the aisle in re Geneva and the laws of war: That the laws do not apply to their conduct, but are only applicable when invoking shields. That fence sitting was _not_ a privilege granted to any POW at Guantanamo, but the opposite was true: Despite Geneva being applicable, it was not afforded; and despite protections being required, they were denied. Blackwater wants the opposite: To be outside the laws when it comes to respecting the leash on its use of power; but it wants to enjoy the shields of Geneva despite Blackwatrer not demonstrating it was, at all times, a lawful combatant subjecting itself to legal oversight.

E. Review Appearance of Justice

From what little we know, it appears the US government's problem is the precedent established at Guantanamo; Yet, it asks the world to forget Geneva when it comes to imposing like abuses against the similarly situated combatants under Blackwater. When the world sees this double standard on Geneva, the US support plummets.

F. Review ICC Jurisdiction, Benefits of ICC Adjudication

The way forward is for the US to wash its hands of the mess at Guanatanamo and Blackwater, and subject all US government legal counsel and Blackwater employees to ICC jurisdiction, for The Hague to adjudicate:
- To what extent did US legal counsel deprive POWs of protections;
- To what extent did Blackwater violate the laws of war, and unreasonably rely on legal protections and promises or privileges it was not, as an alleged unlawful combatant, to rely on during an interrogation

The issue isn't narrowly whether Blackwater was or wasn't properly treated, or whether the employees gave evidence they were or were not required to give; but whether the protections under Geneva have or have not been reasonably enforced to all combatants and civilians. The US and Blackwater have, by their actions, allegedly shown contempt for Geneva and laws of warfare, but should be respected by civilized nations.

The US government appears to be tainted: It cannot credibly gather evidence in this legal nexus; nor can it credibly enforce or revoke privileges or protections for one class of prisoners while denying to similarly situated prisoners the same protections and privileges. The way forward is for the US to accept that its legal community has not effectively enforce Geneva; and the civilian leadership want to inconsistently punish some combatants, while rewarding others despite their both engaging in alleged illegal warfare as unlawful combatants. Only the ICC can credibly differentiate between lawful or unlawful combatants at Guantanamo and Blackwater; and only the ICC can maintain an appearance of independence which justice requires. The Hague can decide whether evidence was or was not consistently gleaned through abuse, unlawful means; or obtained despite lawful reuses; or lawfully gleaned despite no reasonable reliance on any promise by the detaining power.

Recommendation

We urge the US to turn over to The Hague the Blackwater defendants; and release to The Hague all POWs held at Guantanamo for adjudication. The Hague can decide whether their detention was or was not lawful; and whether the evidence justifying their continued detention has or has not been a subsequent war crime. Then, The Hague can decide whether Blackwater leadership, US legal counsel, and US civilian policy advisors and civilian leadership should or should not be indicted for permitting, not stopping, or advising of these alleged war crimes.

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