Next financial fall out is ...??? commercial real estate

AS I have said, when do the office towers go ? Ain't a matter of IF, it's WHEN.

When do they stop building the bloody condos for yuppies - crazed yuppies who are suddenly going to find themselves empoverished? (Reports are there are no buyers any more in some well-heeled communities.)

When - now that peak oil's reality is SINKING IN, although still a bit under the radar - are they gonna admit that they can't pay the utility bills and the lights go off?

It is my contention that looking at the ca$h flows of the bigger players will give you the clues as to what sectors of the economy goes next -- it has to do with corporate culture being of NO DAMNED GOOD to anyone since the Reagan years and then just continuing into today when Cheney and BuZh got their fingers into every little fiscal pie all over North America. Hank Paulson LIED all year, he will continue to lie, and this weekend I wuz hoping the chickens would come "home to roost" on all their friggin headz when he faced the music, I mean press. Having at one time (long ago) worked on The Street and in the legal offices of S&P, I still maintain that when the rationing of the airlines takes effect (big gas guzzler, big carbon footprint, little rationale for flying nearly empty planez .. ) the other thing to watch is the fall out of guys like Fed Ex, DHL/Purolater -- businesses that have been propped up by the flow of PAPER - as in CONTRACTS for the past two decades .. But don't take my word for it, just WATCH.

I worked for these desperados; I know what they got up to and how incredibly, really stoopid they were. They thought I was the stoopid one for not going about getting a legal degree and joining The (gambling) Game, but ya know, I still have my wits and humanity about me, as the saying goes.

I think I can safely say their MacMansions will be incredibly hard to heat in the near future.

One of these high buck lawyers I worked for did the following - he raised his kids living in a high buck apartment in NYC -- once he got them through school, and was an empty nester THAN he built his MANSION North of Yonkers! I mean really. For how many millions of dollars was he gonna impress the neighbors?

I mean really ... I think people are BONKERS. But then they surely did keep The System going for an awfully lot longer than I thought they would!!

It might have been wiser to find out how to plant seeds rather than find out which ex-urban gardening shop provided the best looking lilacs as said Lawyer's wife was a "pro" at doing. May Martha Stewart finally find some common sense. She was a Very Bad Role Model for America.

For those just "catching up" and have questions, put fiscal crisis into the search box in the top left hand corner.

In the meantime, before the lights go out, place yer buck$ on bicycle manufacturers and running shoe makers IN NORTH AMERICA.

http://www.handmadebicycleshow.com/
http://www.bikeforest.com/

Veeger

On 12/20/07

Wall Street's Next Crisis
by Jesse Eisinger

So far, the current credit crisis has zeroed in on mortgages for the less affluent. But easy credit was a sprawling millipede whose wobbly legs reached into the farthest corners of the financial markets. This is the year the other 999 shoes start to drop.

Any loan to any borrower can begin to seem subprime if there's too little down and too much debt. And that, unfortunately, brings us to the commercial-real-estate market.

For the past several years, the market for commercial property—offices, malls, apartment buildings, industrial plants, warehouses, and the like—has enjoyed the very best of times. Prices soared, and lenders lent readily. Owners had no problem meeting their payments. By early 2007, delinquencies had fallen to record lows.

In their own way, however, commercial-real-estate loans were no less foolish than those made to home buyers with speckled credit. And as with the subprime mess, the reckoning will come. Just like what happened in other sectors already hit by the credit crunch, these loans will cause problems that will probably find their way beyond the obvious players in the commercial-real-estate market. Judging by the aspects of the credit crisis we've already seen, commercial-real-estate trouble will probably emerge sooner than people expect—and will be worse than they anticipate.

The implosion is going to be a refreshingly simple and familiar story. The commercial-real-estate frenzy has none of the nagging complications found in the residential market. There aren't any targets of predatory lending. There are no huge failures by government regulators. The aftermath won't see people thrown out of their homes—an unadulterated societal ill regardless of whether they should have known better or were tricked into taking on loans they couldn't afford.

Let's make it clear up front: The commercial-real-estate blowup—while ugly—won't be as bad as the current housing crisis. It's a smaller market, and any single property often has a diversified group of tenants with different sources of income. The supply of buildings didn't increase dramatically over the past several years, as in residential real estate. And the losses won't be as severe, because many commercial spaces can be refashioned for new occupants.

But there will be trouble, in part because of the rise of the untested commercial-real-estate structured-finance market. Just as with residential mortgages, Wall Street banks package commercial-real-estate loans, slicing them up into tranches according to risk and parceling them out to a range of investors. In 1995, $15.7 billion worth of commercial-mortgage-backed securities were issued. Through the third quarter of 2007, $196.9 billion was issued, according to Commercial Mortgage Alert, a trade publication. That amount means 2007 will be a record year, even though issuance collapsed in the fourth quarter as investors panicked over the credit crunch. Right now, there is about $730 billion in commercial-mortgage-backed securities outstanding. "Not only have we been in a rising tide, but the loans are very different in underwriting standards than even five or 10 years ago," says Alan Todd, head of commercial-mortgage-backed-securities research at J.P. Morgan. "We haven't been through a cycle yet" with these new structures, he adds ominously.

The perennial lesson to be drawn from the coming slump: You can't protect greedy and myopic people from themselves. With residential mortgages, one of the most persistent myths to take hold in recent years was that home prices on a national level had never decreased in a given year. That wasn't true, but perhaps we can forgive people for being hopeful.

The commercial-real-estate market has no such excuses. Everyone knew that the business is highly cyclical. Indeed, a huge downturn had occurred as recently as the early 1990s, within the memory of most of the professionals now in the market.

Amid the tall office spires of America's cities, big-money pros have simply been playing a game of greater fool, trying to bring in huge returns with borrowed money and sell out before the arrival of the crash they knew was coming. And in this case, the fools won't just be famous developers. Some of the same banks and Wall Street firms now entangled in the subprime residential crisis will also be caught in the mess. The commercial-real-estate meltdown will be a market failure, pure and simple. We will be able to look at the wreckage in the next several years with wonder and awe, untroubled this time by sympathy for those left holding the bag.

Here's what we know about what happened in commercial real estate: Lending standards fell, starkly. Or as I prefer to see it, they were thrown out of the 60th-floor window of that gleaming office tower in downtown Atlanta/Phoenix/New York/San Francisco/insert your city here. The gap between the cost of debt servicing and the cash actually being generated by the buildings narrowed. What's more, it used to be that banks made loans for no more than 80 percent of the value of a property to ensure a healthy cushion of protection, but by the early part of 2007, loans were sometimes made for 120 percent of a property's value. Who would be so crazy as to lend more than a property is worth? Anyone who believes in perpetual-motion machines—that is, that rents and underlying property values must always go up.

A prime example is Tishman Speyer Properties, which paid a record price for two giant New York apartment complexes. To make the purchase work, the company must now figure out a way to kick out current tenants—many of whom have their rents stabilized by law—at a faster rate than has been managed in years past, in order to replace them with ones who will pay more. Historically, that turnover has been about 6 percent, says Todd, but Tishman Speyer is assuming a rate of more than double that for the first couple of years, and 10 percent for the next few after that.

Free money frothed up the market. The clear top—as clear at the time as it is in hindsight—was when real estate mogul Sam Zell sold his Equity Office Properties to the Blackstone Group, a private equity firm. Blackstone had entered into a bidding war with Vornado Realty Trust for E.O.P. and ended up paying much more than it had initially bid. Yet Blackstone managed to unload so many E.O.P. properties so fast that the deal looks brilliant. The bag holders are ultimately the ones who will appear foolish. Indeed, in a sign of things to come, one titan already does: Harry Macklowe, a famed New York real estate buccaneer, leveraged himself to the gills to buy seven New York office buildings from E.O.P., a side agreement to the Blackstone purchase. He borrowed $7.6 billion, based on stratospheric valuations, while putting a minuscule $50 million of his own equity into the deal, financing much of the purchase with short-term debt. Since the summer, Macklowe has struggled to refinance the debt in increasingly choppy markets. And he has had to put up as collateral his trophy property, the General Motors Building in midtown Manhattan.

Lending standards had been loosening across the industry for years. Standard & Poor's and Moody's both voiced early concerns in late 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Sure, "supply and demand is in balance, but that's not a license to loan more money against a given cash flow," says Tad Philipp, Moody's managing director of commercial-mortgage finance. "What we were seeing was riskier and riskier loans, and the loans got riskier still. And we are just past the top of the cycle."

Despite their misgivings, the ratings agencies kept slapping seals of approval on commercial-real-estate structures. Just as they did when rating securities containing residential mortgages, the agencies relied heavily on recent historical data, which were misleading. Such transactions are designed so that investors who take on the most risk stand to get wiped out first. What happened is that the level of cushioning shrank dramatically, meaning damage from bad loans will seep into higher-rated tranches more quickly than generally expected.

To its credit, Moody's started requiring higher levels of protection in the spring of 2007. S&P and Fitch, according to a J.P. Morgan analysis, lagged significantly—and won market share as a result. Those two will come to regret that they didn't respond faster to the Moody's move. And of course, those stuck with the paper won't be able to ignore what they bought during the frothy times, when commercial-real-estate structured finance became a big, lucrative business for Wall Street. As financial firms pushed these securities out the door, the structures took on alarming qualities.

As Todd explains, in the early part of the decade, commercial-mortgage-backed-securities deals rarely had any one loan that was so big it dominated the pool. But in recent years, the top 15 loans in a 200-loan pool could make up 40 to 65 percent of the pool's total value. In the old days, any single default wouldn't hurt a structure disproportionately. That's no longer true. Investors and ratings agencies haven't fully appreciated how hairy these structures have become, according to some commercial-mortgage experts. Todd calls this blindness to risk the agencies' and investors' "biggest mistake" with regard to commercial real estate. "You are disproportionately exposed to the largest loans.... It's been so good for so long, we don't have models set up to look at defaults properly," he says.

In recent months, as real estate developers have scrambled for funding from lenders, a standoff has developed. The banks haven't been able to find buyers for structured financial products. At some point, the banks will have to come down in price, and then they will take losses, just as they have with leveraged loans made to corporations being taken over by private equity. Since the losses haven't happened yet and since we've reached the end of a very good year in commercial real estate, Wall Street is understandably reluctant to face reality. Why take losses that will eat into this year's bonuses if you can take the losses next year, when, as everyone knows, the market will be bad?

We've seen this throughout the financial markets in 2007. This has been the season of see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil—until you absolutely have to. But you can't hold off losses forever, as the huge write-offs at banks have demonstrated. Through the first nine months of 2007, Wachovia was by far the top contributor of loans in the commercial-real-estate-structures business, followed by Lehman, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, and J.P. Morgan, according to Commercial Mortgage Alert. Now the firms are sitting on those loans, waiting to unload them. "The problem is there are no buyers. Nobody wants to take a really big loss and jump the gun too quickly," an investment professional at a commercial-real-estate investment trust told me. "There's a game of chicken going on."

A few weeks ago, a hedge fund manager emailed me a PowerPoint presentation on the commercial-real-estate market. It opened with a typically dry title: "2008 C.M.B.S. Forecast."

I clicked through to the first page, "Capital Markets." It had a picture of a derailed train. The next page, "Credit Fundamentals," included a photo of a bridge collapsing in a hurricane. Next came "Property Values," featuring an imploding skyscraper. The fourth page was "Economic Outlook"—a ship run aground on the rocks.

And the slide titled "Conclusion"? A photo of the exploding Hindenburg.


http://www.portfolio.com/views/columns/wal...l-Estate-Crisis