Showing posts with label University of California. Show all posts
Showing posts with label University of California. Show all posts

May 24, 2008

Back to John Yoo and exclusivity ..

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Today's Must Read

It all depends on what your definition of "exclusive" is.

At the heart of the debate over warrantless wiretapping is whether FISA, by its own terms, is the exclusive means for the government to undertake electronic surveillance in counterespionage and counterterrorism cases.

The plain language of the FISA statute seems clear, stating that FISA is the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted."

But nothing is ever that simple with the Bush Administration.

This week Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) released a declassified sentence from one of John Yoo's notorious memos, written while he was serving in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. In it, Yoo managed to rationalize away the exclusivity provision of FISA in order to justify a warrantless wiretapping program outside of the FISA framework, without judicial oversight or regular reports to Congress:

"Unless Congress made a clear statement in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area -- which it has not -- then the statute must be construed to avoid [such] a reading."

Poof! Just like that, exclusivity disappeared and the Bush Administration was free to pursue warrantless wiretaping with the official blessing of the OLC. (Former OLC attorney Jack Goldsmith has described his office's memos as "advance pardons").

The Bush Administration says it no longer relies on the Yoo memo as the legal underpinning for warrantless wiretapping, pointing instead to perhaps an even weaker rationale, the post-9/11 AUMF:

The Justice Department told the senators it no longer relies on Yoo's FISA memo. "The 2001 statement addressing FISA does not reflect the current analysis of the department," wrote Brian A. Benczkowski, principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legislative Affairs.

He "respectfully" requested that if the senators "wish to make use of the 2001 statement in public debate," they refer to the administration's current position, which pins the authority to choose non-FISA procedures on a law that Congress actually passed, not merely its failure to rule out alternatives.

When Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force of Sept. 18, 2001, it "confirmed and supplemented the President's Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States," Benczkowski said.

Exclusivity remains a key sticking point in passage of a new FISA law. Democrats are demanding language that erases whatever doubt there might be (although in fact there is none). The White House is balking.

Comments (21)

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Does this mean that unless the law explicitly says this law applies to (fill in your own name), it is okay to commit the crimes of your choice?

The sad fact is... these crimes will go unpunished simply because these are important people beyond the control of our rule of law.

All these folks... Republicans and Democrats alike are just "more equal" than the rest of us farm animals...

Too bad so few are willing to change this fact... the demise of a democracy is sad indeed...

Comment:

There is no doubt.

The issue is that Bush/Cheney through Yoo have decided that whenever Little Georgie puts on his "Commander In Chief" hat he doesn't have to obey ANY law. In the interest of "national security" there is nothing that can impede Little Georgie from doing anything he decides is necessary.

Get it?

He's not above the law. He's beyond the law.


But that's just their say-so. No one else believes such inane misinterpretation of the Constitution and the law. Clearly, Little Georgie has been authorizing quite illegal operations that constitute gross abuse of governmental powers. i.e. he's committed High Crimes & Misdemeanors. Can we Impeach him now?


ITMFA (impeach the motherfucker already)

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Wiretapping up. Prosecutions down. Is there any doubt about what the wiretapping is REALLY for? Getting Rove's permanent GOP majority.

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The single best part of this story is that former U.S. Attorney Senator Sheldon Whitehouse is on the case. He is extraordinary. Addington/Yoo/Bybee & Co. have met their match in this gentleman.

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America looks just a little more like Putin's Russia everyday. Or, am I being too nice? .... a USSR or a Stalinistic regime? Rule are made to be broken, a controlled media, spying, torture, more and more jails, purging of authorneys, politized trials with trumped up charges, the haves and the have nots, and constricted military personel trapped in a dieing profession.
Where is America headed? And why with all the ourtage is there nothing being done about it?
Americans must love how it is being treated.

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DOJ Reliance Continues

The issue is: What Other programs have relied on this (incorrect) assertion the statutes and Constitution do not apply. It is meaningless for DoJ/AG to argue it "no longer" relies on the Yoo memo. Sure it does. AG said explicitly that he would not enforce any laws DOJ OLC said did not apply: Geneva, FISA. What other standards have been cast to the winds with other DOJ OLC memos?

Yoo's Convoluted Logic

FISA was written, in part, to authorize lawful violations of the Constitution. Once the President claims FISA does not apply -- in either granting an exception to the warrant requirement, or in having "no role as a standard" -- then the President must comply with the Constitution.

Yoo's Construction would have us believe FISA does not apply, but he fails to explain why the President can ignore Constitutional requirements in the 4th Amendment. Youngstown shows the President's power is constrained by the Constitution, and law. Even if Yoo's assertion is correct -- that the FISA does not apply because Congress did not expressly say it applied to a specific situation -- Yoo has not addressed the Constitutional requirements.

Evenif FISA does not apply, Yoo fails to address the Constitution Violations or Constrain Other Programs

Yoo's argument has not adequately addressed the implications of his argument: Once FISA is ignored, or does not apply, or Congress did not expressly say it applied to a narrow situation -- the President is only left with the Constitution which prohibits all warrantless surveillance. Yoo's asked us to believe the law does not apply; but fails to explain why the President, as a creature of the Constitution, has any authority from the document Yoo also says does not apply.

Exception to Privilege

It appears Yoo's written this after the illegal activity started: The President, as with Geneva violations, was stuck with a legal issue, and hoped to "rely on" DOJ OLC memos to "legalize" what had already started. These memos do not appear to be deliberative/pre-decisional, but post-decisional, also not protected given the crime-fraud exception to attorney client privilege.

Illegal Wiretapping
Illegal Torture
Illegal Propaganda Program
All admitted by the administration.
Approval ratings in the toilet.
No impeachment proceedings?
The Senate is just as guilty as the administration. Throw the "outraged"-stern-letter-writing bums out.

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It's a shame that Dianne Feinstein voted in committee to pass the Senate bill that grants retroactive immunity to the telecoms who assisted the administration in spying on Americans without a FISA warrant (thus flouting the clear and plain "exclusive means" clause of the 1979 FISA law quoted above).

Because every other means of legal discovery and review of this illegal program has been closed off by the Bush Administration on standing grounds or through claims of executive privilege, the telecom lawsuits are the last, best way for the American people to finally learn what laws were broken in their name and what violations of their personal privacy occurred without their knowledge or consent. They're also the last best way to hold those lawbreakers (in both the corporate and private sector) accountable for their lawbreaking, and to disincentivize such flagrant illegalities in the future.

Unfortunately, Dianne Feinstein's pro-immunity vote in committee made the pursuit of justice and accountability infinitely harder. Again, that's a shame. And it's an even bigger shame that she cast that pro-immunity vote, to the great benefit of her largest contributors such as AT&T, in direct opposition to the overwhelming balance of her own constituent contact with regard to the bill, which, per her own staffers' admission, was almost exclusively anti-immunity.

But then, why the hell should she care what we constituents think? We're only her stupid constituents.

Patrick Meighan
Culver City, CA

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President Delegated No Power To Violate the Constitution

DOJ OLC views surveillance as lawful unless the Congress or Constitution expressly prohibits that activity. However, the 10th Amendment does the opposite: Unless a power -- for the President to violate the Constitutin -- has been delegated, that power is reserved to the States and People.

DoJ OLC Separates 4th Amendment

Part 1 of 4th Amendment

The problem with the 4th Amendment, in light of DOJ OLC memos, is that they look at the 4th Amendment as two separate clauses. DoJ OLC views electronic surveillance as reasonable during wartime:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,

Part 2 of 4th Amendment

DoJ OLC argues that warrants are not always required. When they are required, the standard is probable cause:

"and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

By splitting the 4th Amendment into two, DOJ OLC is arguing the President-DOJ OLC-AG alone, outside the court, can determine that Presidential power is not constrained by the Warrant requirement. They've invented a new exceptions to the Constitution: The President, his decisions, and any action taken in the name of a nebulous objective.

This is the definition of tyranny.

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By splitting the 4th Amendment into two, DOJ OLC is arguing the President-DOJ OLC-AG alone, outside the court, can determine that Presidential power is not constrained by the Warrant requirement.

they got the right to argue that

and if a court don't buy it, they got the right to go to jail


Well the thig that I always point back to when talking to friends about this white house and many of their supporters is that in essence they consider themsleves conservative. I have always felt that many of the people which define themselves as conservative cared about government abuse, goverment spending and the nature of balance between government responsibility tempered against personal/civc responsability. If that were the case then how under any interpretation of conservatism can you have this interpretation of a legal statute? At a bare minimum their interpretation is quite liberal or I should say creative, but definitely not a conservative approach nor a conservative conclusion? Don't you guys agree? If the status quo was A and you have people asking for B, then it needs to be seen as exactly that, not A but B. A change! Therefore the white house has changed its policies so that those policies reflect what they feel represents conservatism, not that they are conservatism, but that their goals are conservative and their methods are anything but. So essentially these guys have hijacked conservatism because they felt that was the only way to get America the way that they wanted! So we get back to feeling the way most of the people who have had a problem with their methods over the last couple of years which is namely that their methods have been bad for US perception abroad, they have been bad for your average American, who makes less than 75 thousand a year or a family that makes less than a 100 thousand a year, they have been bad for our education policies in many ways by creating a top down structure which puts the burden on teachers rather who have little power in terms of teaching guidelines and even less when it comes to classroom discipline, you have ever increasing health care cost, while thousands of americans continue to be added to the list of uninsured, etc! They have failed in getting the results which they beleived they could accomplish but have been successful at changing the language and spirit of those working in Washington. Now we have a goverment in which those at the top are both responseable for much of the policy but then places the ultimate critique not on those policies but on how well those underneath the top performed them. This allows the Kings/high-goverment officials the pleasure of never being accountable for their action or the policies they support. I know I am oversimplifying but this is a large picture of how I see things moving. It is going to take the best and the brightest to create a new spirit in Washington and a new spirit around this country which better reflects how the majority messures up to the first paragraph of the preamble.

Dude, there's this thing called the 'Enter' key that makes your posts more readable. I don't know if you had a point. I don't care. Think paragraphs....

And even when this program supported by legal garbage is hopefully dismantled by Obama what happens? If there is no consequence for Bush Co., then won't the same programs and be put back in place by the next tyrannical administration...

I imagine the administration plans to put programs in "sleeper" mode. I dislike conspiracy thinking, but it fits the trend/pattern of facts that are ever so slowly emerging every month. Our only hope is the whistle blowers with any sense of decency.

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DoJ has not made the case that something other than FISA governs electronic surveillance; or that non-FISA procedures apply to this surveillance. DOJ cannot reasonably expect Congress to comply with this non-sense request:

He "respectfully" requested that if the senators "wish to make use of the 2001 statement in public debate," they refer to the administration's current position, which pins the authority to choose non-FISA procedures on a law that Congress actually passed, not merely its failure to rule out alternatives.From

The 2001 statement must be considered without regard to whether the statutes, policies, or programs did or did not change after the DOJ OLC statement. Today's debate is related to the illegal activity before the FISA changes. DoJ cannot ask Congress to examine one set of violations under statutes which were changed later. We still don't know what's been going on before the changes.

The "current position" is to pretend there's been compliance with standards they've ignored, but not prosecute the violations. That's not a position or policy. It's a decision to not enforce the Constitution. How that illegal activity, unlawful use of information, and surveillance relates to war crimes against POWs is a relevant discussion.

"Choosing non-FISA procedures" does not mean also ignoring the Constitution. Once the AG departs FISA, the AG cannot reasonably justify warrantless activity directed at American civilians. The exceptions do not apply. The ruse is to pretend Americans -- on accusation alone -- "Might be" disguised terrorists. ( Here Is Yoo's article on Katz highlights to waffling possition on the warrant requirements. )

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It is a misreading to suggest the concern with preventing an attack. The President and legal counsel were concerned with thhe opposite: If tehre was a second attack, could they go to the American people and say, "We did all we could">

Senator Specter, in reminding the AG the AUMF did not change FISA as the exclusive means to conduct warrantless surveillance, expressly rejected this assertion when Gonzalez testified Feb 2006 before the Senate Judiciary:

When Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force of Sept. 18, 2001, it "confirmed and supplemented the President's Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States," Benczkowski said.

Wrong, Benchowski. The AUMF in no way said the FISA was anything; nor did the AUMF say the FISA was something other than the exclusive means to conduct warrantless surveillance.

Illegal Changes To Constitution

The Congress has no power to "complement" the Constitution; nor can Congress through an Act delegate any power to the President. It's a mis-reading of the Constitution to pretend that an Article I declaration of war (which never happened) grants the President any new powers. It is absurd for Benchowski to misconstrue the AUMF as any Congressional comment about how the President may ignore FISA, bypass the Constitution, or use "new" authorities which Congress has "not" expressly prevented or assigned.

Using the Yoo-Benchowski construction, they would have us believe that the AUMF was an act of Congress that delegated to the President new authorities; but they contradict themselves arguing the Congress was silent in constraining that authority. That defies reason: How can the Congress both speak and not speak at the same time? The DOJ OLC would have us believe in quantum-speech-specificity: At the same time, Congressional language "is clear" and "isn't clear".

Even if true and there was any grant of new authority under the AUMF (which never happened), the President may not assert any power that illegally violates the Constitution unless the People agree. That never happened, as evidenced by the continued refusal to grant immunity for FISA violations; and the State AG efforts to enforce existing state-level contract requirements on the telecoms. Congress has no power to mediate contract disputes between the States and businesses. That is judicial power.

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Well, in a sense, the AUMF did exactly what Benczkowski said: the president has exactly zero authority to conduct domestic warrantless wiretaps under Article II, and after the passage of the AUMF he still had exactly zero authority. Multiply zero by any number, you still get zero.

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"testing" is as full of pseduo-law BS as they come --

"Yoo's argument has not adequately addressed the implications of his argument: Once FISA is ignored, or does not apply, or Congress did not expressly say it applied to a narrow situation -- the President is only left with the Constitution which prohibits all warrantless surveillance. Yoo's asked us to believe the law does not apply; but fails to explain why the President, as a creature of the Constitution, has any authority from the document Yoo also says does not apply."

That was addressed in the various (bogus) assertions that Bushit, when acting as Commander-in-Chief, is exempt from ALL legal constraints INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION, fool.

And that "covers" the illegal domestic wiretapping based upon the (equally bogus) assertion -- by the "Commander-in-Chief" -- that the "War on Terror" includes the US as a battlefield.

Problem in the latter case: Congress has not passed a Decaration of War against the US. Only the Bushit criminal enterprise has done that.

He is unconstitutionally claiming the powers of military dictator, without the uniform to give that fact away "too much".

As for your "legal" "theorizing": you haven't the least clue as to what law is and isn't, let alone how it works.

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There are nagging doubts that anything will come of this or any of the other extra-Constitutional scams Bush has run on this country. Congress will yammer protests, the White House will quibble over lawyerly details... and the matter will die. Congress has become the Administration's lapdog, spayed of output and neutered of energy.

The troublesome fact is that future Presidents will see unlimited wiretap privilege as a political tool too valuable to surrender. If they feel no compunction to reveal who they're bugging, what's to keep them from bugging their political opponents? And if there's no official sanction to keep them from doing so, they will. That's been the "Rovian" aspect of the wiretap case from the beginning - national security be damned...

If Yoo is subpoenaed and found to be as lacking as Gonzales, will Bolt Hall continue keeping him on faculty? Is his tenure sealed in stone? I just find this utterly so disturbing. It is not as if he taught at Ken Starr U (Pepperdine) or Condy U (Stanford). That would be bad enough, but we are talking about Berkeley! If one of my kids went to school there, I would be raising hell!

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The 4th amendment is very clear and unequivocal. What all of these interpretations indicate is that there is a need for many new laws in 2009 to make sure the conservatively-stacked courts have no more opportunities to nullify the existing law. The judges specifically responsible for nullifying these laws should be impeached and disbarred, because they have violated their oaths to support a right-wing extremist political agenda intent on dismantling the Constitution in favor of a police state. These fanatics are a cancer in the government and must be removed if our form of government is to survive another century.

Sentence in Memo Discounted FISA

By Robert Barnes
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, May 23, 2008; A15

What does "exclusive" mean?

The answer was at the heart of a highly sensitive memo by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel in 2001, when Bush administration officials were keen to institute warrantless domestic surveillance after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

A 1978 law appeared at first glance to be an impediment to using new procedures for such surveillance. It stated that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) provided the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted."

But the administration did not want to follow FISA, because the law requires court approval. The administration has said that law could be a cumbersome obstacle in real-time efforts to intercept intelligence.

This created a quandary that then-Justice Department lawyer John C. Yoo resolved in the OLC memo. Until this week, members of the public did not know exactly what the memo said. But two Democratic senators who had read the classified version asked that a sentence in the memo be declassified, and this week they released the result:

The passage states that "[u]nless Congress made a clear statement in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area -- which it has not -- then the statute must be construed to avoid [such] a reading."

In short, in this context exclusive does not mean exclusive because Congress did not specifically rule out the alternative approach sought by the administration.

But Democratic Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse (R.I.) and Dianne Feinstein (Calif.) said the memo provided the legal underpinnings for the Bush administration to ignore FISA's clear language.

"I cannot reconcile the plain language of FISA that it is the exclusive procedure for electronic surveillance of Americans with the OLC opinion saying Congress didn't say that," Whitehouse said in a statement. "Once again, behind the veil of secrecy, OLC appears to have cooked up extravagant or misguided legal theories which would never survive the light of day."

The context of Yoo's statement is unclear, because the rest of the memo remains classified. Yoo, now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley, also wrote a controversial memo from August 2002 that narrowly defined torture; the department later rescinded it.

The Justice Department told the senators it no longer relies on Yoo's FISA memo. "The 2001 statement addressing FISA does not reflect the current analysis of the department," wrote Brian A. Benczkowski, principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legislative Affairs.

He "respectfully" requested that if the senators "wish to make use of the 2001 statement in public debate," they refer to the administration's current position, which pins the authority to choose non-FISA procedures on a law that Congress actually passed, not merely its failure to rule out alternatives.

When Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force of Sept. 18, 2001, it "confirmed and supplemented the President's Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States," Benczkowski said.

Whether such surveillance can be authorized outside of the legal requirements of FISA is one of the most contentious points in negotiations between Congress and the administration as it attempts to revise the statute -- a matter on which lawmakers will have the last word.

Feinstein said in a statement: "The declassified OLC opinion claimed that FISA didn't restrain the President's authorities. The OLC was wrong, and new FISA legislation must have strong exclusivity language to make clear that we cannot have such abuses again in the future."

Sentence in Memo Discounted FISA

By Robert Barnes
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, May 23, 2008; A15

What does "exclusive" mean?

The answer was at the heart of a highly sensitive memo by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel in 2001, when Bush administration officials were keen to institute warrantless domestic surveillance after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

A 1978 law appeared at first glance to be an impediment to using new procedures for such surveillance. It stated that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) provided the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted."

But the administration did not want to follow FISA, because the law requires court approval. The administration has said that law could be a cumbersome obstacle in real-time efforts to intercept intelligence.

This created a quandary that then-Justice Department lawyer John C. Yoo resolved in the OLC memo. Until this week, members of the public did not know exactly what the memo said. But two Democratic senators who had read the classified version asked that a sentence in the memo be declassified, and this week they released the result:

The passage states that "[u]nless Congress made a clear statement in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area -- which it has not -- then the statute must be construed to avoid [such] a reading."

In short, in this context exclusive does not mean exclusive because Congress did not specifically rule out the alternative approach sought by the administration.

But Democratic Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse (R.I.) and Dianne Feinstein (Calif.) said the memo provided the legal underpinnings for the Bush administration to ignore FISA's clear language.

"I cannot reconcile the plain language of FISA that it is the exclusive procedure for electronic surveillance of Americans with the OLC opinion saying Congress didn't say that," Whitehouse said in a statement. "Once again, behind the veil of secrecy, OLC appears to have cooked up extravagant or misguided legal theories which would never survive the light of day."

The context of Yoo's statement is unclear, because the rest of the memo remains classified. Yoo, now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley, also wrote a controversial memo from August 2002 that narrowly defined torture; the department later rescinded it.

The Justice Department told the senators it no longer relies on Yoo's FISA memo. "The 2001 statement addressing FISA does not reflect the current analysis of the department," wrote Brian A. Benczkowski, principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legislative Affairs.

He "respectfully" requested that if the senators "wish to make use of the 2001 statement in public debate," they refer to the administration's current position, which pins the authority to choose non-FISA procedures on a law that Congress actually passed, not merely its failure to rule out alternatives.

When Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force of Sept. 18, 2001, it "confirmed and supplemented the President's Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States," Benczkowski said.

Whether such surveillance can be authorized outside of the legal requirements of FISA is one of the most contentious points in negotiations between Congress and the administration as it attempts to revise the statute -- a matter on which lawmakers will have the last word.

Feinstein said in a statement: "The declassified OLC opinion claimed that FISA didn't restrain the President's authorities. The OLC was wrong, and new FISA legislation must have strong exclusivity language to make clear that we cannot have such abuses again in the future."


April 23, 2008

John Yoo, Berkley: Alex Whelan

Berkeley Defends John Yoo With Nonsense

Via Marty Lederman, I see that Christopher Edley, Jr., the Dean of the UC Berkeley School of Law, has decided to step up and defend John Yoo, the lawyer who wrote the now infamous memos legalizing torture. First the letter (all emphasis mine) and then my response:

While serving in the Department of Justice, Professor John Yoo wrote memoranda that officials used as the legal basis for policies concerning detention and interrogation techniques in our efforts to combat terrorism. Both the subject and his reasoning are controversial, leading the New York Times (editorial, April 4), the National Lawyers' Guild, and hundreds of individuals from around the world to criticize or at least question Professor Yoo's continuing employment at UC Berkeley Law School. As dean, but speaking only for myself, I offer the following explanation, although with no expectation that it will be completely satisfying to anyone.


Professor Yoo began teaching at Berkeley Law in 1993, received tenure in 1999, and then took a leave of absence to work in the Bush Administration. He returned in 2004, and remains a very successful teacher and prolific (though often controversial) scholar. Because this is a public university, he enjoys not only security of employment and academic freedom, but also First Amendment and Due Process rights.

It seems we do need regular reminders: These protections, while not absolute, are nearly so because they are essential to the excellence of American universities and the progress of ideas. Indeed, in Berkeley's classrooms and courtyards our community argues about the legal and moral issues with the intensity and discipline these crucial issues deserve. Those who prefer to avoid these arguments--be they left or right or lazy--will not find Berkeley or any other truly great law school a wholly congenial place to study. For that we make no apology.

Does what Professor Yoo wrote while not at the University somehow place him beyond the pale of academic freedom today? Had this been merely some professor vigorously expounding controversial and even extreme views, we would be in a familiar drama with the usual stakes. Had that professor been on leave marching with Nazis in Skokie or advising communists during the McCarthy era, reasonable people would probably find that an easier case still. Here, additional things are obviously in play. Gravely so.

My sense is that the vast majority of legal academics with a view of the matter disagree with substantial portions of Professor Yoo's analyses, including a great many of his colleagues at Berkeley. If, however, this strong consensus were enough to fire or sanction someone, then academic freedom would be meaningless.

There are important questions about the content of the Yoo memoranda, about tortured definitions of "torture," about how he and his colleagues conceived their role as lawyers, and about whether and when the Commander in Chief is subject to domestic statutes and international law. We press our students to grapple with these matters, and in the legal literature Professor Yoo and his critics do battle. One can oppose and even condemn an idea, but I do not believe that in a university we can fearfully refuse to look at it. That would not be the best way to educate, nor a promising way to seek deeper understanding in a world of continual, strange revolutions.

There is more, however. Having worked in the White House under two presidents, I am exceptionally sensitive to the complex, ineffable boundary between policymaking and law-declaring. I know that Professor Yoo continues to believe his legal reasoning was sound, but I do not know whether he believes that the Department of Defense and CIA made political or moral mistakes in the way they exercised the discretion his memoranda purported to find available to them within the law. As critical as I am of his analyses, no argument about what he did or didn't facilitate, or about his special obligations as an attorney, makes his conduct morally equivalent to that of his nominal clients, Secretary Rumsfeld, et al., or comparable to the conduct of interrogators distant in time, rank and place. Yes, it does matter that Yoo was an adviser, but President Bush and his national security appointees were the deciders.

What troubles me substantively with the analyses in the memoranda is that they reduce the Rule of Law to the Reign of Politics. I believe there is much more to the separation of powers than the promise of ultimate remedies like the ballot box and impeachment, even in the case of a Commander in Chief during war. And I believe that the revolution in sensibilities after 9/11 demands greater, not reduced, vigilance for constitutional rights and safeguards. What of the argument made by so many critics that Professor Yoo was so wrong on these sensitive issues that it amounted to an ethical breach? It is true, I believe, that government lawyers have a larger, higher client than their political supervisors; there are circumstances when a fair reading of the law must--perhaps as an ethical matter?--provide a bulwark to political and bureaucratic discretion. And it shouldn't require a private plaintiff and a Supreme Court ruling to make it so. Few professions require an oath at entry, but law does. Oaths must mean something.

Assuming one believes as I do that Professor Yoo offered bad ideas and even worse advice during his government service, that judgment alone would not warrant dismissal or even a potentially chilling inquiry. As a legal matter, the test here is the relevant excerpt from the "General University Policy Regarding Academic Appointees," adopted for the 10-campus University of California by both the system-wide Academic Senate and the Board of Regents:

Types of unacceptable conduct: ... Commission of a criminal act which has led to conviction in a court of law and which clearly demonstrates unfitness to continue as a member of the faculty. [Academic Personnel Manual sec. 015]

This very restrictive standard is binding on me as dean, but I will put aside that shield and state my independent and personal view of the matter. I believe the crucial questions in view of our university mission are these: Was there clear professional misconduct--that is, some breach of the professional ethics applicable to a government attorney--material to Professor Yoo's academic position? Did the writing of the memoranda, and his related conduct, violate a criminal or comparable statute?

Absent very substantial evidence on these questions, no university worthy of distinction should even contemplate dismissing a faculty member. That standard has not been met.

John Yoo wrote the memos that provided the legal rational and defense for the president's torture regime. As today's AP and ABC News stories make abundantly clear, it was on the basis of his findings that the president ordered the program to go forward. Thus, in the opinion of those directly involved in the process, his arguments were instrumental to the program itself. Yoo wasn't just providing one of many opinions. He was providing the opinion on which everything was based.

What is at issue here are not simply John Yoo's ideas. Tenure and academic freedom are designed to protect ideas but that is not what this is about. This is about John Yoo's actions as a lawyer. As a lawyer working within the Dept. of Justice, his duty was to defend the laws and constitution of the United States. As a lawyer working within the Office of Legal Council, the President of the United States was often his client, but the law should have been his master. Although he clearly did not understand this, his obligation was not to craft arguments that would make the president happy, but instead to provide guidance to the president about what the law and the constitution would allow.

In my opinion, the normal arguments about tenure and academic freedom simply do not apply here, because what Yoo was doing was not in any way academic. As Dean Edley indicates above, tenure is designed to allow faculty members the complete freedom to examine ideas and follow truths wherever they might lead. And I absolutely agree, that freedom must be protected. But John Yoo wasn't merely pursuing ideas. He wasn't simply following truths wherever they might lead. His memos weren't controversial papers in an obscure academic journal or law review, nor were they inflammatory articles in a newspaper or magazine. They were legal opinions used by the president to authorize the torture of other human beings. Nothing could possibly be further from the world of academia than that.

Moreover, Dean Edley's claims that because Yoo was only providing opinions and analysis, and not actually making decisions, his conduct is not "morally equivalent to that of his nominal clients." But this sets the bar for misconduct so high that virtually no one will ever clear it. Yoo is quite obviously a very smart man. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard University, attended Yale Law School, and clerked for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. As a lawyer working within the Office of Legal Council, he knew that the opinions he was providing weren't merely an academic exercise designed to explore the ramifications of hypothetical behaviors. He knew who was asking for his opinion, and as a smart man he certainly knew why. So when he was asked to urgently provide the president with a legal opinion on the president's authority to order the torture of another human being, he absolutely must have known where that would lead.

Knowing that his legal rational was likely to be used in the construction of a torture regime, Yoo provided it anyway. And he didn't provide it in a careful, heavily qualified way. He told the president in no uncertain terms that when it came to torture, there was absolutely nothing that could stand in his way.

Go back and read the memos. Yoo wasn't simply arguing that this was an issue on which the laws were not clear. Not at all. He was arguing that despite laws that explicitly outlawed this sort of behavior, so long as the president claimed it was in the interest of national security during a time of war, the president could not be stopped:

"If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions."

Yoo is not stupid. He knew what he was doing, and he knew where this would lead.

Here's another example, this time taken from a debate in 2005:

Cassel: If the President deems that he's got to torture somebody, including by crushing the testicles of the person's child, there is no law that can stop him? Yoo: No treaty. Cassel: Also no law by Congress. That is what you wrote in the August 2002 memo. Yoo: I think it depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that.

In this setting, a debate at Notre Dame University in 2005, Yoo was clearly participating in an academic exercise and discussing a hypothetical situation. It was precisely this sort of situation that tenure was designed to protect. But Yo, in his capacity as an Asst. Attorney General in the OLC, he provided precisely the same opinion to the President of the United States. Did he honestly think that the president was merely curious about this? That was an innocent hypothetical and nothing more?

John Yoo wrote the legal rationale that became the basis for state sanctioned torture. Having successfully completed that task, he has returned to UC Berkeley to teach students about the law, its place in society, and the role of the lawyer in constitutional structure. Is he teaching future lawyers to act as he has acted? To put the needs of their client above the demands of the law? To do whatever is necessary to make sure that their client gets their way? And is that what Berkeley wants its faculty to teach? Are there no limits, no legal methods which are out of bounds? Is ethics no part of the curriculum they teach?

What if, for example, he had been responsible for providing this guidance? Although I can't be certain, I would imagine that the author of that memo neither made the decision to order its creation not carried out its instructions. In a large bureaucracy those tasks were certainly left for others to complete. Does that mean the author is blameless? That because they simply provided opinions rather than made decisions that they should not share in the blame? Dean Edley's reasoning would suggest that the author writings would be protected, and yet I'm sure that if it were this memo and not Yoo's he would say nothing of the sort. But how precisely do they differ, and how bright is the line separating these two works?

In the, despite all the words written here, I think it actually is quite simple. Dean Edley asks: Was there clear professional misconduct--that is, some breach of the professional ethics applicable to a government attorney--material to Professor Yoo's academic position? To which I would answer: if drafting the legal rationale atop which a regime of state sanctioned torture was built is not a breach of the professional ethics applicable to a government attorney, what is?

Fire him. Not tomorrow, but now.

UPDATE: A short addition from Marty Lederman that provides some perspective on just how aberrant Yoo's behavior truly war:

It remains the case that the president is constitutionally obligated to take care to faithfully execute treaties, i.e., not to intentionally breach them. And it is therefore noteworthy, I think, that until John Yoo entered the government, the executive branch had never (to my knowledge, anyway) expressed the view that it was at liberty to disregard treaty obligations. The government has never claimed the right to torture--not in the Civil War, not in Vietnam; not even in the (post-Yoo) Bush Administration....


The question, however, is whether it's acceptable constitutional behavior, and, in particular, whether OLC should construct arguments in its favor. And, I suppose, whether leading academics should encourage it.

Please remember, this wasn't an academic exercise to determine if a president could hypothetically do such things. The actual President of the United States was actually asking for an opinion about whether or not he could actually do such things. Why on earth are the protections of tenure supposed to cover that?

Also, it occurs to me that I may have misstated Yoo's obligations above. I wrote that POTUS was his client, but I'm not entirely sure that is the case. Lawyers in the DOJ are paid by the people of the United States to work on their behalf, so a good case could be made that he was our lawyer, not the president's, and that as such he should have been working on our behalf. No doubt Yoo would disagree, but that only underscores the nature of the problem.



Berkeley, John Yoo, Part II

Following up on my post from late last night, take a look at what Scott Horton has to say over at Balkanization. Scott has done tremendous reporting on the establishment of a torture regime here in the US, so I want to highlight one part in particular:

Edley assumes that Yoo was approached, as he has stated repeatedly, and asked to advise as to the full legal range of authority of the president with respect to intelligence interrogations.


That description can't be squared with the facts. A broad array of highly coercive techniques had already been implemented in rules of engagement issued to special operations teams long before Yoo was approached. Yoo was fully aware of this fact. He was commissioned to craft memoranda, twice, for purposes of a "cramdown." Lawyers and senior figures within both the CIA and DOD had objected to the new techniques very pointedly, noting that they violated criminal statutes and that both policy makers and personnel using them could be subject to prosecution.

In response to this "legal uprising," David Addington and Alberto Gonzales decided to task John Yoo to prepare memoranda. These memoranda were commissioned with two purposes in mind. First, to protect the policymakers who had authorized torture techniques from future criminal liability (something which Gonzales had identified as early as January 2002 as a serious prospect). And second, to wield the Attorney General's opinion powers to silence lawyers who had correctly evaluated the legal framework.

Both of these purposes were wrongful, and inconsistent with the proper use of the Attorney General's opinion power. Criminal investigators may well conclude that this act joined John Yoo in a joint criminal enterprise with the persons who devised and pushed implementation of the torture policies.

Indeed, this is not entirely a speculative matter. We will shortly learn in the mass media that some prosecutors have already reached that conclusion and that the preparation of a criminal case is underway.

I base my conclusions about the facts behind the Yoo memoranda largely on my own investigation including not only the public record, but interviews with a number of figures who dealt with Yoo in the course of delivery of his torture opinions. Only yesterday, I learned from one prominent figure that he had seen repeated drafts of the March 2003 Yoo opinion, had cautioned Yoo on serious errors in judgment and interpretation in the memo, and had strongly urged modification of the memo at least to reflect the contrary viewpoint, even if only to distinguish it. Yoo insisted that he wanted it to be "clean." He declined to make any of the changes requested.

Similarly, Yoo was warned repeatedly that his views could not be squared with the overwhelming majority viewpoint in the community of law of war scholarship, and that the risk of criminal prosecution of those implementing his policies was severe. In response, Yoo stated that he was crafting his opinion consciously as a bulwark against future prosecution. Indeed, the March 2003 memorandum reflects that he had consulted and secured non-prosecution assurances from the Criminal Division headed by Michael Chertoff. This reassurances did not have their intended affect, however. A good part of his audience believed, correctly, that his attitudes and conduct actually undermined the validity of the opinion and would render it useless in the face of future prosecutions.

... So the facts establish that the torture policies were settled upon and had in fact been implemented. The principal authors were facing severe blow back from career lawyers inside the government. And John Yoo was carted in to use the powers of OLC to silence lawyers protesting the illegality of what was done. I believe that an objective examination of the facts will show that this is precisely how John Yoo understood his role. In essence, he was not an independent legal advisor. He had become a facilitator, an implementor of the torture policies. His role had shifted from passive advisor to actor, pushing a process forward.

And his conclusion:

A final aspect of Dean Edley's memorandum troubles me. He is appropriately concerned about freedom of expression for his faculty. But he should be much more concerned about the message that all of this sends to his students. Lawyers who act on the public stage can have an enormous impact on their society and the world around them. They can make great sums of money. They can be a force for social good. And they can also be vessels of horrendous injustice and oppression. Indeed they can foment and advance a criminal design. Does Dean Edley really imagine that their work is subject to no principle of accountability because they are mere drones dispensing legal analysis? Does he believe that they are free to follow their careers like legal pipefitters, dispensing the advice that their clients want to hear--and if it goes astray, well then, the problem is all the client's? Does he want a generation of Berkeley grads to think that writing up CYA memos for political friends is an honorable and proper thing--or at least something you can get away with, suffering no negative repercussions? This is exactly what some of the more unfortunate and ill-considered language in his memo suggests.


Much of the nobility of this profession lies in the duty of a lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment and to warn a client from an enterprise which is not merely foolish but at times actually immoral and criminal. Elihu Root famously termed this the lawyer's first calling. When confronted with a trying circumstance, John Yoo not only failed to give proper warning -- He became an active part of an enterprise bent on overriding the most fundamental legal and ethical prohibitions. Perhaps a criminal enterprise. And that is and will likely be seen by future generations as a far more troublesome matter than Dean Edley recognizes.

Edley owes it to his institution and to the students it is training to accept the full ethical and legal challenges that the case of John Yoo raises, and to treat them earnestly. His decisions are not wrong. But the words he chose to express them do little credit to the students and faculty at Boalt Hall.

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