CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS STATEMENTS FROM AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA, CANADA, FRANCE, SRI LANKA, CHINA AND NEW ZEALAND 
The following information was released by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG):
The Conference on Disarmament today heard statements from Australia, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Canada, France, Sri Lanka, China and New Zealand on Presidential proposal CD/1840 to end the impasse in the Conference and on regional nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
The incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States, said it was unquestioned that CD/1840 was a compromise, and thus by definition, unable to meet anyone's goals perfectly, but it was well-suited to advance everyone's interests and to get the Conference back to work. If it was adopted, all would win much and lose a little. While the United States would continue to focus on CD/1840 as the desired outcome of this year's activities in the Conference, with the support of the P6, they proposed a series of informal meetings during the third part of the 2008 session of the Conference in late July and in August. The United States had asked the seven Coordinators to resume their roles and to chair the discussions. The full exchange of views in these renewed informal discussions would help refresh all the issues in Members' minds, would help advance consensus on CD/1840, and would help inform the Conference on its final report.
Australia informed the Conference of an announcement made by the Australian Prime Minister in a speech in Japan on the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In a joint statement with the Japanese Prime Minister, Australia and Japan had renewed their determination to strengthen the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime and to cooperate closely to achieve a successful outcome to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The objective of the Commission was to enhance global efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by paving the way for a successful Review Conference in 2010.
Japan said that, on 12 June, the Japanese Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia had released a joint statement to reaffirm the particular importance of the Japan-Australia relationship and to strengthen further the comprehensive and strategic partnership between the two countries. Both leaders had renewed their determination to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan had also welcomed the Australian Prime Minister's proposal to establish an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation. On CD/1840, Japan believed it was a well-balanced compromise.
The Russian Federation said not everything in CD/1840 suited the Russian Federation and it was sure that all other delegations were not fully satisfied either. The Russian Federation wanted a stronger focus on prevention of an arms race in outer space which was a priority for the country. The Russian Federation was interested in having a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation was prepared not to oppose it with the view of ensuring the quickest return of the Conference to work.
South Africa said the consensus rule in the Conference had often been mentioned as the main reason why the Conference had not been able to negotiate anything in the last couple of years. But was it not perhaps the misuse of the consensus rule, rather than the rule itself, that had created the problem. The consensus rule did not apply itself, it was the Members of the Conference that chose when and how to apply it. When it was used to block the commencement, not the finalization, of negotiations, one could perhaps understand why some referred to the "tyranny of consensus". South Africa did not believe that CD/1840 was perfect. However, it represented that which was possible and practical under the present circumstances. South Africa stood ready to join a consensus on CD/1840.
Canada, speaking also on behalf of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), presented to the Conference the report on a conference entitled: "Security in Space: the Next Generation", that had taken place earlier this year. The conference had been the latest in a series of annual conferences held by UNIDIR on the issues of space security, the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
France referred to the statement by the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, on 21 March in Cherbourg proposing an ambitious disarmament plan, saying that these transparency measures were unprecedented for a nuclear weapon State. The President of France proposed to invite international experts to come and witness the dismantling of the fissile material for weapons facilities in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. Today, France renewed this invitation, and a visit to these facilities would be organized on 16 September. All Member States were invited to send representatives.
Sri Lanka said CD/1840 was a good basis for discussion, Sri Lanka had no doubt about that. However, Sri Lanka wished to draw attention to some underlying structural anomalies which had to be addressed if this effort was to be successful. CD/1840 privileged one agenda item over others. This particular item elevated over the others involved certain Member States more than certain others. If those Member States felt that their fundamental national interests were at variance with the spirit of CD/1840, then it was not a question of a handful of holdouts. Those countries concerns had to be seriously engaged with. If it was the perception of these States that their core strategic interests were at stake, then the Conference had to do better. Doing better could mean looking afresh at the other agenda items.
China hoped that the relevant parties would continue to make efforts to further conduct a constructive dialogue and consultations so that they were able to narrow the differences and reach consensus on a programme of work which was acceptable to all. In general, China was ready to make joint efforts with all the relevant delegations to push forward progress in the Conference.
New Zealand supported the President's comment that moving forward to reach consensus on the basis of CD/1840 was the best basis for advancing the work in the Conference. As far as its national position was concerned, New Zealand would be happy to commence negotiations on any of the core items before the Conference. As a non nuclear weapon State and as a State which had taken strong positions on nuclear weapons, New Zealand particularly wished for the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The reality was that no delegation here was in a position to begin serious negotiations on all the core issues before the Conference. A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would contribute to nuclear disarmament. New Zealand would like to see the treaty deal with verification and existing stocks and would argue in the negotiations in favour of including verification and existing stocks.
According to draft decision CD/1840 by the 2008 Presidents of the Conference, the Conference would appoint Chile as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war; appoint Japan as Coordinator to preside over negotiations, without any preconditions, on a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, thus providing all delegations with the opportunity to actively pursue their respective positions and priorities, and to submit proposals on any issue they deem relevant in the course of negotiations; appoint Canada as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions dealing with issues related to prevention of an arms race in outer space; appoint Senegal as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions dealing with appropriate arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and would request those Coordinators to present a report to the Conference on the progress of work before the conclusion of the session. The Conference would also decide to request the Coordinators for the agenda items previously appointed by the 2008 Presidents (i.e., new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems for such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armament) to continue their work during the current session.
Draft Decision CD/1840 builds on an earlier proposal submitted by the 2007 P-6 (CD/2007/L.1), and its related documents CRP.5 and CRP.6, combining those three texts in a single document.
The Conference on Disarmament will hold a public plenary at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 25 June, to listen to a statement by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. This will be the last public plenary of the second part of the 2008 session of the Conference. The third and last part of the 2008 session of the Conference will be held from 28 July to 12 September.
Statements
CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States), Incoming President of the Conference on Disarmament, said it was an honour to preside over the Conference. The common sense of purpose shown by all members of the Presidency, their joint aim in getting the Conference back to work, the genuine collegialitiy, was all impressive and gratifiying. It was a demonstration of how harmony could be created from disparate voices, given the will to do so. Some delegations had questioned the need for the differentiation among the key issues shown by CD/1840. It was unquestioned that CD/1840 was a compromise, and thus by definition, unable to meet anyone's goals perfectly, but it was well-suited to advance everyone's interests and to get the Conference back to work. If it was adopted, all would win much and lose a little.
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Jon Perr has a most excellent write-up about it:
Lest anyone be confused, this is quite the opposite situation from when former NYT pseudo-reporter/White House shill, Judy Miller, was subpoenaed and went to jail for failing to reveal her sources in the CIA leak case. In her case she was refusing to name White House officials who were involved in government wrongdoing in which she had a role. In James Risen’s case, he exposed government wrongdoing that had been shrouded in secrecy, which is quite simply the most meritorious and patriotic deed a journalist can do, and is exactly why the fourth estate deserves to have a federal shield law to prevent government retaliation for exposing their crimes.
What DO we do about this latest assault on freedom
this time freedom of the press
We can educate ourselves on this things,
but what steps must we take to see that yet another
Constutional imperative is not ripped up and thrown away
Time for the public and bloggers to expand the public inquiry, and support the NYT. They’re under siege by alleged domestic enemies of the US Constitution. Allegedly this prosecutor, despite an oath to enforce Geneva, is supporting efforts to block evidence of war crimes in re Iran. The goal of the prosecutor appears less to identify a real source, but more to understand the methods the NYT is using to keep ahead of the President’s efforts to suppress open source information about alleged war crimes planning.
It is incorrect to assume the NYT only used classified, non-public sources. There are open sources which do point to information the President, NSA, and NSA contracting legal counsel do not want connected. Do not assume that the “only” way to arrive at these conclusions in the NYT or the book are through illegal methods.
There are things that can be done to corroborate information, and piece together open-source information which baffles the NSA. It’s likely the NYT has used a novel approach to do something the President and others didn’t consider needed hiding or protected. It’s the burden of the prosecutor to prove that there is “a source” as opposed to a method. There may not be “a source”; there could be a method of inquiry that is novel, and proprietary.
It’s the burden of the government to prove that the “only” way this information could be known was through illegal methods; or a leak. That is a burden the government needs to prove. The fact that they’re unable to find “the source” means they don’t know how the NYT reporter was able to arrive at the conclusions; hence, they have no case, just accusations. That’s not evidence, but insinuation by unsophisticated prosecutors. The prosecutor appears to only be going on a fishing trip to find an answer the domestic NSA-intercepts have not been able to pinpoint: How was the cover-up thwarted; and what will they do “next time” to hide all the evidence from the voters?
It appears the President and contractors are attempting to use the legal system to disclose the methods used to catch them. This has the appearance of corruption by the prosecutor, and contradicts the notion of justice: Oversight through an informed voting public. It appears the prosecutor has bought into the notion that any public discussion of alleged war crimes can only occur if there is illegal disclosures: That’s absurd. The illegal activity cannot lawfully be suppressed. The public should remind itself: There is a higher duty than the President: It is the oath of office which includes the Constitution and all treaties, including Geneva.
The grand jury is not well-advised to support a line on inquiry that seeks to suppress evidence of war crimes, illegal planning, or reckless US government activity. What’s most absurd is the GOP was in the “Clinton did it too”-crowd; but would ask that that accusation not be applied, and that it is “only” possible to conclude “there were efforts to penetrate Iran” using only illegal reporting and sourcing.
Why is the “Clinton did it too”-crowd upset that the disclosures occurred about the efforts in Iran? Because it shows that Clinton attempted to do something; and after 2003, the Bush President was unable to find what Clinton was concerned about. No longer did the US government have a pretext for war with Iran that they could take to the UN Security Council. This means the power balances has shifted away from the US, and includes Russia and China as credible sources of opposition to the US track record of reckless defiance of international law.