We the People take a deeper look at the pResident's information warfare

by
Virginia Braddock Simson

With the revelations of the past few weeks stemming from Freedom of Information Act disclosures about information used against the American public (We the People), it is clear that We don't need to prove the pResident did anything, yet our investigations continue. It's the job of the court or Congress or war crimes prosecutors to provide the final legal answers to what should be done with the Bush administration and provide the nexus.

But We the People have a job: to establish what is most likely happening; outline that problem; and most importantly, maybe, to discuss solutions. Then we can discuss a coherent strategy. Whether the US Congress or the international community agree or disagree is irrelevant. Our contract is obviously with the US Constitution and our obligation to uphold Geneva, which is the Supreme Law of the Land.

To meet our goals, we must examine the emerging date showing there is a domestic threat to the US Constitution. This data is in the recently released DoD emails.

Some are getting lost in the details, but missing the larger nexus.

Some are confused about what needs to be proven. The data speaks for itself. We're not here to prove the email is or isn't part of information warfare, it is. The question is not whether the data and information that we have does or does not fit with the Department of Defense (DoD) information warfare guidance. It does.

The issue is whether we will broaden our horizon and act on the assumption that there is information warfare against American citizens, and look for other programs that threaten the US Constitution. The information is there. Our job is to find it. Our task is to examine the open source information for the clues to who else is involved, what is going on and how these patterns fit in with other lines of evidence related to other illegal activity.

Once that is established that we don't need perfect information on the details (that is someone else's job), but to consider the other types of programs the pResident and the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (DoJ OLC) organized under this DoD information warfare umbrella. That umbrella has provided a "temporary" shelter for a coup which took place with the stolen election of 2000. We the People are now engaged in the process of taking that "shelter" away by showing precisely how it conflicts with international accords and the legacy of Nuremberg.

It is beyond dispute there is a reasonable basis to request information through the FOIA process about this larger, vague but emerging nexus. We must stop waiting for evidence to ask questions. We must ask questions. We must ask questions to understand what evidence might exist.

That same pattern - that of having key players crossing between two issues - is how, in part, We demonstrated the connection between the National Security Agency (NSA) and contractors; and how We the People discovered some details of the still not-fully disclosed illegal activity. We're recognizing some of the common, loose threads of the same nexus. The same information connections to new, emerging lines of evidence in other illegal activity. It is the same nexus, not a new or isolated problem.

Some may not be familiar with these violations of international law or human rights. Our job is to focus on these violations, and not be preoccupied debating whether the nexus is real. Our time is better spent focusing our energy on finding information that would confirm or deny the scope of the illegal nexus. Although the information supporting the nexus outweighs the information against it, we're not here to debate whether the symptoms are real. Our job is to lawfully confront the problem of this unacceptable - and illegal - nexus with solutions.

This is not asking anyone to avoid questions, or stop independent research. That important work must continue, in parallel.

Some believe this information is hidden. Some of it is, but some data is out there, still to be discovered, through the FOIA process. Other data can be pieced together using the open sources to guide others to important, new insights.

Our job is to lay the foundation for those asking for information to show there is specific evidence supporting these FOIA requests. This asks that you keep an open mind about how these findings fit in with the larger nexus, and how the smallest piece of information can make the difference. This is of critical importance to We the People, you and I. We need every one involved to notice the details in the emails. They are important and connect to other things that cannot remain hidden.

The information is available in public. This effort will hopefully guide others. The FOIA responses - and by this I mean in particular to questions about the digital data forensics, conference coordination and data exchange between the IT industry - will give us more details. This will strengthen the connection between the FBI contacts in re Wecht; and the NSA illegal domestic surveillance.

The larger issue isn't illegal Federal Intelligence Security Agency (FISA) violations. That is a symptom. The larger nexus is the common information warfare. It includes NSA FISA violations, POW abuse, Wecht jury tampering and the military analysts' domestic propaganda.

Indeed, it is time confusing for We the People to comb through these documents. But the Constitution demands we continue our work, finding the connections and pathways, examining the decayed foundation below our nation's house. Combined, each of our points of light forms a giant torch, illuminating new tunnels within this nexus.

Some data from one cavern reflects from one inconsequential rock, and bounces across the tunnels, illuminating a new pathway we missed. Our job is to notice where the stray light falls, and recognize the new jewels newly flickering in these untraveled caverns. We must shine our lights, adjust to the unfamiliar light, and notice what is new. The smallest flicker may lead to the important tunnel. Our job is to find it, then lead the way.

To put this another way, the fact that the government has hidden information that is otherwise available through open sources strongly supports the assertion that the aim is NOT to protect "private information" (which is disclosed elsewhere), but to hide information useful to show the DoD information warfare guidance largely matches the evidence related to FBI jury tampering, NSA domestic surveillance/FISA violations, and information directed at civilians.

We the People need to recognize that the issue isn't that there is or isn't evidence. The problem is that people are NOT seeing each new disclosure doesn't contradict the original assertion; the assertion was and continues to be that DoD guidance was used to organize this illegal information warfare, which the telecoms, NSA, DoD and White House used to violate FISA and our Constitution of the United States.

If you take a close look (even just a smidgen of a glance!) it appears the DoD emails substantially complement the lines of evidence showing there is illegal data mining, domestic surveillance and information warfare.

The pResident hopes to distract us from the larger nexus. As evidence emerges from the walls, people have begun arguing of whether the data/evidence related to the symptoms is or isn't real. That is a misdirection, and a waste of our energy. But of course, this was intended, under the plan for information warfare !

As we connect the tunnels, and examine new jewels within these taverns, prepare to stumble upon convoluted maps with false trails, invalid arguments, and convoluted rewards for delay. These are from trolls. These disinformation agents are surfacing within blog threads, weakening our nation's foundations, but not our resolve. Beware those bearing false maps, singing a promise that others will do the work. They are bought and paid for by DoD, the US State Department or outside Contractors, and other alphabet-soup agencies. It is our job to find the way, not be lulled into inaction. We must continue.

The DoJ Inspector General's (DOJ IG) report - long awaited by We the People - has been discredited, and it does not focus on key DoD guidance or other decisions made outside the FBI to block investigations. DOJ IG is focusing on the parsin of the interrogation-connection, but fails to explain why Nuremberg precedents were enforced. That claim of "unclear guidance" is irrelevant.

The DoJ IG report substantially contradicts the US government's contentions about the FBI contacts with Wecht jury members. FBI agents at Guantanamo did object; but one cannot say the same in re those jury contacts.

The Wecht case, jury tampering and the DoD emails are NOT the points to prove - they are symptoms of the larger data information warfare. We the People are called to establish just how much other activity under his information warfare umbrella of which We are unaware. We don't need data proving the pResident personally did anything. The fact that all data is well couched by the DoD information warfare guidance is the basis for the FOIA:

- what other emails related to this information warfare;

- How was the email related to these other information warfare destroyed, not preserved; and

- When did legal counsel discuss war crimes in re using illegal information against civilians ??

What can We the People conclude?

• A. There is a reasonable basis to use the DoD emails to prosecute US contractors for illegal information;
• B. There is a link between the President and jury tampering;
• C. The pResident ignored the restriction against POW abuse and jury tampering;
• D. The FBI inconsistently argued it was doing the right thing on the POW abuse; but contradicts itself by doing the wrong thing on the jury tampering.

I have provided the first installment of "InfraGard - First in a Series" to show you how infragard relates to the NSA violations and Wecht jury tampering; It's part of the same information warfare against US citizens. The pResident is still waging illegal information warfare against us US citizens (and Canada, too) with Wecht jury tampering, NSA violations, propaganda (and the attendent cointelpro efforts) as well as the harassment of bloggers who are outside the propaganda matrix.

We the People must rise above the weeds! This citizen of We the People and our attorneys post this in the hopes We will soon hear back from you whether this perspective is helpful; or let us know whether you would like some additional assistance, discussion, or dialog. We would be most interested to learn if you have had trouble with accessing or posting to your blogsites or any interference in commenting to share the truth!

The "information" intelligence CONTROL

(oxymoron!) is revisted

Full Spectrum Information Warfare
Information Operation Roadmap Part 1

Brent Jessop - Knowledge Driven Revolution.com
November 5, 2007

When the US military refers to full spectrum domination, they truly mean full spectrum. Information operations or information warfare is a key part of the military battlespace. Recently, a document entitled Information Operation Roadmap was declassified by the Pentagon because of a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The document was described by the Council on Foreign Relations' website as:

"A 2003 Pentagon document previously classified as 'noforn' (not for release to foreign nationals, including allies), this report details the US military's information operations, including psychological operations, electronic warfare, and involvement in foreign journalism. The document was made public by the National Security Archive on January 26, 2006."

On Par with Air, Ground, Maritime and Special Operations

The importance of information warfare is clearly laid out in this document.

"Key assumptions. Information, always important in warfare, is now critical to military success and will only become more so in the foreseeable future. Three key assumptions underscore the growing importance of information:

- (U) Effectively communicating U.S. Government (USG) capabilities and intentions is an important means of combating the plans of our adversaries. The ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to diverse audiences in order to directly influence their decision-making is an increasingly powerful means of deterring aggression." [emphasis mine] - 3

The major thrust of the document was that information operations should be centralized under the Office of the Secretary of Defence and made a core military competency.

"Objective: IO [information operations] becomes a core competency. The importance of dominating the information spectrum explains the objective of transforming IO into a core military competency on a par with air, ground, maritime and special operations. The charge to the IO Roadmap oversight panel was to develop as concrete a set of action recommendations as possible to make IO a core competency, which in turn required identifying the essential prerequisites to become a core military competency." [emphasis mine] - 4

Uniformity in Message and Themes

The major reason for centralizing the information operations under a single command was to create consistency between the various segments of the Pentagon's information operations.

"IO requires coordination with public affairs and civil military operations to complement the objectives of these related activities and ensure message consistency." [emphasis mine] - 23

"- (U) The USG [US Government] can not execute an effective communication strategy that facilitates military campaigns if various organs of Government disseminate inconsistent messages to foreign audiences. Therefore, it is important that policy differences between all USG Departments and Agencies be resolved to the extent that they shape themes and messages.

- (U) All DoD [Department of Defense] information activities, including information operations, which are conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical level, should reflect and be consistent with broader national security policy and strategy objectives." [emphasis mine] - 25

"Coordinating information activities. Major DoD "information activities" include public affairs, military support to public diplomacy and PSYOP [psychological operations]. The State Department maintains the lead for public diplomacy, the [half line redacted] and the International Broadcasting Board of Governors maintains the lead for broadcasting USG messages overseas, often with DoD in a supporting role. DoD has consistently maintained that the information activities of all these agencies must be integrated and coordinated to ensure the promulgation of consistent themes and messages." [emphasis mine] - 25

A Trained and Ready Career Force

With the ascension of information operations into a core military competency the document recommended, under the heading "A Trained and Ready Career Force" that the:

"DoD [Department of Defence] requires a cadre of IO professionals capable of planning and executing fully integrated IO in support of Combatant Commanders. An IO career force should be afforded promotion and advancement opportunities commensurate with other warfighting areas and provided opportunities for advancement to senior executive or flag level rank." - 32

Support

The forward of this document was signed by then Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld which contained the following statement of support:

"I approve the Roadmap recommendations and direct the Services, Combatant Commands and DoD Agencies to fully support implementation of this plan." - iv

What Are Information Operations?

This document defined information operations as follows:

"The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decisions-making while protecting our own." - 22

The following series of articles will examine the Pentagon's intention of gaining full spectrum dominance in information warfare. Including, dominating the electro-magnetic spectrum and fighting the internet. Also, I will expand on the use of psychological operations or PSYOP as defined by the Information Operation Roadmapif any limits exist in information warfare.

WAR CRIMES DOSSIER: US government data show President ordered FBI agents to contact Wecht Jury

Subj: US government data show President ordered FBI agents to contact Wecht Jury

The Department of Justice Inspector General's office
shows the FBI has engaged in
illegal jury tampering.

The DOJ IG report and DOD data show the President ordered the FBI to question Wecht Jury members. The classified White House, DoJ, and DoD emails disclose names and establish the link between the President, the IT security industry, and information warfare against the jury members.

The DOJ IG report establishes a higher nexus outside DOJ including the President and White House. There is a striking contrast between FBI conduct in re FBI war crimes investigation (in action, appeal to standards) and the FBI contact with Wecht Jury members (meddling, defiance of standard).

The classified DoD emails establish the link between the President, DoD, DOJ and information warfare against civilians, largely contradicting DoD guidance.

Breach of FOIA Requirements For Unlawful Purposes

The redactions do not protect privacy, but (unsuccessfully) thwart oversight and examination of DoD connection through contractors to offensive and defensive coordination with NSA on information warfare against civilians.

No Right To See War Crimes Evidence

The President and legal counsel are denied the right to review how the classified DoD emails were reviewed; or what evidence on those classified emails show the link between the President and illegal information warfare against jury members. Legal counsel may request copies of this war crimes evidence through the war crimes prosecutor.

Inconsistent Story On FBI Involvement

The President cannot explain the contrast between the FBI actions in re POW and Wecht. The President cannot explain why the FBI agents did not object to the home interviews, but they did object to Geneva.

On the POW issues, the DOJ IG would have us believe the FBI was not following Geneva because the guidance was unclear. However, the DoD JAG comments show the opposite: The decision to not investigate had nothing to do with vague guidance or anything that would block the FBI.

The DoD JAG memos sows FBI agents were concerned about procedures. Something or someone higher than DOJ blocked investigations. No DOJ guidance blocked any investigation. The US Attorney was not, as they should have been, involved in war crimes investigations in violation of Geneva. The US Attorney cannot explain why they reversed themselves and were involved with FBI interviews of jury members.

The DOJ IG report shows efforts to discredit the FBI do not reconcile with the DOD JAG reports. DoD IG fails to discuss POW abuse, and misdirects to the "uncertainty" over torture. Geneva expressly prohibits all abuse. Nuremberg establishes the precedent for enforcing the laws of war. DOJ IG cannot explain this many years after Nuremberg, why the FBI agents were absurdly actively thwarted with "vague" guidance; but there was no FBI investigation of things they were concerned about.

US Attorney Failure To Enforce Nuremberg Precedents

The US attorney did not adequately involve themselves on US prosecutions of war crimes. Inexplicably, we're asked to believe the opposite in re Wecht: The US Attorney was involved.

The President cannot explain why the US Attorneys refused to act on Geneva; but did involve themselves in Wecht.

The President cannot explain why the US Attorney that had "no role" in blocking the FBI, did have a role in guiding the FBI in re Wecht.

Discredited DOJ IG Report

We question the DOJ IG conclusions. The DoD IG report on FBI conduct is misdirection from the failure to enforce Geneva. Nothing in DOJ blocked the FBI. DoJ IG admits it did not review all DoD guidance related to investigations. The report does not adequately discuss which guidance FBI agents relied to not investigate.

Classified DoD Emails Establish Link Between President and Illegal Information Warfare

DoD emails establish a US government connection with information security, data mining, digital forensics, and security management. The classified versions of the DOD redacted emails show the key information to establish a link between the President, contractors, and NSA on domestic information warfare.

The President will have to explain why he is using government connected contractors to wage information warfare against US targets; and when Congress was told about these exercises to fine tune information warfare capabilities against China and Russia.

Information Warfare: Illegal US Civilian Intimidation

The DOD emails show there were specific, by-name US military personnel in Iraq conducting information warfare against American civilians, US government personnel, and American media.

The US government data shows the President ordered FBI to contact the Wecht Jury.

Digital Security Nexus Linked with FISA and Geneva Violations

The DOD emails show the nexus of information warfare, digital data forensics, and security management was a secondary role of the Public affairs personnel linked with US military advisers. DoD public affairs office and security contractors have an offensive and defensive information warfare role.

The US Attorney was connected with the data forensics conference in 2007 discussing digital data forensics. By name White House and DOJ officials are linked with these discussion, substantially mirroring the classified versions of the DoD emails.

Wecht judge cancels 2nd date for trial
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, PA - 19 May 2008
... into the pool for future jury duty. Wecht, 77, of Squirrel Hill is accused of using his public office while Allegheny County coroner for personal gain. ...

Appeals court: Hold up on that Wecht retrial Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, PA - 9 May 2008 By The Tribune-Review An appeals court agreed to delay the start of Dr. Cyril H. Wecht's second federal public corruption trial. Jury selection was set to ... Wecht Retrial Delayed By Federal Appeals Court WPXI.com Court puts indefinite stay on Wecht trial Pittsburgh Post Gazette Appeals court stays pathologist Wecht's retrial Philadelphia Inquirer Anchorage Daily News (subscription) - The Oregonian - OregonLive.com all 18 news articles »

Oral arguments scheduled in Cyril Wecht appeal
Pittsburgh Post Gazette, PA - 15 May 2008
The 11-person jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, however, and US District Judge Arthur J. Schwab declared a mistrial on April 8. Dr. Wecht's ...

See also:

President Left Calling Card in Wecht Jury Home Visits: Mary Buchanan's FBI Problem

From TPM Muckraker

The US Attorney in re the Wecht Case knew or should have known the FBI had a credibility problem.

The government would ask that we believe Buchanan supposedly knew something about the FBI, enough to supposedly order them to do something.

FBI agents "interviewed" Wecht Jury Members at their home, prompting Congressman Conyers to seek information from the Attorney General. AG Mukasey has not responded.

What Buchanan failed to mention in re the FBI home visits of Wecht Jury members was the small problem with Special Agent Bradley W. Orsini. Orsini at one time was a steller, sterling FBI agent, highly trained, weapon ceritified. With enough talent to be the FBI director, potential Senate nominee to lead the Department of Justice.

The Wecht Jury members raised concerns they were contacted at home by the FBI agents.

Buchanan has yet to explain why she alone directed the FBI to do anything given the cloud already hanging over the FBI. It defies reason for the US Attorney, on their own, to ignore the FBI discipline problem and send them to the homes of Wecht Jurors.

Special Agent Bradley W. Orsini discipline problem was so bad, Buchanan claimed the access to Orsini's personal data would be an invasion of privacy. Buchanan's "concern" and stellar legal arguments were not lost on the court, promptly ordering Orsini's records unsealed. And the White House is surprised the prosecutors didn't convince the jury?

This wasn't a minor problem with the FBI. This agent alone had four (4) DOJ OPR investigations into that agent between 1997 and 2000. Who does Buchanan, on her own, supposedly think is the "best" group to contact the Jury members?

We're asked to believe the first agency the US Attorney thought of when getting information from jurors were agents whose peers' idea of a "professional interaction" include:

Singing other agents' names to investigation reports because, "It was a convenience and a shortcut" -- Send these people to take notes about why Jury members were doing things?

Falsifying a chain of custody forms Prohibited sexual relations -- Send these people to jury members homes?

Threats against a subordinate -- Send these people in groups before jury members at home?

Damage government propery with fists by punching holes in office walls -- Send these people to jurors' homes?

Made unprofessional and insensitive remarks -- Send these people to talk to jury members?


Buchanan knew or should have know the above conduct was linked direct to one of the FBI agents involved with the case. It defies reason to suggest she didn't know. Buchanan said of the FBI agent:

The release of his personal information "would constitute an invasion of Agent Orsini's personal privacy".

Buchana's response? Rather than respecting the court order or the privacy of the jury members, she sends the tainted FBI back into the nexus, as if to dare the public: "Watch us." Did she get, 'em?

It defies reason to believe a US Attorney who knew there were problems with the FBI, and who hoped to keep that agents' records sealed, to then inexplicably reverse herself, cast aside caution, send the FBI in, and do the opposite with the juror names that she did with the FBI agent's case file. How many reversals has the President made on the Constitution, Iraq WMD, and "mission accomplished". His head has spun so many times, we need not question whether its still connected.

It defies reason to believe the US Attorney hoping to preserve the privacy of an FBI agent over discipline problems would reverse herself, unleash the FBI, and violate a court order. Buchanan most likely attempted to block the order to interact with the Wetch Jurors, and knew there would be a very bad public relations problem.

We've seen this president ignore discipline problems and DOJ OPR findings before. He blocked the DOJ OPR from reviewing the FBI. This President's idea of a loyal FBI agent is one who lies, abuses people, and misleads the FISA court.

It gets better. Who are the people who abused the NSLs and conducted warrantless searches? That's right, the FBI. The same FBI that were

"infected with deliberate and reckless falseshoolds"

Nobody should be surprised why the DoJ can't give a straight story on the FBI interviews of Wecht Jury members. They've gagged the DOJ OPR that might find the truth. Nobody but the President could be stupid enough to believe anyone could get away with using the same FBI agents -- who violated the Constitution and engaged in multiple disciplinary problems the DOJ OPR documented -- to conduct home visits of jury members.

This is the President's calling card he's leaving with Iraqi civilians. Send in the reckless to abuse people, and find someone else to blame. War crimes in Iraq. Jury tampering in America.

Same peas. Same stench of criminal activity. Only the President could issue such a stupid, reckless order to ignore common sense and DOJ OPR findings. His answer to bad news in the wake of his reckless decisions: Send in the people you would think would be the least helpful.

This is the same story as with the Iraq WMD, Iraq, and Guantanamo. This President creates a mess, and people are too shocked to believe this President might be involved. Prisoner abuse, torture, war crimes, illegal invasion: We've got those DOJ OLC memos.

But the President directing the FBI to conduct non-permitted jury contact. Child's play. There are holes in the wall to prove it. The chairs were destroyed. There were no WMD's under the President's carpet in his office.

"Never happened."

NETWAR file: George Stein's cyberwarfare

Chapter 6

Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar

George J. Stein

---

[Table of Contents][ Chapter 7]

---

In Arthur Waley’s Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, Chuang Tzu tells the story of a simple gardener who was shown a new tool that promised to change gardening. He laughed scornfully and replied,

I used to be told by my teacher that where there are cunning contrivances there will be cunning performances, and where there are cunning performances there will be cunning hearts. He in whose breast a cunning heart lies has blurred the pristine purity of his nature; he who has blurred the pristine purity of his nature has troubled the quiet of his soul, and with one who has troubled the quiet of his soul Tao will not dwell. It is not that I do not know about this invention; but that I should be ashamed to use it.¹

Strategy, according to the Department of Defense, is the “art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.”² For most people, it is obvious that the political and economic aspects of the national security policies of the United States are developed by the national political authorities (e.g., the president and the Congress) and, in dealing with foreign states or groups, executed by the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, etc.

Policies for developing and using military forces are formulated by the national political authorities and conveyed to the armed forces through the secretary of defense. Few, however, have paid much attention to just how and by whom psychological forces are to be developed to support national policies. More importantly: What are psychological forces? By whom will these forces be used? With what authority? To what ends?

New tools and technologies for communication have created the potential for a new form of psychological warfare to a degree imagined only in science fiction. This new form of warfare is known as “information warfare.” When we come to know the Tao of such an invention as information warfare, we may find that we are ashamed to use it.

The futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler have argued that the United States armed forces need to develop a “systematic, capstone concept of military knowledge strategy.” Such a strategy would include clear doctrine, and a policy for how the armed forces will acquire, process, distribute, and project knowledge.³

Quoting from the “Memorandum of Policy No. 30” (6 May 1993) of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Tofflers argue that the US military is expanding the concept of Information War to include psychological operations aimed at influencing the “emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior” of others. Such an expansion would mirror the evolution of traditional warfare toward Information War. It would also mirror the progrssive steps of generating wealth from agriculture and natural resources in much earlier times, to the nineteenth and early twentieth century emphasis on industrial production, to the present emphasis on generating information products as a major new source of income.

As “first wave” wars were fought for land and “second wave” wars were fought for control over productive capacity, the emerging “third wave” wars will be fought for control of knowledge. And, since “combat form” in any society follows the “wealth-creation form” of that society, wars of the future will be increasingly “information wars.”

Currently, there is neither formal military doctrine nor official definitions of information warfare. Despite the computer jargon involved, the idea of information warfare has not only captured the attention of military analysts—it also poses important policy questions.⁴

Despite the lack of authoritative definition, “netwar” and “cyberwar” are emerging as key concepts in discussing Information War. Originally these ideas seem to have come from the science fiction community. Consider, for example, the thought-provoking future war suggested in Bruce Sterling’s Islands in the Net.⁵ More recently, the concepts of netwar and cyberwar have been developed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their important essay, “Cyberwar is Coming!”⁶ Their suggestions provide a thoughtful starting point for exploring the issues that surround “information war.”

Netwar, according to them, is a societal-level ideational conflict waged in part through internetted modes of communication. That is, netwar is most likely to be a nation-against-nation strategic level conflict. Netwar is about ideas and epistemology— what is known and how it is known. It would be waged largely through a society’s communication systems.

The target of netwar is the human mind. One could argue that certain aspects of the cold war had the characteristics of a dress rehearsal for future netwar. Consider, for example, Radio Free Europe, the Cominform, Agence France Presse, or the US Information Agency. But netwar may involve more than traditional state-to-state conflict. The emerging of nonstate political actors such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, as well as survivalist militias or Islamic revivalists, all with easy access to worldwide computer networks for the exchange of information or the coordination of political pressure on a national or global basis, suggests that the governments may not be the only parties waging Information War.

At first glance, netwar may appear to be a new word for old-fashioned propaganda. It would be comforting to believe that the “tried and true” methods (and limitations) of propaganda still worked. And the Gulf War showed that both Saddam Hussein and the Alliance were still of the old school. The war contained many elements of classic propaganda: accusations of bombed baby-milk factories and stolen baby incubators, inflated rhetoric and inflated stakes of the conflict; the future of the new world order and “the mother of battles” for the future of Islam; and the classic “us or them” polarization in which “neutrality” or unenthusiastic support was decried.

One element of traditional propaganda was absent, however, while Saddam Hussein became the “new Hitler” and President Bush was the “Great Satan,” there was little demonization or dehumanization of the opponent. Perhaps the multicultural nature of the American-led alliance precluded turning the Iraqi army into something subhuman. Indeed, there may have been a spark of netwar genius in treating the Islamic Iraqi soldiers as “brave men put into an impossible situation by a stupid leader.” Under such conditions, there is no dishonor in surrendering. And there may have been a glimpse of future netwar—it is rumored that Baghdad Radio signed on one morning with “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

Traditional propaganda was usually targeted to influence a mass audience. Contemporary technologies have the potential to customize propaganda. Anyone who has received individually targeted advertising from a company specializing in “niche” marketing has had a momentary shudder upon realizing that some private companies seem to know everything about our tastes and buying habits.

Contemporary databases and multiple channels for information transmission have created the opportunity for custom-tailored netwar attacks. Computer bulletin boards, cellular telephones, video cameras tied to fax machines—all provide entry points and dissemination networks for customized assault.

A major new factor in information war results directly from the worldwide infosphere of television and broadcast news. Many people have begun to realize that governmental decisions are becoming increasingly reactive to a “fictive” universe created by, CNN and its various international competitors. This media-created universe is dubbed “fictive” rather than “fictional” because while what is shown may be “true,” it is just not the whole, relevant, or contextual truth. And, of course, the close etymological relationship between “fictive” and “fictional” suggests how easy it is to manipulate the message.

Nevertheless, this fictive universe becomes the politically relevant universe in societies in which the government or its military is supposed to “do something.” Somalia gets in the news and the United States gets into Somalia despite the reality of equally disastrous starvation, disorder, and rapine right next door in Sudan. There were no reporters with “skylink” in Sudan because the government of Sudan issued no visas. The potential for governments, parties in a civil war such as Bosnia, rebels in Chiapis, or even nonstate interests to manipulate the multimedia, multisource fictive universe to “wage societal-level ideational conflicts” should be obvious.⁷

Fictive or fictional operational environments, then, whether mass-targeted or niche-targeted, can be generated, transmitted, distributed, or broadcast by governments or all sorts of players through increasingly diversified networks. The niche-manipulation potential available to states or private interests with access to the universe of internetted communications such as the networks over which business, commercial, or banking information are transmitted to suggest that “Mexico” is about to devalue the peso could easily provoke financial chaos. The target state would not know what had happened until too late.⁸

Direct satellite broadcast to selected cable systems, analogous to central control of pay-per-view programs, again offers the potential for people in one province or region of a targeted state to discover that the maximum leader has decided to purge their clansmen from the army. To put it in the jargon of the infowarriors, info-niche attack in an increasingly multisource fictive universe offers unlimited potential for societal-level netwar.

Pictures Worth A Thousand Tanks

When the new, but already well-understood, simulation technologies of the Tekwar and MTV generation are added to the arsenal of netwar, a genuinely revolutionary transformation of propaganda and warfare becomes possible. Traditional propaganda might have attempted to discredit an adversary’s news media showing, for example, that as the official casualty figures were demonstrably false, all “news” from the government was equally false. The credibility of the opponent was the target and the strategic intention was to separate the government from the people.

Today, the mastery of the techniques of combining live actors with computer-generated video graphics can easily create a “virtual” news conference, summit meeting, or perhaps even a battle which exists in “effects” though not in fact. Stored video images can be recombined endlessly to produce any effect chosen. Now, perhaps, “pictures” will be worth a thousand tanks.

Of course, “truth will out” eventually, but by the time the people of the targeted nation discover that the nationwide broadcast of the conversation between the maximum leader and “Jimmy Carter” in which all loyal citizens were told to cease fighting and return to their homes was created in Hollywood or Langley, the war may be over. Netwar is beginning to enter the zone of illusion.

This is not science fiction; these are the capabilities of existing or rapidly emerging technologies. Here’s how it might work: through hitching a ride on an unsuspecting commercial satellite, a “fictive simulation” is broadcast. Simultaneously, various “info-niches” in the target state are accessed via “the net.” These info-niche targets, and the information they receive, are tailored to the strategic needs of the moment: some receive reinforcement for the fictive simulation; other receive the “real” truth; others receive merely slight variations. What is happening here?

This kind of manipulation elevates the strategic potential of infopropaganda to new heights. This is not traditional propaganda in which the target is discredited as a source of reliable information. Rather, the very possibility of “truth” is being replaced with “virtual reality”; that is, “information” which produces effects independent of its physical reality. What is being attacked in a strategic level netwar are not only the emotions, or motives, or beliefs of the target population, but the very power of objective reasoning: this threatens the very possibility of state control.

Let us return to the previous scenario to play out its effects. The fictive simulation of the maximum leader’s call to stop fighting would, of course, be followed immediately by a “real” broadcast in which state “Voice and Vision” exposes the netwar attack as propaganda invented by “culture destroyers in Hollywood.” “Jimmy Carter” is denounced as a hoax. But the damage has already been done: it is all but impossible for the television viewers of the targeted state to tell which broadcast is true and which fiction, at least in a timely manner. In a society under assault across its entire infosphere, it will become increasingly difficult for members of that society to verify internally the truth or accuracy of anything. Objective reasoning is threatened.

At the strategic level, the ability to “observe” is flooded by contradictory information and data; more importantly, the ability to “orient” is weakened by the assault on the very possibility of objective reasoning; “decisions” respond increasingly to a fictive or virtual universe and, of course, governmental or military “actions” become increasingly chaotic as there is no “rational” relationship of means to ends.

It would seem, then, that strategic-level netwar or information war brings us within sight of that elusive “acme of skill” wherein the enemy is subdued without killing by attacking his ability to form a coherent strategy.⁹

Reality, however, may be far more complex than the infowarriors yet imagine, and victory not so neat. The idea of “societal-level ideational conflict” may need to be considered with all the care given to the conduct of nuclear war, as the “end state” of netwar may not be bloodless surrender but total disruption of the targeted society. Victory may be too costly as the cost may be truth itself.

What Is Truth?

Any discussion of information warfare, netwar, cyberwar, or even perception manipulation as a component of command and control warfare by the armed forces of the United States at the strategic level must occur in the context of the moral nature of communication in a pluralistic, secular, democratic society. That is, the question must be raised whether using the techniques of information warfare at the strategic level is compatible with American purposes and principles.

Likewise, the question must be raised whether the armed forces of the United States have either the moral or legal authority and, more importantly, the practical ability to develop and deploy the techniques of information warfare at the strategic level in a prudent and practical manner. There are good reasons to be skeptical.

According to the philosopher Eric Voegelin, the moral basis of communication in any society can be discussed in terms of its substantive, pragmatic, and intoxicant functions.¹⁰ The substantive purpose of communication is the building or developing of the individual human personality; it is simultaneously the process by which a substantive, real-world community of “like-minded” persons is created, developed and sustained. Simply, it is the glue which binds a society together.

At the most trivial level, the moral purpose of substantive communication can be seen in contemporary American efforts to remove sexist or racist language from accepted use. At a more serious level, the debates in American society about prayer in the public schools illustrate a recognition of the substantive and formative nature of communication in society, as “private religious views,” in the view of many, must not corrupt the public school formation of character for life in pluralistic, modern America.

Finally, any real world society rests on the substantive communication and understanding among its members. Again, in Voegelin’s terms, society is no mere external structure of relationships; it is a “cosmion,” a universe of meaning “illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization.”¹¹

The efforts of several nations such as China, Iran, or Saudi Arabia to insulate their societies from the effects of the global communications network illustrate their awareness that their cultures and societies may depend on a shared, substantive universe of discourse distinctive to their societies.

Even within the West, the French believe the continued existence of France as a distinctive society organized for action in history may require state intervention in the substantive content of communication within society.¹² That France seeks to limit the percentage of foreign broadcast material and American films in Europe illustrates the seriousness with which they consider the substantive nature of communication.

Voegelin’s second construct, identifying the pragmatic function of communication in society, is reasonably straightforward. Pragmatic communication is defined by its goal and consists of the universe of techniques designed to influence other persons to behave in ways the communicator wishes. Only behavior matters. Most political and commercial communication is merely pragmatic. It is usually indifferent to the substantive moral content of the communication and intends to mold perception, and consequently behavior, to the purposes of the communicator. This pragmatic use of communication as an attempt at perception manipulation is, of course, the central essence of information war. Its use by the government and the armed forces is, consequently, the real issue.

Finally, the

intoxicant function of communication in American society is equally straightforward.

The addiction of a considerable part of the citizenry to talk shows, soap operas, romance novels, professional sports broadcasts, high-profile legal trials and other well-known forms of distraction and diversion is well catered to by the entertainment industry.

For Voegelin then, civil communication or public discourse in contemporary American society is dominated almost entirely by the intoxicant and pragmatic modes. More importantly, the absence of substantive communication in public life is defended by much of the secular and liberal political class in the name of freedom, pluralism, and multiculturalism.

Pluralistic America is supposed to be a society in which the formation of character or opinion is left, through the use of various means of communication, to private initiative. Government attempts at “communication” in an information war, especially if prosecuted by the armed forces, would raise serious questions in a pluralistic, multicultural society.

The official military view of strategy, recall, is the “art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.”¹³

Strategy is the means to achieve an end, with military strategy serving political or policy purposes. A slightly different view of strategy, however, may highlight a problem of Information War. If strategy were seen as “a plan of action designed to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment,” the limitations of infowar thinking are obvious.¹⁴

Sound military strategy requires influencing the adversary decision maker in some way that is not only advantageous but reasonably predictable. The goal is control, not chaos. A national security strategy of information war or netwar at the strategic level—that is, “societal-level ideational conflict waged in part through internetted modes of communication”—and an operational-level cyberwar or command-and-control warfare campaign to decapitate the enemy’s command structure from its body of troops may or may not be “advantageous” but, more importantly, is unlikely to produce effects that are reasonably predictable.

Conflict is about a determinate something, not an indeterminate anything. If the goal of influencing the adversary’s ability to “observe” by flooding him with corrupted or contradictory information and data; disrupting his ability to “orient” by the elimination of the possibility of objective reasoning; and forcing his “decisions” to respond to a fictive or virtual universe, “actions” will, of course, be produced, but they may well be actions which are chaotic, random, nonlinear and inherently unpredictable by our side as there is no “rational” relationship of means to ends.

In the context of military operational-level cyberwar or command-and-control warfare, this appeals to the infowarrior an attractive military strategy. The inherently unpredictable nature of combat, the notorious “fog and friction” of real battle, will be amplified for the enemy in a successful cyberwar.

A successful cyber-strategy depends on the ability of the local military commander to deploy his power assets, especially his combat forces, not merely to dominate the enemy decision cycle (which, after all, has just been rendered chaotic), but to exploit opportunities as they evolve unpredictably from the disoriented, decapitated, or irrational enemy actions. Whether, then, command-and-control warfare can “shape” the battlefield or will merely generate chaos remains to be seen.

Cyber-strategy is the control of the evolution of the battlefield or theater power distribution to impose the allied commander’s “order” on the enemy’s “chaos.” As Sun-Tzu observed, “Those who are able to adapt to changes in the enemy and achieve victory are considered supreme.”¹⁵ The threat exists, however, that the destruction of enemy rationality may collapse “battle” into mere “fighting” with no outcome but surrender or death. Merely defeating hostile fielded military forces may be insufficient.

Sun-Tzu also observed that “when battles gain victories and attacks achieve occupations, yet these successes are not followed up, it is disastrous. This is known as `persisting turmoil’.”¹⁶ Whether the recent Gulf War was a strategic victory or mere “battle” remains for historians to judge. Operational-level cyberwar may, then, be that very “acme of skill” which reduces the enemy will without killing. On the other hand, it may also be the abolition of strategy as it attacks the very rationality the enemy requires to decide for war termination.

Strategic Implications

The tools, techniques and strategy for cyberwar will be developed and, during wartime, should be employed. In many ways, cyberwar is more demanding than netwar. But the resources, organization, and training needed for cyberwar will be provided once its war-winning, and casualty-reducing, potential is grasped by the national political leadership. Such a development would certainly be prudent. On the other hand, many of the tools and techniques of battlefield cyberwar can be applied to netwar or strategic-level information war. This application may not be prudent, however, as there are serious reasons to doubt the ability of the United States to prosecute information war successfully.

One reason is that the United States is an open society; it may be too vulnerable to engage in netwar with an adversary prepared to “fight back.” ¹⁷ The communications infrastructure, the “information highway,” is “wide open” in our society. American society may be terribly vulnerable to a strategic netwar attack; getting us to believe fictive claims appears to be what commercial and political advertising are all about, and they seem to be effective. Also we may find physical control and security to be impossible. The domestic computer, communication, and information networks essential for the daily functioning of American society are very vulnerable to penetration and manipulation—even destruction—by determined hackers.¹⁸ In the future, these may not be amateurs but well-paid “network ninjas” inserting the latest French, Iranian, or Chinese virus into Compuserve or other parts of the internet.¹⁹

A strategic information warfare attack on America’s communication systems, including our military communication systems, air traffic control system, financial net, fuel pipeline pumping software,and computer-based clock/timing systems, could result in societal paralysis.

Currently, for example, over 14,000 Internet databases are being used by over 30 million people in over 90 nations. Over 1,600 software pirates are prowling the Internet, some in the employ of hostile commercial or intelligence services. The recent “spy flap” between France and the United States over alleged US attempts to gather data on French Telecom may be indicative of the future.²⁰

Infosphere dominance—controlling the world of information exchange—may be as complex and elusive as “escalation dominance” appeared to be in nuclear strategy.²¹ It will certainly be expensive: the US business community and the US armed forces are required to devote ever more resources and attention to computer, communications, and database security. The resources and skills required for battlefield cyberwar are not insignificant, but the resources and skills required to wage Information War at the national strategic level would be massive.

The second reason to doubt US ability to prosecute an information war is that the political and legal issues surrounding info war are murky. What of congressional oversight? Would one “declare” information war in response, say, to an Iranian-originated computer virus assault on the FBI’s central terrorist database? And what about preparing for it? How should we develop and implement a national capability for netwar?

While theoretically a requirement to develop or implement a national information war strategy, analogous to the nuclear-era single integrated operations plan, could be communicated from the president to the executive branch agencies, it is unclear whether there would be adequate congressional oversight. Which committees of the House or Senate would have control and oversight of policies attendant to information war, and which would have the power to inquire into the judgment of a local ambassador or military commander who wished to use the tools of cyberwar for a perception manipulation in peacetime that would shape the potential wartime environment?²²

The US armed forces only execute the national military strategy—they do not control it. However, they are developing, quite appropriately, the tools and techniques to execute the national military strategy for operational-level cyberwar. They are simultaneously, albeit unintentionally, developing the tools and capabilities to execute a national strategic information war strategy. The former is their job under the Constitution; the latter may not be. Congressional oversight in the development of a national strategic-level information war capability is even more essential than oversight of the intelligence community.

The third reason to doubt US capabilities in prosecuting an effective information war is that such a “societal-level ideational conflict waged in part through internetted modes of communication” may simply be beyond the competence of the executive agencies that would have to determine the substantive content to be communicated. Pluralism is a great strength of American society, but perhaps a drawback in waging information war.

While diversity may make the formation and execution of domestic and even foreign policy more complex, the lack of a moral center or public philosophy in American society could render the political leadership incapable of building a consensus on strategic-level information war policies. And, since there is no single view of what is morally acceptable, but simply a host of contending views, a national security strategy of information war could be developed by the national security decision makers that lacked a moral consensus.

The technological wizardry does not change the humanity of the target. Unless the goal of information war is merely to unhinge people from their ability to reason objectively, and thereby create an interesting problem for post-conflict reconstruction, any strategic-level netwar or information war would seem to require the ability to communicate a replacement for the discredited content of the target society.

If, say, an information war were to be mounted against China to disrupt its drive for regional hegemony, the goal would be to “withdraw the Mandate of Heaven” from the rulers and “influence” the Chinese leaders and people to adopt the policies or behavior we find appropriate.

Put in terms of such a concrete policy goal, the philosophically problematic nature of information war becomes outrageously obvious. Does anyone really believe that the US national executive agencies, including the armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, know the substantive discourse of China sufficiently well to withdraw the Mandate of Heaven?

The final reason, then, can be stated in the form of a question: does anyone really believe that anyone in the US government has the philosophical sophistication to project an alternative discourse to replace the emotions, motives, reasoning, and behavior grounded in the Chinese reality we propose to influence? Would our “fictive” creation really have “virtual” effects. We might be able to use the armed forces or the CIA to destroy China’s objective reasoning through a “successful” information war. Indeed, we might be able to loose anarchy in a society, but that is not usually the political goal of war.

Second Thoughts

The techniques being developed by the armed forces for a more narrowly constrained operational-level cyberwar was demonstrated in the Gulf War. Translated to the strategic level, however, netwar or information war is not a prudent national security or military strategy for the simple reason that neither the armed forces nor any other instruments of national power have the ability to exploit an adversary’s society in a way that promises either advantageous or predictable results.

Societal-level ideational conflict” must be considered with all the care given to the conduct of nuclear war, as the “end state” of a netwar may be total disruption of the targeted society. Conflict resolution, including ending wars this side of blasting people into unconditional surrender, assumes and requires some rationality—even if that rationality is the mere coordination of ends with means.

Moral reasoning and substantive communication may not be required; minimal reasoning and pragmatic communication are required. However, a successful all-out strategic-level information war may, however, have destroyed the enemy’s ability to know anything with certainty and, thereby, his capacity for minimal reasoning or pragmatic communication.

In some exercises during the cold war “decapitation” of the Soviet military leadership in a hypothetical nuclear exchange was intended to defend the United States by preventing an escalatory or exploitative strike, nuclear or otherwise. Precisely how war termination would have been accomplished without an effective leadership will remain, hopefully, one of the great mysteries. The “decapitation” of the leadership is, however, often proposed as a key goal of an information war. That is, the credibility and legitimacy—even the physical ability to communicate—of the decisionmakers will be compromised or destroyed relative to their own population and in terms of their own worldview. And even if we merely “seize” his communication system electronically and substitute our “reality” into his society, with whom, then, do we negotiate the end of the conflict?

What confidence do we have that a call to surrender, even if communicated to the people by either the enemy leadership or our “net warriors,” would be accepted as “real” and not another “virtual” event? And, depending on the content, intensity, and “totality” of a strategic information war, personalities could be flooded with irrational or unconsciousness factors—the clinical consequence of which is generally acute psychosis. How do we accomplish conflict resolution, war termination, or postconflict reconstruction with a population or leadership whose “objective reasoning” has been compromised?

Just as the mutually destructive effects of nuclear war were disproportionate to the goals of almost any imaginable conflict, so may be the mutually destructive effects of a “total” information war exchange on the publics exposed and subsequent rational communication between the sides. And as the techniques of “cyberstrike” proliferate throughout the world, enabling small powers, nonstate actors, or even terrorist hackers to do massive damage to the United States, “mutually assured cyberdestruction” may result in a kind of infowar deterrence. As Sun-Tzu advised, “without advantage, do not act; without gain, do not utilize; without crises, do not battle.”²³

Information War, then, may be the central national security issue of the twenty-first century. Therefore, the United States must develop a coherent national-level policy on the military and strategic use of new information warfare technologies. To facilitate this objective, the US armed forces are developing, under the rubric of command and control warfare, the technologies and systems that will provide the capability for “cyberwar.”

It may be possible to control and exploit information so as to purposely generate stochastic chaos, though there are some doubts.²⁴ Many of the same technologies and systems can be used to develop a national-level capability for strategic “netwar.” Here, however, there are genuine doubts. As Voegelin feared, it may not be possible to control and exploit information and information technologies to impose “a form on the remnants of societies no longer capable of self-organization” because their substantive universe of meaning has been destroyed or corrupted.²⁵

Few info-warriors would claim the ability to “reorient” the former Soviet Union into a liberal society, or to influence the far more ancient barbarism in that heart of darkness, Rwanda. Perhaps strategic-level information war is, indeed, like nuclear war: the capability is required for deterrence; its employment, the folly of mutually assured destruction. But if the United States is to develop the capacity for information war, in the sure and certain knowledge that the technologies have already “proliferated” to both state and nonstate potential rivals, a realistic national consensus must be built.

It is useless to pretend that the proliferation of these technologies will not provide capabilities that can do serious harm. It is useless to pretend that military-based command and control warfare capabilities will not be developed, and it is useless to pretend that cyberwar technologies could not be turned to netwar applications. It is almost universally agreed that these capabilities are essential on the contemporary battlefield.

It is essential, then, that the president and the Congress give serious and sustained attention to cyberwar, netwar, and information war. ž

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Notes

1. Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (New York: Doubleday, 1939), 70.

2. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 350.

3. Alvin & Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), 141.

4. The vocabulary of information warfare includes information war, information-based war, command and control warfare, information operations, C³I, electronic warfare, and, in Russian usage, sixth-generation warfare.

5. Bruce Sterling, Islands in the Net (New York: Ace, 1988).

6. John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!,” Comparative Strategy 12: no.2 (April–June, 1993), 141–165.

7. Historians may record that Ecuador’s posting of government communiqués on the internet at the beginning of the recent “war” with Peru may have been the first “netstrike.” “A Borderless Dispute,” Newsweek, 20 February 1995, 20.

8. H.D. Arnold et. al, “Targeting Financial Systems as Centers of Gravity: `Low Intensity’ to `No Intensity Conflict,’ Defense Analysis, 10, no.2, August, 1994, 181–208.

9. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., Sun-tzu: The Art of War (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1994), 177.

10. Eric Voegelin, “Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy,” Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), 53–68.

11. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), 27.

12. John Andrews, “Culture Wars,” Wired, May 1995, 130–138.

13. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1967), 14.

14. Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, trans., J.H. Huang. (New York: Quill, 1993), 68.

15. Ibid, 109.

16. Peter Black, “Soft Kill: fighting infrastructure wars in the 21st century,” Wired, July/August 1993, 49–50.

17. Paul Wallich, “A Rogue’s Routing,” Scientific American 272, no. 5, (May 1995), 31.

18. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (New York: Thunders Mountain Press, 1994).

19. Jean Pichot-Duclos, “Toward a French `Economic Intelligence’ Model,” Defense Nationale, Jan 1994, 73–85, in Federal Broadcast Information Service - West Europe, 25 January 1994, 26–31.

20. John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance,” Strategic Review, Summer, 1994, 24–30.

21. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 30, Command and Control Warfare, 8 March 1993.

22. Sun Tzu, 110.

23. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1994).

24. Eric Voegelin, “The Ecumenic Age,” in Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 117.

25. Brig V.K. Nair, War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991).

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

MORE on DOD emails - and the ties to Wecht jury tampering

Dod Emails Strengthen Bridge Between President and Illegal FBI Wecht Jury Tampering

By testing - August 7, 2008, 7:37PM

TPM reports DoJ has expanded its document review to the White House. The information below showcases key DoD military analyst-related emails which link the President with files and emails coordinating unusual DoJ actions.

One file included an important file linked with the President. Another email shows how this was sent to the Department of Justice to support information warfare, and how the DoJ Staff scheduling was involved.

The DoJ Staff is connected with this file. The file assisted DoD personnel in scheduling. There is a problem. The DoJ would have us believe the Department of Defense, but "not" the US Attorney, can easily schedule using Department of Justice Staff. The US Attorney's office attempted to distract attention the DOJ Staff involvement with the Wecht Jury tampering, asking us to believe the FBI agents -- "not" the DOJ Staff -- were involved with scheduling Wecht Jury interviews. In reality, the FBI agents were doing something else.

This information below shows how an important file, linked with the President, was widely disseminated. However, when responding to Congressional questions about the Wecht prosecution, the DOJ IG and DOJ Staff ignored these emails, which were of interest to the House Judiciary Committee. They were examining selective prosecutions to understand the President's abuse of power.

The discussion below shows how to find new emails connected with the White House, DoJ-WH liaison, DoJ Staff, and DoD which likely have specific files and communications linking the President to information warfare involving the FBI, and the President's Wecht Jury tampering
decisions.

The DoD emails reveal an inconsistency between what the DoJ staff schedulers were doing for the Department of Justice; and what the US Attorney would have us believe the FBI was doing.

This shows how to find this file, which file to ask for, how to trace this file within the DoJ-DoD-

White House information systems, and which information to review at those connected computers. This also discusses the source documents for these files; and discusses the timing problems for the President and US Attorney on the FBI's Wecht Jury tampering.

This shows why the DoD emails and their timing are relevant to the key court orders establishing original restrictions on the access to, use, and copying of the Wecht Jury names.

We've already shown the reasons why the US Attorney and FBI could not have derived the list: They would have had to know things in advance before taking needed action. The new information establishes a link between specific evidence and the timing of those original orders.

The timing of the emails is important. The email content should be consistent with the original district court orders. The emails still not reviewed show the government was not following the
court orders; but impermissibly transferring information the court expressly said counsel could not transfer, store, or retain for other purposes.

We know the government is lying about how the FBI agents got the names of the jurors. The question is when did the government in the emails understand it wax expressly retaining data and using it to do things the court did not intend.

Details

The DoD email shows the DoD personnel involved in domestic information warfare through the military analyst program were part of a government information planning cell. The email shows there was a key file sent between the DoD, DoJ, and White House:

«contacts for wh outreach. doc»

This file is like Trojan horse. Other Department of Defense email exchanges show 5808-5809 that DoD personnel, with just a call, were able to rely on DoJ Staff to support scheduling for the DoD military analysts.

However, the US Attorneys office misled the public when it said it relied not on the US Attorneys office or DOJ staff, but the FBI to schedule visits with Wecht Jury members.

The US Attorneys office has downplayed the relationship with the DoJ Staff who regularly provide scheduling assistance, and cannot explain why an outside agency in DoD would know to work with the DOJ Staff for scheduling assistance. They know this evidence relates to a removal decision.

Inexplicably, the US Attorneys office would ask the public and Congress to believe the staff support was too limited within the US Attorney's office, but rather than discuss these requirements with their superiors, the US Attorney would go through their superiors -- at DOJ Staff, the ones they were supposedly bypassing -- to the FBI HQ, then down to the FBI agents to get permission to use the FBI agents for scheduling.

This defies reason, and complicates and does not streamline the scheduling function. It does not match what the DoD was doing when using DoJ Staff to schedule the military analysts. It should not be easier for non-DoD personnel to use DoJ Staff than the US Attorney.

The DoD email establishes a link between the President, the DoD and DoJ staff, and the subsequent scheduling decisions within DOJ related to information warfare.

The key information on the email isn't the content of the email or the words, but the attached file:

«contacts for wh outreach. doc»

This file is like a Trojan horse, attached to the DoD-DoJ emails, and traceable throughout the US government. The file is connected with the White House, the President, and the Presidents domestic military analyst program.

Once DoD personnel coordinated on this email, and sent the contents to the Department of Justice, this establishes the link between the President and the Department of Justice on the information warfare. This is new information. The DoD emails were once thought to be narrowly related to a DoD program and DoD military analysts.

The President's domestic information warfare program is linked to the DoJ staff scheduling. The US Attorney's office, attempting to hide this link to to the White House, attempted to pretend that it alone asked the FBI to schedule appointments with the Wecht Jury. Higher HQ Staff, including DOJ, DOJ-WH liaison, and the White House staff must have been involved with, among other things:

(a) Email and discussions related to the Wecht prosecutions;
(b) FBI tampering with the Wecht Jury members, and planning gather information from the Wecht Jury;
(c) Decisions to ignore the original court orders related to prospective juror names and home addresses
(d) US Attorney deception to the media and public on the results of the jury deliberations, reasons for using the FBI, and how the FBI obtained the names of the prospective jurors
(e) When the US prosecutor originally obtained and impermissibly retained copies of the prospective juror lists before the original court orders were modified
(f) Files shared between teh White House, DoD, and DoD on information warfare planning, the Presidential interest, and
(g) Executive orders to hide this activity.

The file attached to the email would have been sent into the DOJ-WH liaison office. The date of the email is important relative to the key court orders the District Court issued, which established original restrictions on who had access to the prospective Wecht Jury names.

The Department of Justice Inspector General and the now-Chief of Staff to the Attorney General were part of incomplete email reviews. It's an open question whether the DOJ IG engaged in malfeasance. Inexplicably, despite the DOJ IG and Congressional liaison office being independent, both the DOJ IG and DOJ Staff did not review the same Wecht-related emails connected with the DOJ-White House liaison office.

There is one possible explanation: The President signed a secret executive order suppressing all investigations into any information related to these emails. Perhaps he is concerned the DOJ IG inquiry would stumble upon something else. This secret executive order, if it exists, might explain why there has not been a timely, coherent explanation on why the DoJ Staff and IG failed to completely review all White House and DoJ Staff emails for Wecht-related prosecution decisions.

The District Court issued a set of instructions which established the ground rules on how the Wecht Jury names would be handled. These orders established rules that were in place before and just after this DoD email, with the White House file, was sent in early-late Autumn 2006. Until there were new orders, US Attorney DoJ Staff would have had to comply with these orders. However, the US Attorney's office issued inconsistent statements to explain what the FBI agents were doing, how they obtained the list of jurors.

Regardless what did or didn't change with subsequent district orders, the emails and attached files sent -- just before after the original district orders -- should have complied with those restrictions. The key will be to look for emails sent containing any language or content which violates the district orders which placed specific restrictions on how the names of the prospective Wecht jurors' names were to be handled.

You will want to look for computers, work products, and other electronic information connected to these DoJ-DoD personnel that include files of prospective jurors.

The District Court said in the initial orders that there could be no copying of the names; and that the list of prospective jurors had to be signed for and were only available to counsel. The court expressly stated the prospective juror lists were property of the court. These restrictions, regardless whether they were or were not changed later, should match what the DOJ Staff were doing and sending through the emails when this DoD-DoJ-connected email and White House file was sent.

As you examine the email accounts connected with the DoD email and other computers containing this White House military analyst outreach file, your job will be to examine those computers, work stations, and other databases which contain the Wecht-related prospective juror lists, but are contained in emails before changes to these initial orders.

It appears the DoD email -- showing the DoJ connection and the ease with with DoD was able to use the DoJ schedulers -- means the US Attorney's office was lying about the use of the FBI agents for scheduling. Conversely, this means if the US Attorneys office in re Wecht did have a manning problem, the first step should have been the same DoJ scheduling people at the DOJ level which the DoD personnel, outside DoJ, were using.

It defies reason for the DoD to coordinate with DOJ Staff to schedule; but for the US Attorney to use the FBI agents. This would require the US Attorney to go through the DoJ Staff -- that they were supposedly ignoring -- to clear with FBI HQ the use of FBI agents in a different division of DOJ, outside both the US Attorneys office and EOUSA.

Either way, the information related to the Wecht prosecution, connected with the White House -- which the now AG Chief of Staff and DOJ IG have implicitly admitted they did not completely review -- should exist within the DOJ Staff area, and is likely indirectly connected with the White House outreach file, and the DOD-connected personnel. A detailed discussion shows why the White House-DoJ liaison office is most likely computer the White House outreach and the Wecht related information was read, generated, modified, updated, and possibly removed. The answers to these file transfers exist within JCON and the

The DoD email with this White House file of military analysts, is connected to the DOJ Staff, White House-DOJ liaison, and the DOJ Staff schedulers who organized the military analysts. All the DoJ computers linked with this White House file, and were not searched with either the DOJ IG or the internal DOJ review, must be examined.

This is what the investigators need to accomplish:

1. Find Connections With this Email

Examine the IP numbers, email accounts, and the identifying information for all DoJ-DoD computers, files, records, and scheduling actions linked with this email.

2. Identify Computers With this .doc File [ contacts for wh outreach. doc ]

Identify all White House, RNC, DoJ, and DoD computers, email accounts, and files which include this key file.

3. Look for Wecht-Related Communications

Use that list -- of computers containing or accessing, update the the White House file -- to then compare that information with:

(a) the computers the DOJ IG ignored during their review of Goodling; and

(b) the computers DOJ Staff did not review when they incompletely searched for the Wecht files.

Some Key Dates:

A. Email With Trojan Horses

The date the emails were sent ( July-Sept 2006);

B. Restrictions Ignored, Confirmed By DoJ Emails

The date the District Court issued the orders establishing clear restrictions on the prospective juror lists; and

C. Personnel Assignment

The dates that personnel were assigned to the EOUSA and DoJ-WH liaison 14 of 146.

The timeline on 14 of 146 of the DOJ IG report will assist you in examining the key dates of the personnel assigned. Compare those dates with the dates the disttrict court issued its orders. You will se that the district court imposed certain restraints on the names, home addresses, and other identifying information. Those orders should have been fully met until they were changed. Those later changes are, for now, outside the planning window.

The key databases to review are these listed: JCON and the Enterprise Vault.

Within all the searches within DoD, DoJ, White House, and GOP accounts, look for the following initials: MBB, well known to the WH-DoJ liaisons.

Also, look in the SIPR Net, as disclosed and discussed within the DoD emails at 7390 Personnel supporting the domestic information warfare were using SIPR Net to exchange planning information. It is not clear to what extent DoJ-connected personnel, counsel, and contractors were using a similar classified system to exchange information related to Wecht and selective prosecution planning.