Showing posts with label subprime crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subprime crisis. Show all posts

February 20, 2009

The lastest from Dr. Michael Hudson

Finance Capitalism Hits a Wall

The Oligarchs’ Escape Plan – at the Treasury’s Expense

By Prof. Michael Hudson

The financial “wealth creation” game is over. Economies emerged from World War II relatively free of debt, but the 60-year global run-up has run its course. Finance capitalism is in a state of collapse, and marginal palliatives cannot revive it. The U.S. economy cannot “inflate its way out of debt,” because this would collapse the dollar and end its dreams of global empire by forcing foreign countries to go their own way. There is too little manufacturing to make the economy more “competitive,” given its high housing costs, transportation, debt and tax overhead. A quarter to a third of U.S. real estate has fallen into Negative Equity, so no banks will lend to them. The economy has hit a debt wall and is falling into Negative Equity, where it may remain for as far as the eye can see until there is a debt write-down.

February 18, 2009 "Global Research" -- - Mr. Obama’s “recovery” plan based on infrastructure spending will make real estate fortunes for well-situated properties along the new public transport routes, but there is no sign of cities levying a windfall property tax to save their finances. Their mayors would rather keep the cities broke than to tax real estate and finance. The aim is to re-inflate property markets to enable owners to pay the banks, not to help the public sector break even. So state and local pension plans will remain underfunded while more corporate pension plans go broke.

One would think that politicians would be willing to do the math and realize that debts that can’t be paid, won’t be. But the debts are being kept on the books, continuing to extract interest to pay the creditors that have made the bad loans. The resulting debt deflation threatens to keep the economy in depression until a radical shift in policy occurs – a shift to save the “real” economy, not just the financial sector and the wealthiest 10% of American families.

There is no sign that Mr. Obama’s economic advisors, Treasury officials and heads of the relevant Congressional committees recognize the need for a write-down. After all, they have been placed in their positions precisely because they do not understand that debt leveraging is a form of economic overhead, not real “wealth creation.” But their tunnel vision is what makes them “reliable” to Wall Street, which doesn’t like surprises. And the entire character of today’s financial crisis continues to be labeled “surprising” and “unexpected” by the press as each new surprisingly pessimistic statistic hits the news. It’s safe to be surprised; suspicious to have expected bad news and being a “premature doomsayer.” One must have faith in the system above all. And the system was the Greenspan Bubble. That is why “Ayn Rand Alan” was put in charge in the first place, after all.

So the government tries to recover the happy Bubble Economy years by getting debt growing again, hoping to re-inflate real estate and stock market prices. That was, after all, the Golden Age of finance capital’s world of using debt leverage to bid up the book-price of fictitious capital assets. Everyone loved it as long as it lasted. Voters thought they had a chance to become millionaires, and approved happily. And at least it made Wall Street richer than ever before – while almost doubling the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 1% of America’s families. For Washington policy makers, they are synonymous with “the economy” – at least the economy for which national economic policy is being formulated these days.

The Obama-Geithner plan to restart the Bubble Economy’s debt growth so as to inflate asset prices by enough to pay off the debt overhang out of new “capital gains” cannot possibly work. But that is the only trick these ponies know. We have entered an era of asset-price deflation, not inflation. Economic data charts throughout the world have hit a wall and every trend has been plunging vertically downward since last autumn. U.S. consumer prices experienced their fastest plunge since the Great Depression of the 1930s, along with consumer “confidence,” international shipping, real estate and stock market prices, oil and the exchange rate for British sterling. The global economy is falling into depression, and cannot recover until debts are written down.

Instead of doing this, the government is doing just the opposite. It is proposing to take bad debts onto the public-sector balance sheet, printing new Treasury bonds give the banks – bonds whose interest charges will have to be paid by taxing labor and industry.

The oligarchy’s plans for a bailout (at least of its own financial position)

In periods of looming collapse, wealthy elites protect their funds like rats fleeing a sinking ship. In times past they bought gold when currencies started to weaken. (Patriotism never has been a characteristic of cosmopolitan finance capital.) Since the 1950s the International Monetary Fund has made loans to support Third World exchange rates long enough to subsidize capital flight. In the United States over the past half-year, bankers and Wall Street investors have tapped the Treasury and Federal Reserve to support prices of their bad loans and financial gambles, buying out or guaranteeing $12 trillion of these junk debts. Protection for the U.S. financial elite thus takes the form of domestic public debt, not foreign currency.

It is all in vain as far as the real economy is concerned. When the Treasury gives banks newly printed government bonds in “cash for trash” swaps, it leaves today’s unpayably high private-sector debt in place. All that happens is that this debt is now owed to (or guaranteed by) the government, which will have to impose taxes to pay the interest charges.

The new twist is a variant on the IMF “stabilization” plans that lend money to central banks to support their currencies – for long enough to enable local oligarchs and foreign investors to move their savings and investments offshore at a good exchange rate. The currency then is permitted to collapse, enabling currency speculators to rake in enough gains to empty out the central bank’s reserves. Speculators view these central bank holdings as a target to be raided – the larger the better. The IMF will lend a central bank, say, $10 billion to “support the currency.” Domestic holders will flee the currency at a high exchange rate. Then, when the loan proceeds are depleted, the currency plunges. Wages are squeezed in the usual IMF austerity program, and the economy is forced to earn enough foreign exchange to pay back the IMF.

As a condition for getting this kind of IMF “support,” governments are told to run a budget surplus, cut back social spending, lower wages and raise taxes on labor so as to squeeze out enough exports to repay the IMF loans. But inasmuch as this kind “stabilization plan” cripples their domestic economy, they are obliged to sell off public infrastructure at distress prices – to foreign buyers who themselves borrow the money. The effect is to make such countries even more dependent on less “neoliberalized” economies.

Latvia is a poster child for this kind of disaster. Its recent agreement with Europe is a case in point. To help the Swedish banks withdraw their funds from the sinking ship, EU support is conditional on Latvia’s government agreeing to cut salaries in the private sector – and not to raise property taxes (currently almost zero).

The problem is that Latvia, like other post-Soviet economies, has scant domestic output to export. Industry throughout the former Soviet Union was torn up and scrapped in the 1990s. (Welcome to victorious finance capitalism, Western-style.) What they had was real estate and public infrastructure free of debt – and hence, available to be pledged as collateral for loans to finance their imports. Ever since its independence from Russia in 1991, Latvia has paid for its imported consumer goods and other purchases by borrowing mortgage credit in foreign currency from Scandinavian and other banks. The effect has been one of the world’s biggest property bubbles – in an economy with no means of breaking even except by loading down its real estate with more and more debt. In practice the loans took the form of mortgage borrowing from foreign banks to finance a real estate bubble – and their import dependency on foreign suppliers.

So instead of helping it and other post-Soviet nations develop self-reliant economies, the West has viewed them as economic oysters to be broken up to indebt them in order to extract interest charges and capital gains, leaving them empty shells. This policy crested on January 26, 2009, when Joaquin Almunia of the European Commission wrote a letter to Latvia’s Prime Minister spelling out the terms on which Europe will bail out the Swedish and other foreign banks operating in Latvia – at Latvia’s own expense:

Extended assistance is to be used to avoid a balance of payments crisis, which requires … restoring confidence in the banking sector [now entirely foreign owned], and bolstering the foreign reserves of the Bank of Latvia. This implies financing … outstanding government debt repayments (domestic and external). And if the banking sector were to experience adverse events, part of the assistance would be used for targeted capital infusions or appropriate short-term liquidity support. However, financial assistance is not meant to be used to originate new loans to businesses and households. …

… it is important not to raise ungrounded expectations among the general public and the social partners, and, equally, to counter misunderstandings that may arise in this respect. Worryingly, we have witnessed some recent evidence in Latvian public debate of calls for part of the financial assistance to be used inter alia for promoting export industries or to stimulate the economy through increased spending at large. It is important actively to stem these misperceptions.

Riots broke out last week, and protesters stormed the Latvian Treasury. Hardly surprising! There is no attempt to help Latvia develop the export capacity to cover its imports. After the domestic kleptocrats, foreign banks and investors have removed their funds from the economy, the Latvian lat will be permitted to depreciate. Foreign buyers then can come in and pick up local assets on the cheap once again.

The practice of European banks riding the crest of the post-Soviet real estate bubble is backfiring to wreck the European economies that have engaged in this predatory lending to neighboring economies as well. As one reporter has summarized:


In Poland 60 percent of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary, the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly – by lenders and borrowers – it matches America’s sub-prime debacle. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not. Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe, especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks.1

This was the West’s alternative to Stalinism. It did not help these countries emulate how Britain and America got rich by protectionist policies and publicly nurtured industrialization and infrastructure spending. Rather, the financial rape and industrial dismantling of the former Soviet economies was the most recent exercise in Western colonialism. At least U.S. investors were smart enough to stand clear and merely ride the stock market run-up before jumping ship.

But now, the government’s plan to “save” the economy is to “save the banks,” along similar lines to the West trying to save its banks from their adventure in the post-Soviet economies. This is the basic neoliberal economic plan, after all. The U.S. economy is about to be “post-Sovietized.”

The U.S. giveaway to banks, masquerading as “help for troubled homeowners”

The Obama bank bailout is arranged much like an IMF loan to support the exchange rate of foreign currency, but with the Treasury supporting financial asset prices for U.S. banks and other financial institutions. Instead of banks and oligarchs abandoning the dollar, the aim is to enable them to dump their bad mortgages and CDOs and get domestic Treasury bonds. Private-sector debt will be moved onto the U.S. Government balance sheet, where “taxpayers” will bear losses – mainly labor not Wall Street, inasmuch as the financial sector has been freed of income-tax liability by the “small print” in last autumn’s Paulson-Bush bailout package. But at least the U.S. Government is handling the situation entirely in domestic dollars.

As in Third World austerity programs, the effect of keeping the debts in place at the “real” economy’s expense will be to shrink the domestic U.S. market – while providing opportunities for hedge funds to pick up depreciated assets cheaply as the federal government, states and cities sell them off. This is called letting the banks “earn their way out of debt.” It’s strangling the “real” economy, because not a dollar of the government’s response has been devoted to reducing the overall debt volume.

Take the much-vaunted $50 billion program designed to renegotiate mortgages downward for “troubled homeowners.” Upon closer examination it turns out that the real beneficiaries are the giant leading banks such as Citibank and Bank of America that have made the bad loans. The Treasury will take on the bad debt that banks are stuck with, and will permit mortgagees to renegotiate their monthly payment down to 38% of their income. But rather than the banks taking the loss as they should do for over-lending, the Treasury itself will make up the difference – and pay it to the banks so that they will be able to get what they hoped to get. The hapless mortgage-burdened family stuck in their negative-equity home turns out to be merely a passive vehicle for the Treasury to pass debt relief on to the commercial banks.

Few news stories have made this clear, but the Financial Times spelled the details buried in small print.2 It added that the Treasury has not yet decided whether to write down the debt principal for the estimated 15 million families with negative equity (and perhaps 30 million by this time next year as property prices continue to plunge). No doubt a similar deal will be made: For every $100,000 of write-down in debt owed by over-mortgaged homeowners, the bank will receive $100,000 from the Treasury. Government debt will rise by $100,000, and the process will continue until the Treasury has transferred $50,000,000 to the banks that made the reckless loans.

There is enough for just 500 of these renegotiations of $100,000 each. Hardly enough to make much of a dent, but the principle has been put in place for many further bailouts. It will take almost an infinity of them, as long as the Treasury tries to support the fiction that “the miracle of compound interest” can be sustained for long. The danger is the economy may be dead by the time saner economic understanding penetrates the public consciousness. In the mean time, bad private-sector debt will be shifted onto the government’s balance sheet. Interest and amortization currently owed to the banks will be replaced by obligations to the U.S. Treasury. Taxes will be levied to make up the bad debts with which the government is stuck. The “real” economy will pay Wall Street – and will be paying for decades!

Calling the $12 trillion giveaway to bankers a “subprime crisis” makes it appear that bleeding-heart liberals got Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into trouble by insisting that these public-private institutions make irresponsible loans to the poor. The party line is, “Blame the victim.” But we know this is false. The bulk of bad loans are concentrated in the largest banks. It was Countrywide and other banksters that led the irresponsible lending and brought heavy-handed pressure on Fannie Mae. Most of the nation’s smaller, local banks didn’t make such reckless loans. The big mortgage shops didn’t care about loan quality, because they were run by salesmen. The Treasury is paying off the gamblers and billionaires by supporting the value of bank loans, investments and derivative gambles, leaving the Treasury in debt.

U.S./post-Soviet Convergence?

It may be time to look once again at what Larry Summers and his Rubinomics gang did in Russia in the mid-1990s and to Third World countries during his tenure as World Bank economist to see what kind of future is being planned for the U.S. economy over the next few years. Throughout the Soviet Union the neoliberal model established “equilibrium” in a way that involved demographic collapse: shortening life spans, lower birth rates, alcoholism and drug abuse, psychological depression, suicides, bad health, unemployment and homelessness for the elderly (the neoliberal mode of Social Security reform).

Back in the 1970s, people speculated whether the US and Soviet economies were converging. Throughout the 20th century, of course, everyone expected government regulation, infrastructure investment and planning to increase. It looked like the spread of democratically elected governments would go hand in hand with people voting in their own economic interest to raise living standards, thereby closing the inequality gap.

This is not the kind of convergence that has occurred since 1991. Government power is being dismantled, living standards have stagnated and wealth is concentrating at the top of the economic pyramid. Economic planning and resource allocation has passed into the hands of Wall Street, whose alternative to Hayek’s “road to serfdom” is debt peonage for the economy at large. There does need to be a strong state, to be sure, to keep the financial and real estate rentier power in place. But the West’s alternative to the old Soviet bureaucracy is a financial planning. In place of a political overhead, we have a financial and real estate overhead.

Stalinist Russia and Maoist China achieved high technology without land-rent, monopoly rent and interest overhead. This purging of rentier income was the historical task of classical political economy, and it became that of socialism. The aim was to create a Clean Slate financially, bringing prices in line with technologically necessary costs of production. The aim was to provide everyone with the fruits of their labor rather than letting banks and landlords siphon off the economic surplus.

Ideas of economic efficiency and “wealth creation” today are an utterly different kind of liberalism and “free markets.” Commercial banks lend money not to increase production but to inflate asset prices. Some 70% of bank loans are mortgage loans for real estate, and most of the rest is for corporate takeovers and raids, to finance stock buy-backs or simply to pay dividends. Asset-price inflation obliges people to go deeper into debt than ever before to obtain access to housing, education and medical care. The economy is being “financialized,” not industrialized. This has been the plan as much for the post-Soviet states as for North America, Western Europe and the Third World.

But we are far from having reached the end of the line. Celebrations that our present financialized economy represents the “end of history” are laughingly premature. Today’s policies look more like a dead end. But that does not mean that, like the Roman Empire, they won’t lead us down toward a new Dark Age. That’s what tends to happen when oligarchies do the planning.

Is America a Failed Economy?

It may be time to ask whether neoliberal pro-rentier economics has turned America and the West into a Failed Economy. Is there really no alternative? Have the neoliberals made the shift of planning from governments to the financial oligarchy irreversible?

Let’s first dispose of the “foundation myth” of the idea still guiding the United States and Europe. Free-market economists pretend that prices can be brought into line most efficiently with technologically necessary costs of production under capitalism, and indeed, under finance capitalism. The banks and stock market are supposed to allocate resources most efficiency. That at least is the dream of self-regulating markets. But today it looks like only a myth, public relations patter talk to get a generation of increasingly indebted voters not to act in their own self-interest.

Industrial capitalism always has been a hybrid, a symbiosis with its feudal legacy of absentee property ownership, oligarchic finance and public debts rather than the government acting as net creditor. The essence of feudalism was extractive, not productive. That is why it created industrial capitalism as State Policy in the first place – if only to increase its war-making powers. But the question must now be raised as to whether only socialism can complete the historical task that classical political economy set out for itself – the ideal that futurists in the 19th and 20th centuries believed that an unpurified capitalism might still be able bring about without shedding its legacy of commercial banking indebting property and carving infrastructure out of the public domain.

Today it is easier to see that the Western economies cannot go on the way they have been. They have reached the point where the debts exceed the ability to pay. Instead of recognizing this fact and scaling debts back into line with the ability to pay, the Obama-Geithner plan is to bail out the big banks and hedge funds, keeping the volume of debt in place and indeed, growing once again through the “magic of compound interest.” The result can only be an increasingly extractive economy, until households, real estate and industrial companies, states and cities, and the national government itself is driven into debt peonage.

The alternative is a century and a half old, and emerged out of the ideals of the classical economic doctrines of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and the last great classical economist, Marx. Their common denominator was to view rent and interest are extractive, not productive. Classical political economy and its successor Progressive Era socialism sought to nationalize the land (or at least to fully tax its rent as the fiscal base). Governments were to create their own credit, not leave this function to wealthy elites via a bank monopoly on credit creation. So today’s neoliberalism paints a false picture of what the classical economists envisioned as free markets. They were markets free of economic rent and interest (and taxes to support an aristocracy or oligarchy). Socialism was to free economies from these overhead charges. Today’s Obama-Geithner rescue plan is just the reverse.


NOTES

1 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “If Eastern Europe falls, world is next,” The Telegraph, February 14, 2009.

2 Krishna Guha, “US closes in on subsidy plan to stop foreclosures,” Financial Times, February 13, 2009.

© Copyright Michael Hudson, Global Research, 2009


July 11, 2008

BANKING DOSSIER: Feds shut down IndyMac!!

IndyMac Bank Closes, Transfers Operations To Federal Gov't

Depositors Withdrew $1.3 Billion In 11-Day Span

POSTED: 3:23 pm PDT July 11, 2008
UPDATED: 6:19 pm PDT July 11, 2008
The IndyMac Bank, headquartered in Pasadena, will be closed and operations will be transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision announced Friday.

Video: Feds Shut Down IndyMac
FDIC: IndyMac Closure | FDIC: IndyMac Closure Q&A | July 1 Video: IndyMac Assures Customers | Gov't Considers Freddie, Fannie Bailout

IndyMac had $32.01 billion in assets as of March 31.A successor institution, IndyMac Federal Bank (FSB), will open for business on Monday and be run by the FDIC, according to the OTS, which is part of the U.S Treasury Department.According to the OTS, IndyMac Bank is unlikely to be able to meet continued depositors' demands in the normal course of business and is therefore in "an unsafe and unsound condition."

ndyMac is the largest OTS-regulated thrift ever to fail and, according to FDIC data, the second largest financial institution to close in U.S. history.

What Will Happen To My Money?

Depositors will have no access to banking services online and by telephone this weekend, but will continue to have access to their funds this weekend by ATM, through other debit card transactions and by writing checks, according to the OTS.Online banking and phone banking services will be available again on Monday.Depositors' accounts at IndyMac are insured by the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund up to the statutory limits. Customer questions regarding the institution, including questions about federal deposit insurance coverage, should be directed to the FDIC at 1-866-806-5919.The hotline's recorded message explains the bank's status. The message states that Internet banking has been suspended for the weekend, but online banking should be available Monday.
This toll-free number will be available during the following hours:
  • Friday, July 11 -- 3 to 9 p.m., PDT
  • Saturday, July 12 -- 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., PDT
  • Sunday, July 13 -- 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., PDT
  • Thereafter: 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., PDT

How Could This Happen?

The immediate cause of the closing was a deposit run that began and continued after the public release of a June 26 letter to the OTS and the FDIC from Sen. Charles Schumer of New York, according to the OTS. The letter expressed concerns about IndyMac's viability. In the following 11 business days, depositors withdrew more than $1.3 billion from their accounts."This institution failed today due to a liquidity crisis," said OTS Director John Reich. "Although this institution was already in distress, I am troubled by any interference in the regulatory process."According to the OTS, IndyMac had been in a precarious financial situation that was caused, in part, by an unprecedented stress in the residential real estate market, combined with the evaporation of the non-agency secondary mortgage market in August 2007."The OTS had significant concerns with the bank's funding strategy, had directed appropriate changes and was finalizing a new set of enforcement actions to address its numerous problems," the OTS said in a statement released Friday.As a result of an OTS examination that began in January 2008, the OTS deemed IndyMac to be in troubled condition.An overwhelming majority of problem institutions are able to successfully modify their operations and business plans, work closely with their regulator and eventually return to a healthy condition. IndyMac had reacted to market conditions and OTS concerns in November 2007 by changing its operations and business plan to build a foundation for recovery, according to the OTS."IndyMac was actively seeking to arrange a significant capital infusion or find a buyer. The recent release of the senator's letter undermined the public confidence essential for a financial institution and took away the time IndyMac needed to pursue a recovery," the OTS said in Friday's statement.With no viable alternatives and insufficient liquidity, IndyMac was placed into receivership.The OTS has appointed the FDIC as conservator of the newly chartered successor institution and will transfer most of the assets and liabilities of IndyMac to the new thrift.IndyMac specialized in making and selling so-called Alt-A mortgage loans, a category of loans to consumers more credit worthy than subprime borrowers but typically without the complete documentation of income or assets necessary to receive a prime-rate loan.

OTS Fact Sheet: IndyMac Bank

Institution Profile
  • Total assets, as of March 31, 2008: $32.01 billion
  • Branches: 33 retail branch offices, all located in Southern California
  • Employees: On July 7, 2008, announced staff reduction from 7,200 to 3,400
Recent Deposit Flows
  • Deposit inflows in the three days prior to June 27, 2008: $31.2 million
  • Deposit outflows beginning June 27, 2008: $730.2 million through July 7 and $1.3 billion through July 10
Other Financial Details
  • Brokered deposits as of June 30, 2008: $5.97 billion or 32 percent of total deposits
  • Federal Home Loan Bank advances as of June 30, 2008: $10.1 billion
  • Loans held (March 2008 10-Q statement): $11.9 billion in single family loans held for investment, including $3.4 billion pay-option ARMs (29 percent) and $4.9 billion interest-only (43 percent)
  • Loan servicing (March 2008 10-Q statement): $184.5 billion in loans serviced for others, including 16 percent pay-option ARMs, 10 percent reverse mortgages and 39 percent fixed-rate mortgages
  • Loan servicing portfolio delinquency rate: 8.26 percent

February 07, 2008

Bankruptcy Fight on Private Student Loans re Sally Mae

Bankruptcy Fight on Private Student Loans Hotlist

Thu Feb 07, 2008 at 05:59:59 AM PST

The U.S. House of Representatives has a chance today to provide much-needed relief to low-income and minority students who have fallen victim to predatory private student loan practices by Sallie Mae and other lenders.

The U.S. House of Representatives has a chance today to provide much-needed relief to low-income and minority students who have fallen victim to predatory private student loan practices by Sallie Mae and other lenders.

House Members will vote on an amendment, sponsored by Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL), that would reverse a 2005 law making it virtually impossible for borrowers who are in financial distress to discharge private student loans in bankruptcy.

Higher Ed Watch has argued in the past for the need for this change. But as we learn more about how Sallie Mae "partnered" with giant publicly-traded, for-profit higher education companies to push high cost private loans, with interest rates and fees exceeding 20 percent, on high-risk borrowers with poor credit, we are even more convinced that Congress has a moral obligation to act.

For most unsecured debt, a borrower who runs into difficulty can file for Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 13 reorganization, so a judge can sort out the appropriate treatment of various loans. But there is a short list of debts that the law subjects to a different status, allowing discharge in only the most extreme circumstances. The government, for example, makes it especially difficult for people to escape child support responsibilities, overdue taxes, and criminal fines.

Federal student loans also can't be discharged. There's at least some justification for providing federal student loans that status since they are backed by taxpayer dollars and come with borrower protections in cases of economic hardship, unemployment, death and disability. But there is no good reason for private student loans to be accorded the harshest bankruptcy status given to criminal fines, child support, and back taxes.

To be clear, we're not advocating allowing borrowers to claim bankruptcy willy nilly in order to avoid student loan repayment. Our view is that private student loans should not be treated any differently than other forms of consumer debt when it comes to bankruptcy. Right now they are, and that's wrong. People who borrow private student loans are trying to better their lives. They should not be treated more harshly than those who rack up credit card debt at the mall.

Shielding private loans from bankruptcy in almost all circumstances means that repayment demands extend essentially forever, leaving even the most destitute borrowers with no way out. And bankruptcy exemption makes private student loan providers less cautious about peddling high cost loans to low-income students who might never to repay them. In other words, it promotes the kind of subprime lending that Sallie Mae was engaged in at some of the most scandal-ridden chains of for-profit colleges. Treating private student loans like other forms of unsecured debt would at least cause lenders to think twice before providing high-interest loans to people who they know will have trouble paying them back.

The Davis amendment takes a responsible approach to helping financially-distressed borrowers. Under the measure, private loans would not become dischargeable until five years after they come due. The five year wait protects lenders from a loan being discharged before a borrower has had an opportunity to reap financial benefits from his or her education.

In addition, after the five years, borrowers wishing to have their private loans erased would still have to meet a strict means test that Congress set up as part of the 2005 law to prevent consumers from abusing bankruptcy laws by trying to escape debt they can afford to repay.

To read more, about lender opposition and the response, please visit www.HigherEdWatch.org


Tags: Bankruptcy, Subprime, Education, Students, Colleges and Universities, Congress (all tags) :: Previous Tag Versions


January 31, 2008

Pandemonium!! The market is SPEAKING!! Alex Wallenwein

January 31, 2008
Pandemonium!
by Alex Wallenwein


Markets in Uproar After Fed Loses All Traction
From Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary:

Pandemonium. noun; Etymology: New Latin, from Greek pan- + daimo-n evil spirit -- more at demon. Date: 1667. 1: the capital of Hell in Milton's "Paradise Lost." 2: the infernal regions: hell. 3: not capitalized : a wild uproar : tumult.

Today, Wednesday January 30, 2008, the last stops to a total collapse of the US financial structure were pulled out. The elevator cable is now cut, with the elevator carriage at the 45th floor of a 50-floor skyscraper. If you believe you can "jump" to avoid getting crushed when the carriage hits the concrete floor below - good luck!

The "puller" of the last stop was none other than "Chopper Bernie" Ben Bernanke.

On January 22, he pulled an unannounced 75 bp emergency cut. Today, he followed suit, trying to give the markets what they were screaming for all along: another whopping 50 bp cut.
It didn't work.

After the announcement, the Dow had a fairly lame bump of about 170 points to the north - but I guess it got too cold up there. By closing time, the Dow ended up 36 points back down south on the day. The reason? Three words:

Bond * insurance * disaster.

Ambac and MBIA (and to an even greater extent Security Capital Assurance, Ltd.) are two bond insurance companies whose credit ratings were infamously downgraded in recent weeks. Moody's cut Ambac's credit rating from AAA to AA. Just today, CNBC reported that further ratings cuts are in the works for these companies as the problems associated with the bond insurance business appear to be "much worse" than previously thought.

A bond insurer's primary line of business is to insure bond issues by municipal and other local governments. The insurer guarantees to the buyers of the bonds that the governmental entity in question will timely make its interest and principal payments. That way, the municipalities get to take advantage of lower borrowing costs (interest) as such guarantees make their bonds more attractive in the open markets.

The reason Ambac, MBIA (and to an even greater extent Security Capital) have suffered these downgrades is that their cash positions became shaky when large portions of their reserves had to be used for payouts on their various policies.

That means their customers - municipalities and other local governments - were defaulting on their scheduled payments to bond investors. The point in time when this started happening strangely but meticulously coincided with the implosion of the subprime lending market and the metastasis of the subslime cancer to other parts of the global body economic: June-July of 2007.
Now, what could make municipal governments unable to make their scheduled interest payments on issued bonds? What is their major source of income?

Property taxes.

When people default on their mortgages en masse, the collection of property taxes naturally becomes just a bit more difficult, wouldn't you agree?

The World Bank has this to say on the subject:
"4.05 Taxes on land and buildings are the most common form of direct revenue for local municipal governments. The ad valorem tax, or the property tax, is usually local government's largest single revenue source. Property tax revenues are normally general purpose revenues contributing to a broad range of municipal services, particularly physical infrastructure such as roads and drainage."

Since we now know that the travails of Ambac and MBIA are much worse than originally thought (and they were already thought to be worse" before), what does that tell us about the real default rate of subslime and other mortgage debt? Could that also be "much worse" than officially reported?

You bet!

Conclusion: We have very likely been lied to about the true extent of the mortgage default crisis. What else is new?

And since that very mortgage debt was leveraged up to about the fifth layer of the earth's stratosphere, if there are that many, or maybe even as far as the outer reaches of our solar system, the problems that arise out of the US subslime morass will soon make Godzilla look like a toy puppet in comparison.

A lot of city governments also listened to the "expert advice" of professional financial analysts and started hedging their liabilities by investing in derivatives of the interest-rate kind. Guess what those hedges were built on? More mortgage-morass from hell!

As the true dimensions of the subslime monster in all of its horrific splendor become vaguely discernible to the naked eye - and vaguely conceivable by the human brain - Godzilla quickly fades into nothingness.

So, not to be left behind, Bernie has begun to empty his magazine on this monster - with mostly negative actual effect. A few more rounds, and the chamber will be completely empty. Unfortunately, he has nothing to fall back on since he must have been pumping out printed money to buy up the long term treasuries everybody else was selling for quite a while - with equally negative effect, as it seems.

In the end, if a 125 bp rate cut by the Fed in an eight-day period doesn't light a serious fire under the stock market, then the "wood" in the furnace must be seriously wet - as in under water.

At the same time, long term rates have bottomed out and are now on the way back up, as can be seen on this chart:
And that means whatever clandestine long term treasuries-buying Bernie has been guilty of as of late appears to be in the process of being hopelessly overwhelmed by precipitous selling from other sources.

And you k now what that means!

When massive amounts of money are exiting long term US treasuries and do not appear to be finding their way to the US stock markets, then where do you think thy are going? When the traditional, much-touted "safe haven" instruments no longer promise to be safe and appear to be a "haven" only for shipwrecks in the making (i.e., guaranteed future losses due to inflation), then only one kind of safe haven remains:

Gold. Silver. Platinum. Precious metals ETFs, and hopefully soon ... PM stocks!

The time for that is not yet, though - but we are getting very, very close. Until recently, I was bearish on gold and other PM stocks because I did not know how close the reversal in treasury prices was. That appears to have already happened, now.

A little more time is needed for confirmation, just to be sure. Monitor subscribers will know when that time comes.

Got gold?

November 24, 2007

'The Financial Tsunami: Sub-Prime Mortgage Debt is but the Tip of the Iceberg"

Part 1: Deutsche Bank’s painful lesson

Even experienced banker friends tell me that they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in credit markets globally, centered in the American asset-backed securities market, and especially in the market for CDO’s—Collateralized Debt Obligations and CMO’s—Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. By now every serious reader has heard the term “It’s a crisis in Sub-Prime US home mortgage debt.” What almost no one I know understands is that the Sub-Prime problem is but the tip of a colossal iceberg that is in a slow meltdown. I offer one recent example to illustrate my point that the “Financial Tsunami” is only beginning.

Deutsche Bank got a hard shock a few days ago when a judge in the state of Ohio in the USA made a ruling that the bank had no legal right to foreclose on 14 homes whose owners had failed to keep current in their monthly mortgage payments. Now this might sound like small beer for Deutsche Bank, one of the world’s largest banks with over €1.1 trillion (Billionen) in assets worldwide. As Hilmar Kopper used to say, “peanuts.” It’s not at all peanuts, however, for the Anglo-Saxon banking world and its European allies like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, HSBC or others. Why?

A US Federal Judge, C.A. Boyko in Federal District Court in Cleveland Ohio ruled to dismiss a claim by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. DB’s US subsidiary was seeking to take possession of 14 homes from Cleveland residents living in them, in order to claim the assets.

Here comes the hair in the soup. The Judge asked DB to show documents proving legal title to the 14 homes. DB could not. All DB attorneys could show was a document showing only an “intent to convey the rights in the mortgages.” They could not produce the actual mortgage, the heart of Western property rights since the Magna Charta of not longer.

Again why could Deutsche Bank not show the 14 mortgages on the 14 homes? Because they live in the exotic new world of “global securitization”, where banks like DB or Citigroup buy tens of thousands of mortgages from small local lending banks, “bundle” them into Jumbo new securities which then are rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poors or Fitch, and sell them as bonds to pension funds or other banks or private investors who naively believed they were buying bonds rated AAA, the highest, and never realized that their “bundle” of say 1,000 different home mortgages, contained maybe 20% or 200 mortgages rated “sub-prime,” i.e. of dubious credit quality.

Indeed the profits being earned in the past seven years by the world’s largest financial players from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley to HSBC, Chase, and yes, Deutsche Bank, were so staggering, few bothered to open the risk models used by the professionals who bundled the mortgages. Certainly not the Big Three rating companies who had a criminal conflict of interest in giving top debt ratings. That changed abruptly last August and since then the major banks have issued one after another report of disastrous “sub-prime” losses.

A new unexpected factor

The Ohio ruling that dismissed DB’s claim to foreclose and take back the 14 homes for non-payment, is far more than bad luck for the bank of Josef Ackermann. It is an earth-shaking precedent for all banks holding what they had thought were collateral in form of real estate property.

How this? Because of the complex structure of asset-backed securities and the widely dispersed ownership of mortgage securities (not actual mortgages but the securities based on same) no one is yet able to identify who precisely holds the physical mortgage document. Oops! A tiny legal detail our Wall Street Rocket Scientist derivatives experts ignored when they were bundling and issuing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CMO’s in the past six or seven years. As of January 2007 some $6.5 trillion of securitized mortgage debt was outstanding in the United States. That’s a lot by any measure!

In the Ohio case Deutsche Bank is acting as “Trustee” for “securitization pools” or groups of disparate investors who may reside anywhere. But the Trustee never got the legal document known as the mortgage. Judge Boyko ordered DB to prove they were the owners of the mortgages or notes and they could not. DB could only argue that the banks had foreclosed on such cases for years without challenge. The Judge then declared that the banks “seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test,” the Judge concluded, “their weak legal arguments compel the court to stop them at the gate.” Deutsche Bank has refused comment.

What next?

As news of this legal precedent spreads across the USA like a California brushfire, hundreds of thousands of struggling homeowners who took the bait in times of historically low interest rates to buy a home with often, no money paid down, and the first 2 years with extremely low interest rate in what are known as “interest only” Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), now face exploding mortgage monthly payments at just the point the US economy is sinking into severe recession. (I regret the plethora of abbreviations used here but it is the fault of Wall Street bankers not this author).

The peak period of the US real estate bubble which began in about 2002 when Alan Greenspan began the most aggressive series of rate cuts in Federal Reserve history was 2005-2006. Greenspan’s intent, as he admitted at the time, was to replace the Dot.com internet stock bubble with a real estate home investment and lending bubble. He argued that was the only way to keep the US economy from deep recession. In retrospect a recession in 2002 would have been far milder and less damaging than what we now face.

Of course, Greenspan has since safely retired, written his memoirs and handed the control (and blame) of the mess over to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can say I would never trust monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.

Now the last phase of every speculative bubble is the one where the animal juices get the most excited. This has been the case with every major speculative bubble since the Holland Tulip speculation of the 1630’s to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the 1929 Wall Street crash. It was true as well with the US 2002-2007 Real Estate bubble. In the last two years of the boom in selling real estate loans, banks were convinced they could resell the mortgage loans to a Wall Street financial house who would bundle it with thousands of good better and worse quality mortgage loans and resell them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation bonds. In the flush of greed, banks became increasingly reckless of the credit worthiness of the prospective home owners. In many cases they did not even bother to check if the person was employed. Who cares? It will be resold and securitized and the risk of mortgage default was historically low.

That was in 2005. The most Sub-prime mortgages written with Adjustable Rate Mortgage contracts were written between 2005-2006, the last and most furious phase of the US bubble. Now a whole new wave of mortgage defaults is about to explode onto the scene beginning January 2008. Between December 2007 and July 1, 2008 more than $690 Billion in mortgages will face an interest rate jump according to the contract terms of the ARMs written two years before. That means market interest rates for those mortgages will explode monthly payments just as recession drives incomes down. Hundreds of thousands of homeowners will be forced to do the last resort of any homeowner: stop monthly mortgage payments.

Here is where the Ohio court decision guarantees that the next phase of the US mortgage crisis will assume Tsunami dimension. If the Ohio Deutsche Bank precedent holds in the appeal to the Supreme Court, millions of homes will be in default but the banks prevented from seizing them as collateral assets to resell. Robert Shiller of Yale, the controversial and often correct author of the book, Irrational Exuberance, predicting the 2001-2 Dot.com stock crash, estimates

US housing prices could fall as much as 50% in some areas given how home prices have diverged relative to rents.

The $690 billion worth of “interest only” ARMs due for interest rate hike between now and July 2008 are by and large not Sub-prime but a little higher quality, but only just. There are a total of $1.4 trillion in “interest only” ARMs according to the US research firm, First American Loan Performance. A recent study calculates that, as these ARMs face staggering higher interest costs in the next 9 months, more than $325 billion of the loans will default leaving 1 million property owners in technical mortgage default. But if banks are unable to reclaim the homes as assets to offset the non-performing mortgages, the US banking system and a chunk of the global banking system faces a financial gridlock that will make events to date truly “peanuts” by comparison. We will discuss the global geo-political implications of this in our next report, The Financial Tsunami: Part 2.

F. William Engdahl is the author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). His most recent book, which has just been released by Global Research is Seeds of Destruction, The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation.

November 21, 2007

Beating that drum about Goldman Sachs just one MORE time

from today's NYT

I notice with interest that the Plunge Protection Team AND its antics of hiding out in Wyoming are never mentioned. Nor are the voices of those who have screamed loud and long against Goldman Sachs ever heard in this article.

The links are good, though.

HANK PAULSON. Put the name in the search box to your left! Or just search for Goldman Sachs in the box. TONS and TONS material on it on this blog!!

Goldman Sachs Rakes In Profit in Credit Crisis

By JENNY ANDERSON and LANDON THOMAS Jr.

For more than three months, as turmoil in the credit market has swept wildly through Wall Street, one mighty investment bank after another has been brought to its knees, leveled by multibillion-dollar blows to their bottom lines.

And then there is Goldman Sachs .

Michelle V. Agins/The New York Times

Lloyd C. Blankfein, chairman of Goldman Sachs, said the firm would not take any write-downs related to the mortgage crisis.

Rarely on Wall Street, where money travels in herds, has one firm gotten it so right when nearly everyone else was getting it so wrong. So far, three banking chief executives have been forced to resign after the debacle, and the pay for nearly all the survivors is expected to be cut deeply.

But for Goldman's chief executive, Lloyd C. Blankfein, this is turning out to be a very good year. He will surely earn more than the $54.3 million he made last year. If he gets a 20 percent raise — in line with the growth of Goldman's compensation pool — he will take home at least $65 million. Some expect his pay, which is directly tied to the firm's performance, to climb as high as $75 million.

Goldman's good fortune cannot be explained by luck alone. Late last year, as the markets roared along, David A. Viniar, Goldman's chief financial officer, called a "mortgage risk" meeting in his meticulous 30th-floor office in Lower Manhattan.

At that point, the holdings of Goldman's mortgage desk were down somewhat, but the notoriously nervous Mr. Viniar was worried about bigger problems. After reviewing the full portfolio with other executives, his message was clear: the bank should reduce its stockpile of mortgages and mortgage-related securities and buy expensive insurance as protection against further losses, a person briefed on the meeting said.

With its mix of swagger and contrary thinking, it was just the kind of bet that has long defined Goldman's hard-nosed, go-it-alone style.

Most of the firm's competitors, meanwhile, with the exception of the more specialized Lehman Brothers, appeared to barrel headlong into the mortgage markets. They kept packaging and trading complex securities for high fees without protecting themselves against the positions they were buying.

Even Goldman, which saw the problems coming, continued to package risky mortgages to sell to investors. Some of those investors took losses on those securities, while Goldman's hedges were profitable.

When the credit markets seized up in late July, Goldman was in the enviable position of having offloaded the toxic products that Merrill Lynch, Citigroup , UBS, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley, among others, had kept buying.

"If you look at their profitability through a period of intense credit and mortgage market turmoil," said Guy Moszkowski, an analyst at Merrill Lynch who covers the investment banks, "you'd have to give them an A-plus."

This contrast in performance has been hard for competitors to swallow. The bank that seems to have a hand in so many deals and products and regions made more money in the boom and, at least so far, has managed to keep making money through the bust.

In turn, Goldman's stock has significantly outperformed its peers. At the end of last week it was up about 13 percent for the year, compared with a drop of almost 14 percent for the XBD, the broker-dealer index that includes the leading Wall Street banks. Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and Citigroup are down almost 40 percent this year.

Goldman's secret sauce, say executives, analysts and historians, is high-octane business acumen, tempered with paranoia and institutionally encouraged — though not always observed — humility.

"There is no mystery, or secret handshake," said Stephen Friedman, a former co-chairman and now a Goldman director. "We did a lot of work to build a culture here in the 1980s, and now people are playing on the balls of their feet. We just have a damn good talent pool."

That pool has allowed Goldman to extend its reach across Wall Street and beyond.

Last week, John A. Thain, a former Goldman co-president, accepted the top position at Merrill Lynch, while a fellow Goldman alumnus, Duncan L. Niederauer, took Mr. Thain's job running the New York Stock Exchange . Another fellow veteran trader, Daniel Och, took his $30 billion hedge fund public.

Meanwhile, two Goldman managing directors helped bring Alex Rodriguez back to the Yankees, a deal that could enhance the value of Goldman's 40 percent stake in the YES cable network — which it is trying to sell — while also pleasing Yankee fans. The symmetry was perfect: like the Yankees, Goldman, more than any other bank on Wall Street, is both hated and revered.

Robert E. Rubin, a former Goldman head, is the new chairman of Citigroup. In Washington, another former chief, Henry M. Paulson Jr., is the Treasury secretary, having been recruited by Joshua B. Bolten, the White House chief of staff and yet another former Goldman executive.

The heads of the Canadian and Italian central banks are Goldman alumni. The World Bank president, Robert B. Zoellick, is another. Jon S. Corzine , once a co-chairman, is the governor of New Jersey. And in academia, Robert S. Kaplan, a former vice chairman, has just been picked as the interim head of Harvard University's $35 billion endowment.

Since going public in 1999, Goldman has been the No. 1 mergers and acquisitions adviser, globally and in the United States, with two exceptions: in 2005 it came in second in the United States rankings, and in 2000 it lost the top spot globally. In both instances, Morgan Stanley took the lead, according to Dealogic.

Goldman, of course, has made its share of mistakes. It took among the most serious write-downs in the third quarter on loans that were made to private equity firms, totaling $1.5 billion. The firm runs one of the largest hedge fund operations in the world, but its flagship funds — funds whose investors include marquee Goldman clients and employees — have had two years of abysmal performance. Clients are expected to redeem billions of dollars of capital at the end 2007.

But Goldman's absence from the mortgage debacle and the strong performance of its other businesses made up for the write-down associated with the loans. The firm reported $2.85 billion in profit in the third quarter, up 79 percent. Mr. Moszkowski estimates that investment and commercial banks in the United States have taken $50 billion in write-downs related to mortgages, with more coming; Mr. Blankfein said at a conference last week that he expected to take none.

Goldman's business is built on taking risks, both for itself and its clients. In recent years, Goldman has established the largest private equity and real estate fund complexes in the world. That has led to natural tensions with private equity clients who sometimes complain, but never publicly, about Goldman's common insistence to team up with them for a piece of the deal.

"Goldman has done the best job of any firm in the U.S. or world competing with their clients but doing business with them," said one client who asked not to be named because he does business with the firm. "They've managed to get their clients to live with it."

Still, this bottom-line approach has turned off some Goldman veterans and clients. They see the firm's desire to advise, finance and invest — a so-called triple play — as antithetical to Goldman's stated No. 1 business principle of putting clients first.

And there is little question that its success in trading, investment banking and servicing hedge funds — many of the traders come right from Goldman — allows the firm a bird's-eye view on trends and capital flows in the market.

Numerous Goldman investment bankers, former and current, voice the view that Mr. Blankfein's approach — using Goldman's investment banking business to develop principal investment opportunities for the firm — creates a brand intended to feed Goldman's profits rather than relationships. But this harking back to the firm's golden days as a pure advisory firm does not find much sympathy at Goldman these days.

"I have little patience for these people who talk of the last days of Camelot," Mr. Friedman said. "Principal investing has been an important and useful business. If you want to be relevant you have to anticipate where the world is going."

Mr. Blankfein, at the conference last week, echoed that sentiment. "While the integration of our investment banking operations with our merchant bank was somewhat controversial at the time, we felt these businesses were mutually reinforcing," he said.

Money soothes a lot of concerns, of course, and Goldman has had plenty to spread around. Through the third quarter, Goldman's $16.9 billion compensation pool — the money it sets aside to pay its employees — was significantly bigger than the entire $11.4 billion market capitalization of Bear Stearns.

Goldman executives and analysts assign much of their success to smart people and a relatively flat hierarchy that encourages executives to challenge one another. As a result, good ideas can get to the top.

But the differentiator that has become clearest recently is the firm's ability to manage its risks, a tricky task for any bank. Checks and balances must be in place to turn off a business spigot even as it is still making a lot of money for a lot of people. In a world where power gravitates to the rainmakers, that means only management can empower the party crashers.

At Goldman, the controller's office — the group responsible for valuing the firm's huge positions — has 1,100 people, including 20 Ph.D.'s. If there is a dispute, the controller is always deemed right unless the trading desk can make a convincing case for an alternate valuation. The bank says risk managers swap jobs with traders and bankers over a career and can be paid the same multimillion-dollar salaries as investment bankers.

"The risk controllers are taken very seriously," Mr. Moszkowski said. "They have a level of authority and power that is, on balance, equivalent to the people running the cash registers. It's not as clear that that happens everywhere."

For all its success on Wall Street, it is Goldman's global reach and political heft that inspire a mix of envy and admiration. In the race for president, Goldman Sachs executives are the top contributors to Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, and the second highest contributor to Hillary Rodham Clinton. Mr. Blankfein has held a fund-raiser for Mrs. Clinton in his apartment and has come out publicly in her favor.

Another member of Goldman's influential diaspora is Philip D. Murphy, a retired executive who is the chief fund-raiser for the Democratic National Committee.

All of which has made Goldman a favorite of conspiracy theorists, columnists and bloggers who see the firm as a Wall Street version of the Trilateral Commission.

One particular obsession is President Bush's working group on the markets, an informal committee led by Mr. Paulson that includes Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve; Christopher Cox, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and Walter Lukken, the acting chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

The group meets about once a quarter — privately, with no minutes taken — to ensure that government agencies are briefed on market conditions and issues. The group is currently examining the extent to which the packaging and distribution of mortgage loans contributed to the crisis. It also recently completed a study recommending that hedge funds not be subject to further regulation; the group's fund committee was led by Eric Mindich, a former Goldman trader who now runs a successful hedge fund.

There is no evidence that the conduct of the group is anything but above board. But to some, the group's existence adds more color to the view that Goldman is indeed everywhere — much as J. P. Morgan was in the early years of the 20th century.

"Goldman Sachs has as much influence now that the old J. P. Morgan had between 1895 and 1930," said Charles R. Geisst, a Wall Street historian at Manhattan College. "But, like Morgan, they could be victimized by their own success."

Mr. Blankfein of Goldman seems aware of all this. When asked at a conference how he hoped to take advantage of his competitors' weakened position, he said Goldman was focused on making fewer mistakes. But he wryly observed that the firm would surely take it on the chin at some point, too.

"Everybody," he said, "gets their turn."

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/business/19goldman.html?_r=1&oref=slogin


November 19, 2007

September 14, 2007


THE IHT tells it like it really is, except they do not see the HUGE crash to come ...

Dollar's retreat raises fear of collapse

FRANKFURT: Finance ministers and central bankers have long fretted that at some point, the rest of the world would lose its willingness to finance the United States' proclivity to consume far more than it produces - and that a potentially disastrous free-fall in the dollar's value would result.

But for longer than most economists would have been willing to predict a decade ago, the world has been a willing partner in American excess - until a new and home-grown financial crisis this summer rattled confidence in the country, the world's largest economy.

On Thursday, the dollar briefly fell to another low against the euro of $1.3927, as a slow decline that has been under way for months picked up steam this past week.

"This is all pointing to a greatly increased risk of a fast unwinding of the U.S. current account deficit and a serious decline of the dollar," said Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund and an expert on exchange rates. "We could finally see the big kahuna hit."


*snip* more here.
"And foreigners are being asked to provide those dollars at a time when the subprime turmoil is threatening to spill over into the broader economy."

* * *

"This is all pointing to a greatly increased risk of a fast unwinding of the U.S. current account deficit and a serious decline of the dollar," said Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund and an expert on exchange rates. "We could finally see the big kahuna hit."

* * *
"The data has coincided with profit warnings from major U.S. retailers like Wal-Mart Stores and Home Depot, suggesting that consumer spending, the backbone of the American economy for years, was ebbing. This step would logically follow the rapidly cooling housing market, since Americans have spent heavily with money borrowed against rising home values."

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